Knowledge that Transforms

A company officer is an "alumnus" if he previously worked for an audit firm. Iyer, Bamber, and Barefield (1997) find that alumni have ties with their former audit firms and alumni are more inclined to provide economic benefits to former firms if they have stronger ties. If the alumnus is a senior corporate officer, the alumnus may benefit his former firm by recommending that the company appoint the firm as its auditor. However, the company's audit committee may be concerned that officer-auditor ties threaten audit quality. Therefore, an independent audit committee may not sanction the appointment of the officer's former firm. This study investigates (a) whether companies tend to appoint officers' former audit firms, and (b) whether independent audit committees mitigate this tendency. We document that companies appoint officers' former firms more often than they appoint alternative audit firms. However, companies are less likely to appoint officers' former firms if audit committees are more independent. This suggests that independent audit committees strengthen audit quality by deterring affiliations between audit firms and officers. © CAAA.

In an efficient capital market, asset prices vary when investors change their expectations about cash flows, discount rates, or both. Using dividends to measure cash flows, previous research shows that the aggregate dividend-price ratio varies due to changes in expected discount rates (returns) rather than expected cash flows. In contrast, using accounting earnings instead of dividends as a measure of cash flows, this paper shows that as much as 70% of the variation in the dividend-price ratio can be explained by changes in expected earnings. Moreover, the paper documents a significant negative correlation between expected returns and expected earnings, suggesting that variations in a common factor to both may generate significant price volatility. The results are consistent with the dividend-policy irrelevance hypothesis.

We investigate a sample of 50 firm-events, identified in the Global Research Analysts Settlement, in which analysts were discovered to have acted misleadingly ex post. In this setting, analysts' incentives caused them to issue public disclosures that differed from their private beliefs. We document that these firms' institutional holdings decline significantly during the period in which the analysts issued misleading disclosures. During this period daily small-size trades (a proxy for individual investors) are dominated by buy orders while daily large-size trades (a proxy for institutional investors) are dominated by sell orders. Short interest increases during the event period, consistent with the idea that sophisticated investors are selling. Our estimates of investors' trading losses show that individual investors lost about two and a half times the amount lost by institutions. Overall, the results suggest a wealth transfer from individuals to institutions that is likely attributable to analysts' misleading behavior.

We use the context of a company's initial public offering (IPO) of equity securities as a capital-markets setting to empirically study the economic consequences of endogenous disclosure. In particular, we examine the relation between the extent of dollar detail an IPO issuer provides regarding their intended use of proceeds and first-day underpricing. We document substantial variation in the specificity of this disclosure and find that an increase in such specificity is associated with lower IPO underpricing. Overall, our results suggest that IPOs that provide specific use-of-proceeds disclosures have less ex ante uncertainty, in the sense that these disclosures help investors estimate the dispersion of secondary market values. Our paper contributes to the empirical accounting literature by documenting an association between voluntary disclosure and what is arguably the foremost cost of raising initial equity capital (i.e., IPO underpricing).