Knowledge that Transforms

This paper presents evidence that information asymmetry increases equity misvaluation by showing the impact of analyst coverage on misvaluation. To establish the causality, I use two exogenous events (broker closures and mergers), as well as an instrumental variable approach. The identification strategies indicate that there is a negative causal effect of analyst coverage on equity misvalutaion. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that information environment can cause investors to use their perceived value in cash flow and discount rate to estimate their perceived equity prices, which deviate from intrinsic value.

This study examines whether corporate relationship spending through business entertainment expenses (BEEs) affects future stock price crash risk. Stakeholder theory suggests that expenditure on relationship building with external stakeholders enhances trust, firm reputation, and transparency, potentially lowering future crash risk. However, agency theory suggests that excessive relationship spending is associated with greater information opacity and managerial opportunism, contributing to greater future crash risk. Our results are more aligned with the agency perspective, showing that BEEs relate positively to future crash risk. China's 2012 anti-corruption campaign significantly moderated the effect of BEEs on stock price crash risk, particularly for firms having weak political connections, weak information transparency, and weak external monitoring mechanisms. The positive BEE-crash relation persists after the anti-corruption campaign for high financial risk firms.

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An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.