Municipal bonds, Spending rate, Riskiness of Municipal bonds, Information content

Segment reporting, Simulated mergers, Forecasting

We consider the relation between wages and productivity by means of a model based on the following assumptions. Workers live for 2 periods, firms live forever, senior workers differ nontrivially from junior, seniority enhances workers' expected second-period earnings, both firms and workers recognize the prospect of promotion and the senior-junior wage differential at the time of hiring, and firms have monopsony power in hiring junior workers. We show that senior wages are equal to the senior marginal product, but junior wages are set below the junior marginal product by an amount that depends on the elasticity of the firm's labor supply.

This article surveys the development of nonparametric models and methods for estimation of choice models with nonlinear budget sets.The discussion focuses on the budget set regression, that is, the conditional expectation of a choice variable given the budget set.Utility maximization in a nonparametric model with general heterogeneity reduces the curse of dimensionality in this regression.Empirical results using this regression are different from maximum likelihood and give informative inference.The article also considers the information provided by kink probabilities for nonparametric utility with general heterogeneity.Instrumental variable estimation and the evidence it provides of heterogeneity in preferences are also discussed.

On caracterise les axiomes faible et fort de preference revelee en termes de m-rationalite. Cette caracterisation eclaire le lien fondamental avec les axiomes de comportement de Richter pour la g-rationalite. L'approche presentee ici, est motivee par un operateur de complementarite, defini sur des preferences, qui montre le rapport logique entre ces deux concepts de choix rationnel

Certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive's continued employment. These wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives. Abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty-three events. These abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive's status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive's ‘talents’ and decision-making responsibility, and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement.

Inventory accounting method, Political costs, Agency costs, Production and investment characteristics

This paper presents a model of equilibrium in a capital market for linear shares of risky firms andin a market for managerial labor in which market participants function as both investors and managers. The model yields interesting and relevant equilibrium conditions that integrate earlier separate treatments of the capital market with human capital and the incentive contracting problem regarding shirking.The theory developed here provides a microeconomic explanation of how the price of risk established in the capital market is relevant to the labor contracting problem. The analysis also provides a logical rationale for the division of responsibilities between a board of directors and the management of the firm.

Ivan E. Brick, Buckner A. Wallingford, The Relative Tax Benefits of Alternative Call Features in Corporate Debt, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 95-105