The larger association between earnings and contemporaneous returns for negative returns than for positive returns is often attributed to conditional conservatism. We reason that this asymmetry may also be driven by the lack of timeliness with which stock price incorporates bad news relative to good news. Consistent with our reasoning, we show that when stock price incorporates bad news with delay, the asymmetry can exist in the absence of conditional conservatism. This suggests the testable hypothesis that the asymmetry decreases (increases) with factors that facilitate (impede) the incorporation of bad news into stock price. Using stock liquidity to test this hypothesis, we find that the earnings-return asymmetry decreases as stock liquidity increases. Our findings support the view that variation in the earnings-return asymmetry also reflects variation in the quality of the return generation process. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.

We document multiple dimensions of usefulness of banks' interest income sensitivity disclosures. First, we find management-generated sensitivity measures are predictive of future realized changes in net interest income. Second, we find financial analysts' forecasts of net interest income reflect information provided by interest income sensitivity disclosures. Third, we find equity market responses to interest rate shocks as well as firms' interest rate betas are larger for banks with greater disclosed sensitivity of net interest income to interest rate changes. Across all of these tests, the informativeness of income sensitivity measures is incremental to that of regulatory data. These results suggest that interest income sensitivity disclosures are informative measures of interest rate risk. Our results contradict assertions that these disclosures are useless due to lack of relevance of income sensitivity, poor modeling techniques, and/or redundancy relative to regulatory data.

Prior research finds that the decline in the information content of earnings after restatement announcements is short-lived and the earnings response coefficient (ERC) bounces back after three quarters. We re-examine this issue using a more recent and comprehensive sample of restatements. We find that material restatement firms experience a significant decrease in the ERC over a prolonged period—close to three years after restatement announcements. In contrast, other restatement firms experience a decline in the ERC for only one quarter. We further find that among material restatement firms, those that are subject to more credibility concerns and those that do not take prompt actions to improve reporting credibility experience a longer drop in the ERC. Last, reconciling with prior research, we find that using a more powerful proxy for material restatements and imposing less restrictive sampling requirements help to increase the power of the tests to detect the long-run drop in the ERC. Data Availability: The data are available from the sources indicated in the text.

We analyze whether midlevel managers in securitized finance were aware of a large-scale housing bubble and a looming crisis in 2004–2006 using their personal home transaction data. We find that the average person in our sample neither timed the market nor were cautious in their home transactions, and did not exhibit awareness of problems in overall housing markets. Certain groups of securitization agents were particularly aggressive in increasing their exposure to housing during this period, suggesting the need to expand the incentives-based view of the crisis to incorporate a role for beliefs.

Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we find that family firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the non-tax cost of a potential price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders’ concern with family rent-seeking masked by tax avoidance activities [Desai and Dharmapala, 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 145–179]. Our result is also consistent with family owners being more concerned with the potential penalty and reputation damage from an IRS audit than non-family firms. We obtain similar inferences when using a small sample of tax shelter cases.

We conduct two experiments to examine whether and how the framing (bonus vs. penalty) of a target‐based incentive contract affects knowledge sharing and knowledge seeking. In the first experiment, we predict and find that penalty‐framed contracts increase employees' stress due to the fear of potential loss, which in turn reduces their willingness to share knowledge. Additionally, consistent with loss aversion, employees under penalty‐framed contracts are more likely to seek knowledge than those under bonus‐framed contracts. The second experiment corroborates our theoretical arguments by demonstrating the crucial role of stress in reducing knowledge‐sharing behavior. The results show that, when stress is alleviated through an informal control mechanism, penalty‐framed contracts no longer reduce knowledge sharing. The implications of our findings for research and practice are discussed.

Despite the potential of algorithms to improve judgment quality, recent research suggests that individuals may be averse to algorithmic use. We experimentally examine whether and how managers’ use of an algorithm-advised performance rating is influenced by rating valence and the decision rights managers have to adjust the algorithm. We find that managers are less willing to use an algorithm to evaluate subordinate performance when it advises a low, rather than high, rating. We further show that when the algorithm-advised rating is low, allowing managers to adjust how the algorithm computes the rating, compared with adjusting the rating itself or not allowing any adjustment, increases algorithmic use. Further analyses show this effect to be consistent with managers’ increased understanding of an algorithm when involved in its computation. Our findings inform organizations’ implementation of performance evaluation algorithms by showing how rating valence and decision rights jointly influence managers’ use of the algorithms.

Access to firms’ innovation outputs determines the extent of knowledge spillover that poses risk to innovation appropriability. We provide plausibly causal evidence that processing costs of financial disclosures, which inform users of the economic value of innovation, play a key role in firms’ management of knowledge spillover. We exploit an exogenous, randomly assigned, and staggered policy shock by the SEC that reduces processing costs of mandatory financial disclosures. In response, firms reduce patenting rates, with the effect concentrated among firms in more competitive industries and with lower costs of capital. Firms also reduce their patent disclosure quality. Our results suggest firms rely more on trade secrecy as their innovation property protection mechanism. Lower processing costs of financial disclosures affect neither innovation inputs nor voluntary disclosure practices. Our results show that firms strategically manage access to their innovation outputs through financial disclosures, patent disclosures, and trade secrecy to curb knowledge spillover.

We examine how the ordering of information within quarterly earnings announcements influences investor response to those announcements. Specifically, we examine whether earlier discussion of earnings information, and earlier discussion of qualitatively positive or negative information, is associated with stronger responses to that information. Controlling for the linguistic content of the earnings announcement, we find a positive relation between investor response to information and the prioritization of that information in the earnings announcement. We find no evidence of investor over-reaction and, to the contrary, find some evidence that investors under-react to prioritized information. Our evidence, in conjunction with experimental evidence in Elliott (2006), suggests that information placement influences investors' responses. However, unlike the experimental evidence in Elliott (2006), our archival results suggest that investor response to information placement is warranted, rather than the result of an unintentional cognitive effect. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

The study investigates the impact of collective empathy on corporate green innovation from the perspective of war heritage. Drawing on stakeholder theory and empathy theory, we argue that collective empathy fosters corporate green innovation by generating public emotional empathy toward local descendants of war victims and enhance cognitive empathy within firms regarding the environmental needs of local communities. Analyzing data from Chinese-listed firms in heavily polluting industries between 2010 and 2019, we find that collective empathy significantly encourages green innovation efforts. Mechanism analyses indicate that collective emotional and cognitive empathy serve as key pathways in this relationship. Furthermore, state-owned ownership and formal institutions reinforce and complement the positive effect of collective empathy on corporate green innovation.