We use increases and decreases in the ranking scores of Fortune's Most Admired Companies to test the proposition that media shocks can increase (decrease) the value of a manager's reputational capital and, thus, enhance (diminish) his power to extract corporate resources for private benefit at the expense of shareholders. Consistent with the proposition increases (decreases) in scores are associated with stock price decreases (increases). And, CEOs whose firms experience increases (reductions) in scores experience increases (reductions) in compensation and in job tenure, and their firms undertake more (fewer) acquisitions and the acquisitions are less (more) value increasing.

We investigate how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed firms in the European Union affects peer private firms. We find that private firms’ capital investment decreases significantly after the IFRS mandate, relative to public firms. Private firms also display decreased investment when benchmarked against firms relatively insulated from the impact of the IFRS mandate, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller in this case. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory IFRS reporting (combined with other reforms), while increasing public firms’ financing and investment, crowds out funding for private firms. The effect is more pronounced for larger private firms and in industries where public peers have greater external financing needs. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting regulations cause shifts in resource allocation in an economy.

This study examines the relationship between government subsidies and income smoothing using a sample of US‐listed firms. We find that subsidized firms smooth their earnings more aggressively than their unsubsidized peers. This finding is consistent with the reasoning that subsidized firms bear higher political costs and have more incentives to smooth earnings to avoid public attention. In addition, smoothing by subsidized firms is more pronounced when the subsidies are granted through non‐tax‐related channels than through tax‐based channels, and the positive association between government subsidies and income smoothing is stronger for firms under higher public scrutiny and with less transparent information environments. Further analysis shows that smoothing by subsidized firms serves mainly to obfuscate earnings and that subsidized firms that smooth earnings tend to continue receiving subsidies in the future. Overall, our results help explain the role of government subsidies in shaping firms' accounting and disclosure choices.

Narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait that profoundly influences individuals' cognition, emotions, and actions. This study investigates the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and their engagement in opportunistic insider trading. Utilizing a quantitative measure of CEOs' narcissism derived from textual analysis, we find that CEOs with a higher level of narcissism engage in opportunistic insider trading more intensely. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we employ various rigorous approaches, including matching, instrumental variable, Heckman's two-step sample selection model, and falsification tests. Through cross-sectional analysis, we find that the impact of CEOs' narcissism on opportunistic insider trading is more pronounced among CEOs with limited legal knowledge, facing weaker external and internal monitoring pressure, working at larger firms, and being male. In addition, we demonstrate that the insider trades of narcissistic CEOs are less profitable and less informative than those of non-narcissistic CEOs, as evidenced by subsequent stock performance.

This paper examines the role of restrictive covenants in convertible bonds. After controlling for standard covenant intensity determinants, an average convertible bond offering has 3.21 fewer covenants than an average straight bond offering. While covenants negatively affect straight bond yields, there is no negative association between covenants and convertible bond yields. Moreover, contrary to straight bond covenants, convertible bond covenants are set largely independently of issuer characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that the conversion option and certain covenants are substitutes for addressing debt-related financing costs. The few covenants included in convertibles represent irrelevant boilerplate clauses.

This paper examines the impact of product failures on the pricing of bank loans using hand-collected data on product recalls. We find that banks tend to charge higher loan prices for firms involved in product recalls. Uncertainty as to a recall's ultimate impact on a firm's credit risk conditions banks’ loan-pricing reaction, as reflected in a firm's default risk, information asymmetry and governance deficiency, and by the damage to its reputation, arising from the recall. Further analysis reveals that the impact of product recalls on the cost of debt is stronger in firms that rely more extensively on bank financing, firms with more severe recalls, and those adopting passive recall strategies. However, medical device firms, for which product recalls are often considered a normal part of doing business, do not experience a rise in their bank financing costs following a recall. Finally, we find that recall firms experience a deterioration in their financial performance and a rise in product lawsuits post recall. Overall, our findings shed new light on the economic consequences of product failures through the lens of creditors.

Using surname sharing as a novel measure of social ties, we examine the effect of directors’ surname sharing on firm value. We find that boards with greater surname homogeneity are associated with lower firm value. This finding is not driven by familial ties. The negative effect of surname sharing on firm value is more pronounced when directors share rare surnames and when firms operate in regions with stronger clan systems, but is attenuated by stronger corporate governance mechanisms. The market reacts positively to plausibly exogenous director resignations that reduce director surname sharing, and negatively to board appointments that increase director surname sharing. Director surname sharing lowers firm value by reducing director dissension, granting excess executive compensation, and increasing related-party transactions. Overall, our results suggest that directors’ surname sharing, an easy-to-trace but previously neglected social tie, can have significant economic consequences.

Credit ratings group firms by risk, yet yields are shown to overlap between firms of adjacent ratings. We model this by considering the residual risk arising from differences in the parameters of each firm's value process for firms with the same rating. To do so, our framework simultaneously incorporates jump default with Markov-governed likelihoods and continuous defaults in a default-barrier framework. We provide closed-form approximations for expected default time and tail probabilities, and empirically fit the S-shaped yield curve, intra-rating spread, and inter-rating overlap. Results are robust to time period, rating system, sub-rating, and common characteristics such as liquidity.

We provide methodologies to price discretely monitored exotic options when the underlying evolves according to a double exponential jump diffusion process. We show that discrete barrier or lookback options can be approximately priced by their continuous counterparts’ pricing formulae with a simple continuity correction. The correction is justified theoretically via extending the corrected diffusion method of Siegmund (1985). We also discuss the jump effects on the performance of this continuity correction method. Numerical results show that this continuity correction performs very well especially when the proportion of jump volatility to total volatility is small. Therefore, our method is sufficiently of use for most of time.

Price declines over the previous quarter lead to stronger reversals across the subsequent 2 months. We explain this finding based on the dual notions that liquidity provision can influence reversals and that agents who act as de facto liquidity providers may be less active in past losers. Supporting these observations, we find that active institutions participate less in losing stocks and that the magnitude of monthly return reversals fluctuates with changes in the number of active institutional investors. Thus, we argue that fluctuations in liquidity provision with past return performance account for the link between return reversals and past returns.