This study investigates the relationship between economic conditions and health. Total mortality and eight of the ten sources of fatalities examined are shown to exhibit a procyclical fluctuation, with suicides representing an important exception. The variations are largest for those causes and age groups where behavioral responses are most plausible, and there is some evidence that the unfavorable health effects of temporary upturns are partially or fully offset if the economic growth is long-lasting. An accompanying analysis of micro data indicates that smoking and obesity increase when the economy strengthens, whereas physical activity is reduced and diet becomes less healthy.

Equity financing is modeled when cash flows and asset values are not verifiable. Investors have enforceable property rights to the firm's assets, but cannot prevent insiders (managers or entrepreneurs) from capturing cash flow. Insiders must coinvest and pay in each period a dividend sufficient to ensure outside investors' participation for at least one more period. Intervention by the investors must be limited by an agreement with insiders or by costs of collective action. Basic models are extended to show why firms go public and why agency costs necessarily arise when the act of investment is not immediately verifiable.

This study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management's published cash flow projections. We estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value. We find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value, but the dispersion of valuation errors is very wide-the sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20% to greater than 250%. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders' incentives to overstate or understate the firm's value.

This paper tests, using U.S. data, the dynamics implied by the NAIRU view of the relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate. The results are somewhat sensitive to the measure of inflation used, but they generally reject the dynamics. An alternative way of thinking about the relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate is suggested.

Abstract We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs.

We examine the investment behavior of market participants within different international markets (i.e., US, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), specifically with regard to their tendency to exhibit herd behavior. We find no evidence of herding on the part of market participants in the US and Hong Kong and partial evidence of herding in Japan. However, for South Korea and Taiwan, the two emerging markets in our sample, we document significant evidence of herding. The results are robust across various size-based portfolios and over time. Furthermore, macroeconomic information rather than firm-specific information tends to have a more significant impact on investor behavior in markets which exhibit herding. In all five markets, the rate of increase in security return dispersion as a function of the aggregate market return is higher in up market, relative to down market days. This is consistent with the directional asymmetry documented by McQueen et al. (1996) (McQueen, G., Pinegar, M.A., Thorley, S., 1996. Journal of Finance 51, 889–919).

Productivity Levels and International Competitiveness between Canadian and U.S. Industries by Frank C. Lee and Jianmin Tang. Published in volume 90, issue 2, pages 176-179 of American Economic Review, May 2000

This paper uses microeconomic data from the U.K. Family Expenditure Surveys (FES) and the General Household Surveys (GHS) to describe and explain changes in the distribution of male wages. Since the late 1970s wage inequality has risen very fast in the U.K., and this rise is characterized both by increasing education and age differentials. We show that a large part of the changes in the U.K. can be summarized quite simply as increases in eduction differentials and a decline of growth of entry level wages which persist subsequently. This fact we interpret as cohort effects. We also show that, like in the U.S., an important aspect of rising wage inequality is increased within-group wage dispersion. Finally we use the GHS to evaluate the role of alternative education measures.

This study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management's published cash flow projections. We estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value. We find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value, but the dispersion of valuation errors is very wide - the sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20% to greater than 250%. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders' incentives to overstate or understate the firm's value.

We present evidence that managerial shareholdings are an important determinant of bank risk-taking. Managerial shareholdings are positively related to total and firm specific risk in the late 1980s when banking was relatively less regulated and when the industry was under considerable financial stress. However, following legislation in 1989 and 1991 designed to reduce risk-taking and also reflecting substantial improvements in bank franchise value, managerial shareholdings and total and firm specific risk became negatively related in the early 1990s. In contrast, systematic risk was unrelated to managerial ownership in both periods.