We provide evidence that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts earn lower future returns than otherwise similar stocks. This effect is most pronounced in small stocks and stocks that have performed poorly over the past year. Interpreting dispersion in analysts forecasts as a proxy for differences in opinion about a stock, we show that this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that prices will reflect the optimistic view whenever investors with the lowest valuations do not trade. By contrast, our evidence is inconsistent with a view that dispersion in analysts' forecasts proxies for risk.

We hypothesize that firms' 10-K market risk disclosures, recently mandated by SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR No. 48), reduce investors' uncertainty and diversity of opinion about the implications, for firm value, of changes in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, and commodity prices. We argue that this reduced uncertainty and diversity of opinion should dampen trading volume sensitivity to changes in these underlying market rates or prices. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that after firms disclose FRR No. 48-mandated information about their exposures to interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, and energy prices, trading volume sensitivity to changes in these underlying market rates and prices declines, even after controlling for other factors associated with trading volume. The observed declines in trading volume sensitivity are consistent with FRR No. 48 market risk disclosures providing useful information to investors.

We present a method for decomposing wholesale electricity payments into production costs, inframarginal competitive rents, and payments resulting from the exercise of market power. Using data from June 1998 to October 2000 in California, we find significant departures from competitive pricing during the high-demand summer months and near-competitive pricing during the lower-demand months of the first two years. In summer 2000, wholesale electricity expenditures were $8.98 billion up from $2.04 billion in summer 1999. We find that 21 percent of this increase was due to production costs, 20 percent to competitive rents, and 59 percent to market power.

We use the Ohlson (1995, 1999) and Feltham and Ohlson (1999) valuation models to investigate the market's perception of the economic effect of employee stock options (ESOs) on firm value for a sample of 85 profitable computer software companies. Our results suggest that the market appears to value these firms' ESO expense not as an expense but as an intangible asset (even after controlling for the endogeneity bias arising from the mechanical relation between ESOs and the underlying stock prices). However, we also find a conflict between: (1) the positive manner in which investors appear to value ESO expense, and (2) the negative relation between current ESO expense and future abnormal earnings. This conflict not only could be an artifact of the restrictiveness of the abnormal earnings forecasting equation we estimate, but it also calls into question whether investors assess correctly the effect of ESOs on profitable software firm value.

Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are “rational cheaters,” who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the “rational cheater model” by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the “rational cheater model” predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer.