I examine three composite analyst forecast of earnings per share as proxies for expected earnings. The most current forecast weakly dominates the mean and median forecasts in accuracy. This is evidence that forecast dates are more relevant for determining accuracy than individual error. Consistent with previous research, I find analysts more accurate than time-series models. However prior knowledge of forecast errors from a quarterly autoregressive model predicts excess stock returns better than prior knowledge of analysts' errors. This is inconsistent with previous research, and is anomalous given analysts' greater accuracy.

Abstract. I examine how an internal auditor, called the firm, designs a control system for a strategic employee who conditions his thefts on the amount and types of controls. Society sets minimum testing amounts and fines for detected theft, whereas the firm determines the employee's wages and the amount of monitoring above the minimum. The results fall into three separate cases. When society's minimum testing standards and fines are sufficiently high, the employee never steals in any period. In this case, the firm performs the minimum amount of testing and pays the lowest feasible wage. In the remaining two cases, the testing standard and fines are too low to prevent theft by themselves. In these two cases the firm's control system determines whether there will be theft in the first period. I show that if the firm chooses to prevent all first‐period theft, then it uses only one type of control. She offers a wage premium and monitors the minimum amount. The wage premium substitutes for a tine large enough to prevent all theft. If the firm designs controls that do not prevent all theft, then the firm also uses only one control. In contrast to the no‐theft case, the firm pays the lowest feasible wage and monitors above the minimum. This choice reflects the increasing returns to scale of monitoring in preventing theft.

Much of the comparative economic history of the nineteenth century focuses on the spread of the Industrial Revolution from Britain. Incomes converged, in this view, as the transfer of superior technology raised incomes in the periphery. In Globalization and History, Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson challenge this technological approach, arguing that neoclassical effects of trade and factor supply changes provide more insight. Increased trade, stimulated by falling transportation costs, and factor movements caused prices of locally scarce factors to fall and promoted factor price convergence.

My colleagues at Williams, especially Thomas McCoy, James Halstead, Thomas Tietenberg, and Donald Keesing, gave me invaluable criticism on this paper. At an earlier stage, Mark Perlman 's comments were particularly helpful as were those of Roger Bolton, Stephen Lewis, William Gates, Helen Hughes, Earl McFarland and Francisco Thoumi. A Ford Foundation grant (720-0234), the Williams College Center for Development Economics and the World Bank Capital Utilization Research Project made important contributions to this work. Opinions and errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, all mine.

A preliminary draft of this paper was presented at the Decemnber, 1971 meetings of the Econometric Society. This paper has benefited from the perceptive comments of a number of readers; I am particularly indebted to Ronald Bodkin, Stewart Gillmor, Zvi Griliches, Sherwin Rosen and the referees. Assistance in data compilation was provided by Peter Brubaker, Maureen Donahoe, Charles Eckert, Marshall E. Goldman, Stephen Kalos, Lawrence Kenny, Richard LeClair, and Thurman Northcross. Computations were executed on the Wesleyan University IBM 1130 computer. Research support has been provided by Wesleyan University and National Science Foundation Research Grant GS 2903.