Against the background of the great financial crisis, this paper assesses the merits of bank-based versus market-based financing by exploring the relationship between financial structure and systemic risk. The findings indicate that bank-based financial structures are associated with higher systemic risk than market-based financial structures. In relatively bank-based financial structures, bank financing is found to increase systemic risk while market financing decreases systemic risk. By contrast, in relatively market-based financial structures, bank and market financing do not impact systemic risk. Together, the results signal that market-based financial structures are more resilient to systemic risk.

We establish a link between firms managing investors’ performance expectations, earnings announcement premiums, and cyclical patterns (i.e., seasonalities) in returns. Firms that are more likely to manage expectations toward beatable levels predictably earn lower returns before, and higher returns during, their earnings announcements. This pattern repeats across firms’ fiscal quarters, suggesting firms manufacture positive “surprises” by negatively biasing investors’ expectations ahead of announcing earnings. We corroborate these findings using non-price-based outcomes indicative of expectations management. Together, our findings are consistent with the pressure for firms to meet earnings targets shaping the cross-section of firms’ stock returns.

Priority spreading refers to the practice of firms increasing their reliance on secured and subordinated debt and reducing their reliance on senior debt as their credit quality deteriorates. We argue that priority spreading occurs because security provides creditors with greater protection from dilution from other creditors than do covenants that prioritize payments. Consistent with this argument, we find that secured bank creditors are rarely diluted by junior creditors in distressed restructurings, whereas senior unsecured creditors are frequently diluted, exogenous increases in asset volatility result in greater priority spreading and yields on senior and subordinated bonds converge as asset volatility increases. Received January 22, 2018; editorial decision January 27, 2019 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We provide new evidence on the role of real money balances in terms of explaining equity risk premia by using a rich cross-section of average stock returns (associated with 11 major CAPM anomalies). By estimating Euler equations associated with a cash-in-advance (CIA) model, we find that such model produces substantially smaller pricing errors than the baseline consumption model, while still generating lower estimates of the risk aversion coefficient. The estimates of the parameter governing the share of cash goods are highly significant and plausible in economic terms. A transaction-costs model and a money-in-the-utility model perform considerably worse than the CIA model, both in terms of statistical fit and in terms of the plausibility of the structural parameter estimates. Moreover, a linear version of the CIA model also largely underperforms the corresponding non-linear model.

ABSTRACT We decompose the returns of five well‐known anomalies into cash flow and discount rate news. Common patterns emerge across the five factor portfolios and their mean‐variance efficient (MVE) combination. Whereas discount rate news predominates in market returns, systematic cash flow news drives the returns of anomaly portfolios and their MVE combination with the market portfolio. Anomaly cash flow and discount rate shocks are largely uncorrelated with market cash flow and discount rate shocks and with business cycle fluctuations. These rich empirical patterns restrict the joint dynamics of firm cash flows and the pricing kernel, thereby informing models of stocks' expected returns.

ABSTRACT China's split‐share reform of 2005 (the Reform) converts the previously restricted shares held by founding shareholders to shares tradable on the open market. Against this backdrop, we study how underwriter‐affiliated analysts and firms' large shareholders interact in the event of the latter's sales of restricted shares. We document that recommendations made by affiliated analysts are significantly more optimistic when firms' large shareholders plan to sell their restricted shares. This optimism, however, is associated with negative post‐sale stock returns, suggesting large shareholders profit from share sales. Furthermore, large shareholders sell more restricted shares through the affiliated brokerages for which analysts have issued more optimistic recommendations and firms under their control are more likely to appoint such brokerages as lead underwriters when they refinance in the future. The affiliated analysts also conduct more site visits to the firms after the share sales, thereby improving their earnings‐forecast accuracy. Our analysis shows how conflicts of interest by financial intermediaries arise following the Reform and lead to large shareholders' extraction of rents from public investors.

ABSTRACT Inadequate testing of fair value accounting estimates, including goodwill, is often cited as an audit deficiency in PCAOB inspection reports, and, in some cases, these deficiencies have led to enforcement actions against the auditor. As a result of these issues, the PCAOB recently proposed a new auditing standard for fair value accounting. While these regulatory actions suggest that auditors are challenged by the fair value regime of accounting for goodwill, they also highlight an area where the auditor could be influenced by their financial ties to a client. In this study, we test whether nonaudit fees are associated with goodwill impairment decision outcomes. Our results indicate that the nonaudit fees a client pays are inversely related to the likelihood of impairment in settings where goodwill is likely to be impaired. Additional examinations suggest that the negative relation between nonaudit fees and auditor independence is driven by clients who are most incentivized to exert their influence over the auditor.

Many industries have become increasingly concentrated through mergers and acquisitions, which in health care may have important consequences for spending and outcomes. Using a rich panel of Medicare claims data for nearly one million dialysis patients, we advance the literature on the effects of mergers and acquisitions by studying the precise ways providers change their behavior following an acquisition. We base our empirical analysis on more than 1,200 acquisitions of independent dialysis facilities by large chains over a 12-year period and find that chains transfer several prominent strategies to the facilities they acquire. Most notably, acquired facilities converge to the behavior of their new parent companies by increasing patients’ doses of highly reimbursed drugs, replacing high-skill nurses with less-skilled technicians, and waitlisting fewer patients for kidney transplants. We then show that patients fare worse as a result of these changes: outcomes such as hospitalizations and mortality deteriorate, with our long panel allowing us to identify these effects from within-facility or within-patient variation around the acquisitions. Because overall Medicare spending increases at acquired facilities, mostly as a result of higher drug reimbursements, this decline in quality corresponds to a decline in value for payers. We conclude the article by considering the channels through which acquisitions produce such large changes in provider behavior and outcomes, finding that increased market power cannot explain the decline in quality. Rather, the adoption of the acquiring firm’s strategies and practices drives our main results, with greater economies of scale for drug purchasing responsible for more than half of the change in profits following an acquisition.

We develop a heterogeneous-beliefs asset pricing model with microeconomic foundations that reproduces asset prices, cash flows and trading activity in a real asset economy. In contrast to the majority of financial markets’ behavioural models, and in line with the nature of the shipping industry, in this model agents extrapolate fundamentals. Formal estimation of the model indicates that an economy where a small fraction of agents significantly extrapolates fundamentals can explain the positive relation between earnings, vessel prices, and trading activity.

In the 2000 s, U.S. commercial real estate (CRE) prices experienced a boom and bust as dramatic as the more widely analyzed swings in house prices and contributed significantly to bank failures. We model short-run and long-run movements in capitalization rates (rent-to-price-ratio) and risk premia for office building and apartments. In the mid-2000s’ boom, CRE prices were mainly driven by declines in required risk premia that stemmed from a weakening of capital requirements. In the bust, CRE price declines were initially driven by a jump in general risk premia and later by a tightening of effective capital requirements on commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from the Dodd-Frank Act. The subsequent recovery in CRE prices was induced and sustained by unusually low real Treasury yields. We conclude that macro-prudential regulation of leverage may help limit asset price booms by preventing sharp declines in risk premia.