[This paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long-term interests in order to boost current profits. If stockholders are imperfectly informed, temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued, increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price; hence the managerial concern with current bottom line. The magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors, including the attitudes and beliefs of shareholders, the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information, and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms.]

This paper extends the classical test for structural change in linear regression models (see Chow (1960)) to a wide variety of nonlinear models, estimated by a variety of different procedures. Wald, Lagrange multiplier-like, and likelihood ratio-like test statistics are introduced. The results allow for heterogeneity and temporal dependence of the observations. In the process of developing the above tests, the paper also provides a compact presentation of general unifying results for estimation and testing in nonlinear parametric econometric models.

This article surveys the seventeen papers in this special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics, and related work. The major findings are: (1) patterns of stock ownership by insiders and outsiders can influence managerial behavior, corporate performance, and stockholder voting in election contests; (2) corporate leverage, inside stock ownership by managers, and the control market are interrelated; (3) departures from one share/one vote affect firm value and efficiency; (4) takeover resistance through defensive restructurings or poison pill provisions is associated with declines in share price; and (5) top management turnover is inversely related to share price performance.

Generally, utilities issue straight fixed-rate preferreds, industrials issue convertible fixed-rate preferreds, and financials issue adjustable-rate preferreds. The corresponding announcement-period common stock abnormal returns are economically insignificant for utilities, negative and significant at the 0.05 level for industrials, and positive and significant at the 0.10 level for financials. Information effects explain the cross-sectional results for industrial firms, but tax benefits and/or regulatory conditions are more likely explanations of the results documented for financial corporations and utilities. Returns to preferred stockholders support neither the wealth redistribution- hypothesis nor the price-pressure hypothesis.

HD28 .M414 no.2062-88,

Abstract Reviews the book "Current Budgeting Practices in U.S. Industries," by Srinivasan Umapathy.

[This paper discusses the problem of equity accounting for reciprocal stockholdings. Alternative accounting treatments are presented. Illustrations of some of these alternatives are discussed which are drawn from actual practice in New Zealand. The treatments are classified and evaluated according to two broad underlying theories of equity accounting.]

[Developments of accounting concepts and procedures in governmental, religious, and eleemosynary organizations have received scant attention in the literature. This study examines an extensive store of primary documents that chronicle the early development of the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in eighteenth century England. It concludes that the immediate impetus for auditing in the Society came from business practices rather than from government and that rudimentary managerial accounting procedures emerged in the Society as a result of internal needs for planning and control in much the same way they were emerging in businesses of the period.]

Abstract Developments of accounting concepts and procedures in governmental, religious, and eleemosynary organizations have received scant attention in the literature. This study examines an extensive store of primary documents that chronicle the early development of the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in eighteenth century England. It concludes that the immediate impetus for auditing in the Society came from business practices rather than from government and that rudimentary managerial accounting procedures emerged in the Society as a result of internal needs for planning and control in much the same way they were emerging in businesses of the period.