Discontinuities in earnings distributions at zero have been widely cited as evidence of earnings management but not without controversy. Recent research suggests discontinuities may be mere artifacts of certain research design choices. We find that the well-known zero-earnings discontinuity disappears soon after passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and has not returned. We also find that neither the discontinuity nor its disappearance require the effects of widely cited alternative (non-earnings management) explanations for the zero-earnings discontinuity.

This article studies belief heterogeneity in a benchmark competitive asset market: a market for Arrow–Debreu securities. We show that differences in agents' beliefs lead to a systematic pricing pattern, the favourite–longshot bias (FLB): securities with a low-pay-out probability are overpriced, whereas securities with high probability pay-out are underpriced. We apply demand estimation techniques to betting market data, and find that the observed FLB is explained by a two-type population consisting of canonical traders, who hold virtually correct beliefs and are the majority type in the population (70%); and noise traders exhibiting significant belief dispersion. Furthermore, exploiting variation in public information across markets in our data set, we show that our belief heterogeneity model empirically outperforms existing preference-based explanations of the FLB.

Abstract Twenty-five large field experiments with major U.S. retailers and brokerages, most reaching millions of customers and collectively representing $2.8 million in digital advertising expenditure, reveal that measuring the returns to advertising is difficult. The median confidence interval on return on investment is over 100 percentage points wide. Detailed sales data show that relative to the per capita cost of the advertising, individual-level sales are very volatile; a coefficient of variation of 10 is common. Hence, informative advertising experiments can easily require more than 10 million person-weeks, making experiments costly and potentially infeasible for many firms. Despite these unfavorable economics, randomized control trials represent progress by injecting new, unbiased information into the market. The inference challenges revealed in the field experiments also show that selection bias, due to the targeted nature of advertising, is a crippling concern for widely employed observational methods.

Abstract We investigate whether the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) gave recipients competitive advantages. Using a difference-in-difference (DID) approach, we find that: i) TARP recipients received competitive advantages and increased both their market shares and market power; ii) results may be driven primarily by the safety channel (TARP banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the cost-disadvantage channel (TARP funds may be relatively expensive); and iii) these competitive advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP banks that repaid early. These results may help explain other findings in the literature, and yield important policy implications.

Abstract We utilize the decennial U.S. Census to study social effects in housing consumption across 4 million households from 126 ethnic groups and 2,071 geographic locations in the United States. We find that the homeownership decisions within ethnic groups are locally correlated, after controlling for the homeownership rates within the group and the region. Social influence is stronger for younger, less educated, and lower-income individuals; immigrants; and Americans with ancestors from more unequal, uncertainty-avoiding, and collectivistic cultures. Our results suggest that both status and information considerations play an important role in the social comparison process in capital markets.

Ties between similar partners in economic and financial networks are often attributed to concerns about agency costs. In this paper, we distinguish the underlying motives for tie formation between sets of potential partners in the network, thus informing the relative importance of agency cost and resource accumulation in tie formation across firms. We develop a robust and generalizable methodology that allows for the inference of similarity and/or cumulative advantage motives in the potential presence of resource trading. We estimate the model using venture capital (VC) co-investment networks, employing factor analysis to characterize orthogonal, interpretable resources for VC firms. In the VC setting, value-added resources other than capital appear to be exchanged for capital, but not for one another. We find little evidence for similarity motives as the primary driver of matching, suggesting that concerns over agency conflicts in partnering are dominated by the desire to accumulate higher levels of certain resources.

We use a Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation GARCH (STCC-GARCH) model applied to the euro area monetary policy rates and sovereign yields of Italy, Spain and Germany at 5-year maturity to estimate the threshold level of the signals above which the sovereign bond market moves to a crisis regime. We show that the threshold to a crisis regime for Italy and Spain is reached when (i) their 5-year sovereign yield spreads amount to about 90 basis points; (ii) their 5-year CDS spreads amount to about 155 basis points or (iii) the 5-year spread between the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) bond and the German Bund amounts to about 30–40 basis points. Using impulse responses, we find that the STCC-GARCH with the KfW-Bund spread has leading properties, a feature corroborated by the fact that this indicator suggested a shift to a crisis regime already in August 2007 and has been signaling an improvement of the situation already in the autumn of 2012. An out-of-sample forecast of the STCC-GARCH model is also provided, which is both a novelty and a further robustness check for the stability of the model.