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The chief aim of this paper is to examine the economic theory of natural resource utilization as it pertains to the fishing industry. It will appear, I hope, that most of the problems associated with the words “conservation” or “depletion” or “overexploitation” in the fishery are, in reality, manifestations of the fact that the natural resources of the sea yield no economic rent. Fishery resources are unusual in the fact of their common-property nature; but they are not unique, and similar problems are encountered in other cases of common-property resource industries, such as petroleum production, hunting and trapping, etc. Although the theory presented in the following pages is worked out in terms of the fishing industry, it is, I believe, applicable generally to all cases where natural resources are owned in common and exploited under conditions of individualistic competition.

Recent Publications Get access The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 68, Issue 3, August 1954, Pages 482–485, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/68.3.482 Published: 01 August 1954

Journal Article Recent Publications Get access The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 68, Issue 2, May 1954, Pages 321–322, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/68.2.321 Published: 01 May 1954

Recent Publications Get access The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 68, Issue 1, February 1954, Pages 155–157, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/68.1.155 Published: 01 February 1954

Competition, Monopoly and Countervailing Power — A Correction Get access Walter Adams Walter Adams Michigan State College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 68, Issue 3, August 1954, Page 481, https://doi.org/10.2307/1881975 Published: 01 August 1954