We extend Jin and Myers’s (2006) model to derive the relation between stock price crash risk and operating leverage (i.e., the fraction of fixed costs in total costs). The model predicts that (1) firms’ operating leverage decreases as stock price crash risk increases and (2) the negative effect of crash risk on operating leverage is more pronounced when firms are closer to the crash threshold or when managers face higher costs of stock price crashes. We empirically test the model predictions using a large sample of manufacturing firms in the US and find consistent results. Further analysis shows that higher levels of crash risk lead to a less sticky cost behavior. In addition, crash risk–driven operating deleveraging effectively reduces stock return volatility and enhances operating performance in subsequent years. Collectively, our findings reveal that crash-prone firms adopt a more flexible cost structure to delay stock price crashes and mitigate adverse outcomes.

Asian initial public offerings (IPOs) require investors to pay subscription funds up-front upon submission of applications, and these funds are locked-up for 1–3 weeks without interest. Hence, the IPO process entails an explicit financing cost (opportunity cost) whether investors borrow funds or use their own funds to apply for IPO shares. The IPO subscription costs are not trivial, especially in a high interest rate environment or when an IPO is highly oversubscribed. These costs should be considered in any comparison of IPO returns across countries.

This paper develops a comprehensive framework to address uncertainty about the correct factor model. Asset pricing inferences draw on a composite model that integrates over competing factor models weighted by posterior probabilities. Evidence shows that unconditional models record near‐zero probabilities, while postearnings announcement drift, quality‐minus‐junk, and intermediary capital are potent factors in conditional asset pricing. Out‐of‐sample, the integrated model performs well, tilting away from subsequently underperforming factors. Model uncertainty makes equities appear considerably riskier, while model disagreement about expected returns spikes during crash episodes. Disagreement spans all return components involving mispricing, factor loadings, and risk premia.

Many believe that compensation, misaligned from shareholders’ value due to managerial entrenchment, caused financial firms to take risks before the financial crisis of 2008. We argue that, even in a classical principal‐agent setting without entrenchment and with exogenous firm risk, riskier firms may offer higher total pay as compensation for the extra risk in equity stakes borne by risk‐averse managers. Using long lags of stock price risk to capture exogenous firm risk, we confirm our conjecture and show that riskier firms are also more productive and more likely to be held by institutional investors, who are most able to influence compensation.

In‐house human capital tax investment is a significant input to a firm's tax decisions. Yet, due to the lack of data on corporate in‐house tax departments, there is little empirical evidence on how tax departments are associated with tax planning and compliance outcomes. We expect the size of tax departments to be positively associated with the effectiveness of tax planning and compliance. Using hand‐collected data on the number of corporate tax employees in S&P 1500 firms over the 2009–2014 period, we find that firms with larger tax departments are associated with lower and less volatile cash effective tax rates. Furthermore, using tax employees' specialization, we identify tax departments' relative focus on planning or compliance and document a trade‐off between tax avoidance and tax risk. Specifically, tax departments with more of a tax planning focus have incrementally greater tax avoidance but higher tax risk, whereas tax departments with more of a tax compliance focus have incrementally lower tax risk but higher tax rates. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by looking inside the “black box” of corporate tax departments and shedding light on the importance of human capital tax investment for tax outcomes.

We examine how short sellers affect long‐run management forecasts using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short‐selling constraints on a group of randomly selected firms (referred to as pilot firms). We find that compared to other firms, the pilot firms issue more long‐run good news forecasts but do not change the frequency of long‐run bad news forecasts. The increase in good news forecasts is greater when the pilot firms have higher‐quality forecasts, greater uncertainty about firm value, or higher manager equity incentives. Overall, these results and the results of additional analyses indicate that the reduction in short‐selling constraints and the increase in short‐selling threat induce managers to enhance disclosures through more long‐run good news forecasts to discourage short sellers.

Trust is often posited to substitute for management control in interfirm transactions. However, this raises questions of how trust arises in new relationships, and whether trust that is not based on prior experience transacting together is sufficient to persuade managers to forgo investments in management controls. We use an experiment to test whether two features of the early stage of an interfirm relationship influence a buyer's initial trust in a supplier and have consequences for subsequent investments in management controls and in the collaboration. These two features are the autonomy of the buyer's manager to choose a supplier (i.e., delegation of decision‐making authority) and the supplier's willingness to share information with the buyer. We find that the buyer manager's initial trust in the supplier is associated positively with both the autonomy to choose the supplier and the supplier's willingness to share information. Information content and supplier characteristics are held constant, so these results are novel and distinct from prior studies of the antecedents of trust. We find that higher initial trust is associated with reduced expenditures for management controls and increased investments in the collaboration. Thus, we conclude that delegation of decision‐making authority and supplier information‐sharing behavior in the early stages of a relationship influence the formation of initial trust, which has real consequences for investments in management control and in the collaboration.

This paper shows that robust inference under weak identification is important to the evaluation of many influential macro asset pricing models, including (time‐varying) rare‐disaster risk models and long‐run risk models. Building on recent developments in the conditional inference literature, we provide a novel conditional specification test by simulating the critical value conditional on a sufficient statistic. This sufficient statistic can be intuitively interpreted as a measure capturing the macroeconomic information decoupled from the underlying content of asset pricing theories. Macro‐finance decoupling is an effective way to improve the power of the specification test when asset pricing theories are difficult to refute because of a severe imbalance in the information content about the key model parameters between macroeconomic moment restrictions and asset pricing cross‐equation restrictions. We apply the proposed conditional specification test to the evaluation of a time‐varying rare‐disaster risk model and the construction of robust model uncertainty sets.