The market for credit cards has been the subject of recent attention and controversy because of ‘high’ profits earned on credit cards and substantial premiums on the resale of credit-card receivables. This paper estimates risk—return profiles for credit-card banks and explores the role of intangible assets in determining resale premiums on credit-card receivables. In addition, the effects on the resale market of securitization and the opportunity cost of acquiring new accounts are analyzed. Using alternative measures of risk and alternative control groups, we find, for the years 1989 to 1995, that credit-card banks earned significantly higher returns on assets but that these returns were associated with greater risk-taking. Analysis of premia for the years 1993 to 1995 suggest that acquiring banks pay higher premia for mid-sized regional accounts than for larger, national portfolios, perhaps because of richer cross-selling opportunities.

Over the last decade, there has been considerable public debate in the U.S. on the need to maintain legal barriers (firewalls) between commercial and non-traditional banking. However, no theoretical model has yet been developed that examines the joint influence of various factors suggested, such as competition, production economies and regulatory subsidies that affect the bank's incentive to undertake non-traditional activities. This paper applies a stochastic control model to examine the joint effects of these factors on a bank's optimal investment decisions in non-traditional banking and develops some empirically testable hypotheses.

This paper assesses the importance of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates for the interest-rate channel of monetary policy. We simulate several interest-rate setting policy rules with either high or low inflation targets. We determine the extent to which the zero bound prevents real rates from falling, thus cushioning aggregate output in response to negative spending shocks. For small temporary and large permanent shocks, the output path with zero inflation lies modestly below that for higher inflation. For large shocks persisting a few quarters, differences in output paths across high- and low-inflation scenarios can be larger.

Unlike operating company IPOs, Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs in the 1970s and 1980s were initially overpriced and subsequently underperformed other REIT securities in the 100 trading days after initial issuance. In contrast. equity REIT IPOs in the 1990s have been underpriced. on average by 3.6%. and have moderately outperformed seasoned equity REITs in the 100 trading days after issuance. We attribute the initial-day underpricing of recent REIT IPOs to greater valuation uncertainty and greater institutional involvement in the recent REIT IPO market. Both of these factors make these issues more susceptible to the ‘winner's curse’.

This paper argues that the typical household's saving is better described by a “buffer-stock” version than by the traditional version of the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC/PIH) model. Buffer-stock behavior emerges if consumers with important income uncertainty are sufficiently impatient. In the traditional model, consumption growth is determined solely by tastes. In contrast, buffer-stock consumers set average consumption growth equal to average labor income growth, regardless of tastes. The model can explain three empirical puzzles: the “consumption/income parallel” documented by Carroll and Summers; the “consumption/income divergence” first documented in the 1930s; and the stability of the household age/wealth profile over time despite the unpredictability of idiosyncratic wealth changes.

This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.

This study provides evidence that transaction costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.

This article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scare resources to competing projects in an internal capital market. Unlike a bank, headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in 'winner-picking'–the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another. By doing a good job in the winner-picking dimension, headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firmwide credit constraints. The model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects.

ABSTRACT This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one‐in‐three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.