With the recent significant growth in the single-name credit default swap (CDS) market has come the need for accurate and computationally efficient models to value these instruments. While the model developed by Duffie, Pan, and Singleton (2000) can be used, the solution is numerical (solving a series of ordinary differential equations) rather than explicit. In this paper, we provide an explicit solution to the valuation of a credit default swap when the interest rate and the hazard rate are correlated by using the “change of measure” approach and solving a bivariate Riccati equation. CDS transaction data for the period 2/15/2000 through 4/8/2003 for 60 firms are used to test both the goodness of fit of the model and provide estimates of the influence of economic variables in the market for credit-risky bonds.

We examine the impact of internal coalition, measured by the appointment of the top executives and directors by the CEO after he assumes office, on stock crash risk during 2000–2014. The appointment-based internal coalition has a positive and significant impact on stock crash risk. Internal coalition is a more important factor than measures of CEO power, such as CEO tenure and duality, in predicting stock price crash. We address the endogeneity concerns by utilizing an exogenous shock to the internal coalition to conduct difference-in-differences (DID) regressions. The main results survive numerous robustness tests.

While prior studies have examined whether financial analysts affect corporate innovation, there is little research on the mechanism through which this occurs. In this paper, we examine whether and how analysts' questions about innovation during site visits affect corporate innovation. Using a sample of corporate site visits in China, we find that when analysts ask questions about innovation during site visits, firms invest more in R&D in the future. Consistent with knowledge diffusion across firms, this association is stronger when analysts cover more firms in the same industry, when firms share similar technologies as industry peers, and when an innovation‐expert analyst is present at site visits. We also find that analysts' questions about innovation during site visits are positively associated with the quantity and quality of firms' patent applications in the future. Overall, we provide evidence that analysts can affect corporate innovation through their questions about firms' innovation activities.

We examine the stock price impact of corporate site visits using a unique data set of site visits to listed firms in China. Our main findings are as follows. First, the market reaction around corporate site visits is statistically and economically significant and is stronger for group visits, visits conducted by mutual fund managers, visits covering accounting and finance topics, visits to firms with poor information environments, and visits to manufacturing firms. Second, the stock returns around site visits are positively associated with firms’ future performance. Third, the changes in visiting funds’ holdings are more predictive of firms’ future performance than those of nonvisiting funds. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that site visits are important venues for investors to collect information about firms and make informed trades.

Addressing income inequality is crucial for ensuring equitable and prosperous societies. This study examines the impact of the local press on intrafirm pay disparity. By using recently mandated disclosures of CEO-worker pay ratios and analyzing the staggered shutdown of local newspapers, we find that within-firm pay disparity increases by 8.2 percent following local newspaper closures. Further analysis suggests that this post-closure increase in pay disparity ratio is unlikely to be driven by either CEO compensation or worker pay alone or underlying economic conditions but instead reflects reduced concerns over reputational damage. Overall, our findings are consistent with local newspapers’ playing an important role in disseminating CEO-worker pay ratios and amplifying their reputational effects, thereby shaping and monitoring within-firm pay disparity. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.

We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives' horizon incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives' horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity, including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives' contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality.

We examine the commitment effect provided by mandatory disclosure and the information effect of voluntary disclosure on market illiquidity by exploring a regulatory change that allows smaller reporting companies to reduce the disclosure of certain information in their SEC filings. This regime change allows us to separate the commitment effect provided by mandatory disclosure from the information effect of voluntary disclosure. We find that firms that are eligible to reduce their disclosure, but voluntarily maintain their disclosure level, experience an increase in market illiquidity. We also find that the increase in illiquidity is more pronounced for firms with higher agency costs. These findings suggest that mandatory disclosure serves as a credible commitment mechanism and that losing such commitment by disclosure deregulation is costly in the absence of a loss of information. Our study suggests that while voluntary disclosure is effective in reducing information asymmetry, it cannot replace mandatory disclosure in addressing information problems. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the market reaction to vague forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are more (less) precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with managers strategically choosing forecast precision to increase stock prices before insider sales and to decrease stock prices before insider purchases. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision is less pronounced when institutional ownership is high or when disclosure risk is high, and is more pronounced when investors have difficulty in assessing the precision of managers' information. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.

We provide closed-form solutions for a continuous time, Markov-modulated jump diffusion model in a general equilibrium framework for options prices under a variety of jump diffusion specifications. We further demonstrate that the two-state model provides the leptokurtic return features, volatility smile, and volatility clustering observed empirically for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and its component stocks. Using 10years of stock return data, we confirm the existence of jump intensity switching and clustering, illustrate transition probabilities, and verify superior empirical fit over competing Poisson-style models.