Knowledge that Transforms

Both private information production by market traders and public disclosure by firms contribute to dissemination of financial information in the capital market. However, the motives and economic consequences of the two are quite different. In general, private information production is intended by investors to increase their trading profit, which has the effect of widening the information gap between informed and uninformed investors and increasing the firm's cost of capital. On the other hand, public disclosure can be used to narrow this information gap and to lower the cost of capital. This paper provides a theoretical model to examine the economic incentives behind these two forms of information dissemination and their consequences on the cost of capital. By simultaneously considering the firm's and the information traders' decisions, the paper derives an equilibrium in which the amount of private information production, the level of public disclosure, and the cost of capital are all linked to specific characteristics of the firm, of information traders, and of the market. In contrast to conventional beliefs, the paper predicts that, across firms, the cost of capital can be either positively or negatively related to the firm's disclosure level, depending on the specific factors that cause the variation within a particular sample. Similarly, the extent to which investors follow a firm and the firm's disclosure level can be either positively or negatively related to each other. Implications for empirical research are discussed.

Tax professionals are responsible for objectively evaluating tax authorities and evidence relevant to their application and for serving as client advocates. We predict that practice risk — that is, exposure to monetary and nonmonetary costs of making inappropriate recommendations — will affect tax professionals' ability to meet these responsibilities by influencing the manner in which they process information about a tax situation as well as their resulting recommendations for clients. We conduct an experiment in which we manipulate practice risk through client characteristics. We also manipulate provision and nature of outcome information. We find that tax professionals process information differently for clients of different risk levels. Specifically, tax professionals weight negative outcome information more heavily when forming likelihood assessments underlying recommendations for a high‐risk client, relative to a low‐risk client. Further, risk directly affects recommendations in that tax professionals more strongly recommend an aggressive position for a low‐risk client. Differential processing of information for clients with identical transactions but different risk levels may protect the tax professional from the higher expected costs of making inappropriate recommendations to high‐risk clients. However, it indicates that tax professionals do not evaluate evidence objectively for all types of clients.

Auditing is often depicted in scientific and professional literature as being subject to conflicting forces, such as mechanization versus flexibility, and professionalism versus commercialism. This paper examines how auditors actually make the client‐acceptance decision in the midst of these forces. The investigation was conducted via a field study at three Big 6 firms located in Canada. The results show that in all firms the client‐acceptance decision process in action is largely flexible, being characterized by a high degree of informal communication and the adaptation of the client‐acceptance written policies and decision aids to circumstances. Furthermore, while commercialism in one firm (A) has a significant influence on the decision process, in the two other firms (B and C) the decision process is mostly consistent with professionalism. This result conflicts with the concerns that North American regulators have recently expressed about auditors' professionalism.

Recently, Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis, Olsson, and Oswald (2000) compared the bias and accuracy of the discounted cash flow model (DCF) and Edwards‐Bell‐Ohlson residual income model (RIM) in explaining the relation between value estimates and observed stock prices. Both studies report that, with non‐price‐based terminal values, RIM outperforms DCF. Our first research objective is to explore the question whether, over a five‐year valuation horizon, DCF and RIM are empirically equivalent when Penman's (1997) theoretically “ideal” terminal value expressions are employed in each model. Using Value Line terminal stock price forecasts at the horizon to proxy for such values, we find empirical support for the prediction of equivalence between these valuation models. Thus, the apparent superiority of RIM does not hold in a level playing field comparison. Our second research objective is to demonstrate that, within each class of the DCF and RIM valuation models, the model that employs Value Line forecasted price in the terminal value expression generates the lowest prediction errors, compared with models that employ non‐price‐based terminal values under arbitrary growth assumptions. The results indicate that, for both DCF and RIM, price‐based valuation models outperform the corresponding non‐price‐based models by a wide margin. These results imply that researchers should exercise care in interpreting findings from models using ad hoc terminal value expressions.

Prior research indicates that individuals acting as jurors experience outcome effects in audit negligence litigation. That is, jurors evaluate auditors more harshly in light of negative outcomes, even when audit quality is constant. I posit that outcome effects in this setting are caused by jurors using their negative affect (i.e., feelings) resulting from learning about negative audit outcomes as information relevant to auditor blameworthiness. I tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which I manipulated audit quality, outcome information, and provision of an attribution instruction. The attribution instruction was designed to discredit negative affect as a cue to auditor blameworthiness. Consistent with expectations, attribution participants' evaluations of auditors exhibited less reliance on outcome information and more reliance on audit quality information than did evaluations made by control participants. In fact, outcome effects were eliminated for attribution participants. Courts may be able to improve the quality of jurors' decisions in such cases by employing an attribution instruction.

This paper examines why practitioners and researchers get different estimates of equity value when they use a discounted cash flow (CF) model versus a residual income (RI) model. Both models are derived from the same underlying assumption — that price is the present value of expected future net dividends discounted at the cost of equity capital — but in practice and in research they frequently yield different estimates. We argue that the research literature devoted to comparing the accuracy of these two models is misguided; properly implemented, both models yield identical valuations for all firms in all years. We identify how prior research has applied inconsistent assumptions to the two models and show how these seemingly small errors cause surprisingly large differences in the value estimates.