Default contribution rates for 401(k) pension plans powerfully influence choices. Potential causes include opt-out costs, procrastination, inattention, and psychological anchoring. Using realistically parameterized models, we show how the optimal default, the magnitude of the welfare effects, and the degree of normative ambiguity depend on the behavioral model, the scope of the choice domain deemed welfare-relevant, the use of penalties for passive choice, and other 401(k) plan features. While results are theory-specific, our analysis provides reasonably robust justifications for setting the default either at the highest contribution rate matched by the employer or—contrary to common wisdom—at zero.

For most people, buying a house is one of the most significant investment decisions of their lifetimes. Economists have mainly focused on the consumption aspects of this process. For example, a typical model in urban economics might frame the decision of where to live as a discrete choice over a bundle of housing and neighborhood attributes such as location, square footage, schooling options, and crime levels. The investment side of the problem has received considerably less attention, a surprising omission since housing assets comprise approximately two-thirds of the average American household’s financial portfolio, serve an important role in saving for retirement and, as has become increasingly apparent, can be quite risky. This paper views housing markets from an asset-pricing perspective, using finance theory to relate the risk premium of a housing asset (the difference between its expected return and the return for a risk-free investment) to its exposure to risk. As usual in finance, what matters for the risk premium of a housing asset is its exposure to systematic risk, not idiosyncratic risk. In our model, there are two forms of systematic risk to which housing assets are exposed: national risk (which is common to houses everywhere) and local risk (which affects all houses within a given metropolitan area, but nowhere else). Houses are said to be of the same type h if they are located in the same metropolitan area and have the same exposure to systematic risk. Our main conclusions are that (1) houses of every type face a common set of risk prices ( for the national risk and m for the local risk specific to metropolitan area m) that, together with appropriate measures of exposure to risk,

Even among households with similar socioeconomic characteristics, saving and wealth vary considerably. Life-cycle models attribute this variation to differences in time preference rates, risk tolerance, exposure to uncertainty, relative tastes for work and leisure at advanced ages, and income replacement rates. These factors have testable implications concerning the relation between accumulated wealth and the shape of the consumption profile. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we find little support for these implications. The data are instead consistent with “rule of thumb,” “mental accounting,” or hyperbolic discounting theories of wealth accumulation.

Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bonus contracts in practice is puzzling. If penalty contracts yield more worker effort, why would employers not use them more often? We conduct experimental labor markets to test whether the prior finding of more effort under penalty contracts than bonus contracts (i.e., the contract frame effect) persists when workers can choose their contract and know that their employer intentionally offered the contract they choose. As predicted, these features of labor markets eliminate the difference in effort between penalty and bonus contracts reported in prior studies. This finding suggests employers may use bonus contracts more often than penalty contracts because they can offer the contract most workers prefer without sacrificing worker effort.

We study how business press coverage can discipline credit rating agency actions. Because of their greater prominence and visibility to market participants, more widely covered firms can pose greater reputational costs for rating agencies. Consistent with rating agencies limiting such risk, we find that ratings for more widely covered firms are more timely and accurate, downgraded earlier and systematically lower in the year prior to default, and better predictors of default and non-default. We also find that the recent tightening of credit rating standards is largely explained by growing business press coverage of public debt issuers. Additionally, we find that credit rating agencies take explicit actions to improve their ratings by assigning better educated and more experienced analysts to widely covered firms. Moreover, we document that missed defaults of more visible firms create greater negative economic consequences for rating agencies, and that rating improvements following the financial crisis were greater for more visible firms. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

We examine the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information in quarters containing transitory gains to investigate whether the primary motivation for these managers to disclose non-GAAP earnings is to inform or mislead. In this setting, non-GAAP earnings are more informative than GAAP earnings, even though they are lower than GAAP earnings. Thus, managers motivated to inform stakeholders about sustainable earnings will disclose non-GAAP earnings information excluding the gain, whereas managers motivated to report higher earnings will obscure the transitory nature of the gain by focusing on GAAP earnings. We find evidence that managers' disclosure choices vary widely across firms, and these choices affect investors' perceptions of core operating earnings. We then contrast how the same firm discloses non-GAAP earnings in the presence of transitory losses to provide additional evidence on the motives of individual firms' disclosures. We conclude that the most pervasive motivation to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the presence of transitory gains is to inform. An economically significant proportion of firms, however, appear opportunistic in that they only disclose non-GAAP earnings information when it increases investors' perceptions of core operating earnings. Our evidence is important because we speak to the influence that each motive has on the choice to disclose non-GAAP earnings and we provide evidence on the underlying motives behind specific firms' disclosures. Data Availability: All data are available from the sources cited in the text.

Regulators' interest in analyst reports stems from the belief that small investors are unaware of the conflicts sell-side analysts face and may, as a consequence, be misled into making suboptimal investment decisions. We examine who trades on security analyst stock recommendations by extending prior research to focus on investor-specific responses to revisions. We find that both large and small traders react to analyst reports; however, large investors appear to trade more than small traders in response to the information conveyed by the analyst's recommendation and earnings forecast revision (proxied by the magnitudes of the recommendation change and the earnings forecast revision, respectively). We also find that small investors do not fully account for the effects of analysts' incentives on the credibility of analyst reports, as captured by the type of recommendation (i.e., upgrade versus downgrade or buy versus sell). In particular, small investors not only trade more than large investors following upgrade and buy recommendations, but also trade more following upgrade and buy recommendations than they do following downgrade and hold/sell recommendations. Furthermore, we observe that, on average, small traders are net purchasers following recommendation revisions regardless of the type of the recommendation; large traders tend to be net sellers following downgrades and sells. Consequently, large traders generate statistically positive returns from their trading, while small traders generate statistically negative returns from their trading. These findings are consistent with large investors being more sophisticated processors of information, and provide some support for regulators' concerns that analysts may more easily mislead small investors.

We investigate if earnings forecast accuracy matters to security analysts by examining its association with analyst turnover. Controlling for firm- and time-period effects, forecast horizon and industry forecasting experience, we find that an analyst is more likely to turn over if his forecast accuracy is lower than his peers. We find no association between an analyst's probability of turnover and his absolute forecast accuracy. We also investigate another observable measure of the analyst's performance, the profitability of his stock recommendations. There is no statistical relation between the absolute or relative profitability of an analyst's stock recommendations and his probability of turnover. We interpret our findings as indicating that forecast accuracy is important to analysts.

[Auditors are charged with the responsibility of evaluating internal control systems. Recent advances in decision support systems indicate that the speed, accuracy, and memory capacity of computers may be used to aid auditors in this task. To test this proposition, a computer-assisted method of designing, analyzing, and evaluating internal control systems, called The Internal Control Model or TICOM, was designed and implemented. The technical manual and the TICOM software are available from the authors. This paper presents the results and conclusions of that project. TICOM is a computer-based analytic tool that aids the auditor first to model the internal control system and then to query the model in order to aid the auditor in evaluating the internal control system. TICOM is based on concepts in artificial intelligence such as knowledge representation and graph simplification. It serves (1) to describe office information systems while emphasizing internal accounting controls and (2) as an aid in control evaluation. It was found that the advantages of TICOM over traditional evaluation methods are that (1) the evaluation can be more rigorous and exhaustive, (2) the documentation of the system can be more thorough because of automated completeness and consistency tests, and (3) the modeler may probe and test controls by using the query-processing portion of TICOM.]