Using rich data linking federal cases from arrest through to sentencing, we find that initial case and defendant characteristics, including arrest offense and criminal history, can explain most of the large raw racial disparity in federal sentences, but significant gaps remain. Across the distribution, blacks receive sentences that are almost 10 percent longer than those of comparable whites arrested for the same crimes. Most of this disparity can be explained by prosecutors’ initial charging decisions, particularly the filing of charges carrying mandatory minimum sentences. Ceteris paribus, the odds of black arrestees facing such a charge are 1.75 times higher than those of white arrestees

We study the end of race-based busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools (CMS). In 2001, school boundaries in CMS were redrawn dramatically, and half of students received a new assignment. Using addresses measured prior to the policy change, we compare students in the same neighborhood that lived on opposite sides of a newly drawn boundary. We find that both white and minority students score lower on high school exams when they are assigned to schools with more minority students. We also find decreases in high school graduation and four-year college attendance for whites and large increases in crime for minority males. We conclude that the end of race-based busing widened racial inequality, despite efforts by CMS to mitigate the effect of segregation through compensatory resource allocation.

This paper reports on recent research showing that the severe recession of 2007-2009 and the weak recovery have been due to poor economic policies and the failure to implement good policies during the past decade. Monetary policy, fiscal policy, and regulatory policy became more discretionary, more interventionist, and less predictable in comparison with the previous two decades of better economic performance. At best these policies led to growth spurts, but were followed by retrenchments, averaging to poor performance. The paper also considers alternative views-that the equilibrium interest rate declined during the decade and that the seriousness of financial crisis caused the slow recovery.

This study uses corporate tax return data to examine the evolution of firms' financial structure and performance after leveraged buyouts (LBOs) for a comprehensive sample of 317 LBOs taking place between 1995 and 2007. We find little evidence of operating improvements subsequent to an LBO, although consistent with prior studies, we do observe operating improvements in the set of LBO firms that have public financial statements. We also find that firms do not reduce leverage after LBOs, even if they generate excess cash flow. Our results suggest that effecting a sustained change in capital structure is a conscious objective of the LBO structure.

We investigate whether or not market discipline on banking firms changed after the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010. If market discipline is improved, we should see a lower discount for size on yield spreads, particularly for banks identified as too-big-to-fail (TBTF) or systemically important (SIFI). Using secondary market subordinated debt transactions we find that the size discount is reduced by 47% and TBTF discount is reduced by 94% after the DFA. The DFA has been effective in reducing, but not in eliminating the size and TBTF discounts on yield spreads. Market discipline of banks appears to have improved further after the rating criteria changes by Moody’s.

The board independence requirements enacted in conjunction with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided motivation for firms that were already compliant with the regulations to alter their board structure. We consider actual board changes made by compliant firms and how such changes affect the monitoring efficiency of the boards. We find that the majority of compliant firms (approximately 56%) add independent directors following SOX. However, we find a nontrivial number of firms (approximately 26%) actually decrease the number of independent directors to move closer to the stated 50% requirement. For firms that decrease independence, the CEO turnover performance sensitivity significantly decreases following SOX. We also find that large board independence changes seem to be most detrimental to the monitoring function of the board. Our results highlight that SOX may have had unintended consequences.

This paper presents a flexible, lattice-based structural credit risk model that uses equity market information and a detailed depiction of a financial institution’s liability structure to analyze default risk. The model is applied to examine the term structure of default probabilities for Lehman Brothers prior to its demise. The results indicate, as early as March, that the firm would likely lose access to external capital within two years. The model can be used as both a diagnostic tool for the early detection of financial distress and a prescriptive tool for addressing the sources of risk in large, complex financial institutions.

We investigate the existence and importance of family welfare cultures, where the receipt of a welfare program by one generation causes increased participation in the next generation. Our context is Norway’s disability insurance (DI) system. To overcome the challenge of correlated unobservables across generations, we take advantage of random assignment of judges to DI applicants whose cases are initially denied. Some appeal judges are systematically more lenient, which leads to random variation in the probability a parent will be allowed DI. Using this exogenous variation, we find strong evidence for a causal link across generations: when a parent is allowed DI at the appeal stage, their adult child’s participation over the next five years increases by 6 percentage points. This effect grows over time, rising to 12 percentage points after 10 years. Although these findings are specific to our setting, they highlight that welfare reforms can have long-lasting effects on program participation, since any original effect on the current generation could be reinforced by changing the participation behavior of their children as well. The detailed nature of our data allows us to compare the intergenerational transmission with spillover effects in other networks and to explore mechanisms.

The experience from the global financial crisis has raised serious concerns about the accuracy of standard risk measures as tools for the quantification of extreme downward risks. A key reason for this is that risk measures are subject to a model risk due, e.g. to specification and estimation uncertainty. While regulators have proposed that financial institutions assess the model risk, there is no accepted approach for computing such a risk. We propose a remedy for this by a general framework for the computation of risk measures robust to model risk by empirically adjusting the imperfect risk forecasts by outcomes from backtesting frameworks, considering the desirable quality of VaR models such as the frequency, independence and magnitude of violations. We also provide a fair comparison between the main risk models using the same metric that corresponds to model risk required corrections.

We examine contemporaneous jumps (cojumps) among individual stocks and a proxy for the market portfolio. We show, through a Monte Carlo study, that using intraday jump tests and a coexceedance criterion to detect cojumps has a power similar to the cojump test proposed by Bollerslev et al. (2008). However, we also show that we should not expect to detect all common jumps comprising a cojump when using such coexceedance based detection methods. Empirically, we provide evidence of an association between jumps in the market portfolio and cojumps in the underlying stocks. Consistent with our Monte Carlo evidence, moderate numbers of stocks are often detected to be involved in these (systematic) cojumps. Importantly, the results suggest that market-level news is able to generate simultaneous large jumps in individual stocks. We also find evidence of an association between systematic cojumps and Federal Funds Target Rate announcements.