Research in Economic Education: Five New Initiatives by Michael K. Salemi, John J. Siegfried, Kim Sosin, William B. Walstad and Michael Watts. Published in volume 91, issue 2, pages 440-445 of American Economic Review, May 2001

In this study, we examine whether sell-side security analysts gain access to value-relevant information through political connections. We measure analysts' political connections based on political contributions at the brokerage-house level. We argue that if brokerages are able to obtain private information through their political connections, then analysts at politically connected brokerages should issue more profitable stock recommendations, and this increased profitability should be more pronounced for politically sensitive stocks. Our evidence is consistent with these predictions. Analyses of recommendations issued surrounding the Affordable Care Act further support our main inferences. Moreover, our findings hold after we employ numerous tests to address correlated omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these results suggest that brokerages obtain value-relevant, nonpublic information from their political connections.

Despite the importance placed on professional skepticism by the accounting profession and regulators, the failure of auditors to exercise an appropriate level of skepticism continues to be a global issue. We experimentally test a potential barrier to skepticism. We find that outcome knowledge biases supervisors' evaluations of skeptical behavior. Holding a staff member's skeptical judgments and acts constant, superiors on the engagement team evaluate the staff's skeptical behavior based on whether the staff's investigation of an issue ultimately identifies a misstatement. Our evidence suggests that evaluators penalize auditors who employ an appropriate level of skepticism, but do not identify a misstatement. Although consultation with their superiors while exercising skepticism improved staff auditors' performance evaluations, consultation did not effectively mitigate the outcome effect on their evaluations. Last, we observe that auditors in the field anticipate that their superiors will be influenced by outcome knowledge when they evaluate their skeptical behavior. Collectively, our results depict an evaluation system that may inadvertently discourage skepticism among auditors in the field. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

The task assigned the 1962 Courses and Curricula Committee of the American Accounting Association was "to develop criteria for selecting the content and quality of collegiate accounting educational materials to provide adequate instruction in the body of knowledge that is accounting." The 1961 Committee, which was kept intact for a second year, decided that this task was possible after it discarded other more limited objectives because they involved too many restrictive assumptions to produce useful conclusions. To reduce its task to manageable proportions, the Committee decided to exclude so-called "service" courses, in which accounting is taught primarily to students who are preparing for careers other than accounting careers. For example, the first course in accounting is not considered, since it is offered primarily for those students who do not plan to go on in accounting. As a result, these recommendations apply only to schools which have as one of their objectives educating college students who intend to enter the business world as accountants in industrial, governmental, or public accounting organizations.

The article focuses on the proceedings of the twelfth annual convention of the American Association of University Instructors in Accounting, held at Washington D.C., between December 28 and 29, 1927. After some introductory remarks by the organizers, papers were read by W. W. Nissley of the American Institute of Accountants, John R. Wildman of the company Haskins and Sells, David Himmelblau of Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, William A. Paton of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and J. L. Dohr of Greene and Hurd and of Columbia University, New York, New York. The second program meeting was given over to a discussion of various features of the federal income tax law. Johns Hopkins University's, Baltimore, Maryland, professor presided at the session and opened it with a brief statement introducing the speakers of the afternoon, all of whom were representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The third program session consisted of a joint meeting with the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business. The general topic for discussion was "The Place of Accounting in Commerce Curriculum."

This article investigates whether differences in information‐based trading can explain observed differences in spreads for active and infrequently traded stocks. Using a new empirical technique, we estimate the risk of information‐based trading for a sample of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed stocks. We use the information in trade data to determine how frequently new information occurs, the composition of trading when it does, and the depth of the market for different volume‐decile stocks. Our most important empirical result is that the probability of information‐based trading is lower for high volume stocks. Using regressions, we provide evidence of the economic importance of information‐based trading on spreads.

B. H. Beckhart, Carl F. Behrens, George N. Emory, Shirley K. Hart, James J. O'Leary, A. M. Weimer, Liquidity: A Growing Attribute of Mortgage Loan Portfolios: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1950), pp. 324-336

We explore firm size heterogeneity in production networks. In comprehensive data for Belgium, firms with more customers have higher total sales but lower sales and lower market shares per customer. Downstream factors, especially the number of customers, explain the vast majority of firm size dispersion. We rationalize these facts with a model of network formation and two-dimensional firm heterogeneity. Higher productivity generates more matches and larger market shares among customers. Higher relationship capability generates more customers and higher sales. Model estimates suggest a strong negative correlation between productivity and relationship capability and potentially large welfare gains from improving relationship capability.