Reviews the book "Applications of Statistical Sampling to Auditing," by Alvin A. Arens and James K. Loebbecke.

This paper examines and clarifies the applicability of APB Opinion No. 29 to (1) "trade-in" transactions that involve a dealer, and (2) exchange transactions that involve a "significant" amount of monetary consideration (boot). Principal findings are: The APB intended that the exception to the general accounting rule (as reflected in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Opinion) apply to exchanges of similar nonmonetary assets only in instances where both parties to the transaction are either (a) dealers or (b) non-dealers. If an exchange involving similar nonmonetary assets results in the culmination of an earnings process for either party, the general rule applies to both parties. In addition, the Board's intent was that the exception to the general rule should apply to exchanges of similar nonmonetary assets irrespective of the amount of monetary consideration involved in the transaction.

This paper evaluates whether the primary and secondary dissemination of earnings forecast revisions by security analysts is reflected in security prices. Security prices were used to determine the profitability (before the cost of search) of trading strategies based on the nonpublic knowledge of forecast revisions. For a sample of 288 weekly earnings forecast revisions, the results were consistent with the hypothesis that early knowledge of forecast revisions could be used to form profitable trading strategies. Furthermore, the secondary dissemination of forecasts continued to have information content at the point of disclosure. These results are inconsistent with the strong form, but consistent with the semi-strong form, of market efficiency. Furthermore, the information contemporaneously available from public sources did not generate equivalently profitable trading rules, indicating that forecast revisions were not deducible from other publicly available information. Finally, some general public policy implications concerning mandatory disclosure of forecasts were drawn.

THE ease of substitution between labor and other factors of production is an important determinant of the elasticity of demand for labor and thus of the economic effects of unionism. All else the same, the greater the elasticity of substitution, the greater is the elasticity of derived demand and the greater the displacement of labor for a given union-induced wage increase. In sectors where this elasticity is large, unions are likely to be relatively weak and able to win only slight wage gains (Freeman and Medoff, 1981 and forthcoming) or, if they win large gains, will have to pay a high price in terms of lost jobs. In the sectors where the elasticity is small, unions may be able to extract a substantial wage premium at little cost in terms of employment. Moreover, as a simple general equilibrium model indicates, the elasticity of substitution between labor and other factors in the unionized sector is a key parameter in determining the impact of the IIunion wage effect on the earnings of nonunion workers and on the efficiency of the economy (Johnson and Mieskowski, 1970). Despite the importance of the elasticity of labor demand for an analysis of unionism, little attention has been given to the absolute and magnitude of this elasticity under collective bargaining. While there is some discussion of technological change and the substitution of capital and nonproduction workers for organized production workers in the institutional literature (e.g., Slichter, 1941; Slichter, Healy and Livernash, 1960; Bok and Dunlop, 1970), modern econometric work provides no estimates of the relevant parameters. As a result, Johnson and Mieskowski (1970), Rees (1963), Lewis (1964) and others have been forced to evaluate union effects with guesstimates of the elasticities of concern in union settings. This paper attempts to fill some of the gap in our knowledge by providing estimates for U.S. manufacturing of the constant output elasticity of demand for unionized and nonunionized production workers and of the elasticity of substitution between these workers and other inputs. The analysis concentrates on what we call the relative inelasticity hypothesis, which states that the demand for production workers will be more inelastic in the presence of a union for two reasons: the likelihood that unions have organized and survived in sectors with low elasticities, and the effects of various contract provisions on the ability of management to substitute other factors for production labor. The study is divided into four sections. Section I develops the rationale for the inelasticity hypothesis and describes the nature of the empirical analysis conducted to test its validity. The second section uses a 1972 state by 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry data file for manufacturing to estimate the elasticity of substitution between production labor and both nonproduction labor and capital in the union and nonunion sectors of U.S. manufacturing industries. Section III provides estimates, based on a 1968-72 sample of manufacturing establishments, of the elasticity of substitution between production and nonproduction labor (the only two inputs for which information is available). The final section briefly summarizes the findings and discusses their implications for understanding the impact of trade unionism on the U.S. economy. To preview the ensuing discussion, our main conclusion is: Substitution between production labor and other inputs is generally lower in union Received for publication March 6, 1978. Revision accepted for publication August 17, 1981. * Both authors are with Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research. Supported by U.S. Department of Labor Grant No. J-9-M-6-0094, National Science Foundation Grant No. APT77-16279, and the National Bureau of Economic Research (under its program of research on labor economics). We are especially grateful to Jane Mather for her invaluable assistance on this project and to Greg Bialecki, Charles Brown, Gary Chamberlain, Kathy Coons, Jon Fay, Martin Van Denburgh, and Lori Wilson for their significant contributions. The study has not been reviewed by the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.