Many firms with dividend reinvestment plans also allow their shareholders to voluntarily invest supplemental funds to purchase additional shares. The purchase price for newly‐issued shares often is determined by the average stock price over a prespecified time period preceding the investment date. This gives the firm's shareholders an option to invest in additional shares only when the stock price exceeds the computed average. This paper uses both theoretical and numerical methods to analyze the value of these voluntary purchase options in theory and practice.

In this paper, we examine sequential exercise strategies by warrantholders and the gain from hoarding warrants. We analyze several obstacles to acquiring large blocks in order to exploit sequential strategies. First, we identify several reinvestment policies for which sequential exercise is not advantageous, thereby eliminating the gain from hoarding. However, sequential exercise strategies may be advantageous for monopoly or oligopoly warrantholders, even absent dividends, because using exercise proceeds to repurchase stock or to expand the firm's scale increases the riskiness of an equity share. Second, oligopoly warrantholders can receive a smaller warrant value than perfectly competitive warrantholders, suggesting a potential cost to unsuccessful hoarding.

The due‐on‐sale clause contained in most conventional home mortgage contracts is equivalent to a prepayment penalty equal to the difference between the face value and market value of the loan. We analyze a bilateral game with asymmetric information and show that the bank demands the full penalty unless the market value of the loan is sufficiently low. In that case, the bank demands a prepayment penalty which is independent of the market value of the loan in order to induce additional prepayments. We also demonstrate, by a risk‐sharing argument, that the due‐on‐sale clause is optimal in some settings, even though it eliminates some beneficial home sales.

Before the opening of the Paris Bourse, traders place orders and indicative prices are set. This offers a laboratory to study empirically the tâtonnement process through which markets discover equilibrium prices. Since preopening orders can be revised or canceled before the opening, indicative prices could be noise. We test this against the hypothesis that preopening prices reflect learning.Early in the preopening the noise hypothesis is not rejected. As the opening gets closer, the informational content and efficiency of prices increase and the learning hypothesis is not rejected. We also propose a GMM‐based estimate of the speed of learning.

Option wholesalers specialize in purchasing and executing against retail option order flow. Orders are internalized via auctions (which provide price improvement) and the limit order book. Designated market makers (DMMs) have a key advantage in internalizing limit order book trades: they obtain the first five contracts of any order they bring to an exchange where they are a DMM. We exploit variation in DMM assignments and allocation rules to highlight how these rules create a barrier to entry in option wholesaling that does not exist for equity wholesaling, protecting wholesaler profits and high option PFOF.

As a centralized, computerized, limit order market, the Paris Bourse is particularly appropriate for studying the interaction between the order book and order flow. Descriptive methods capture the richness of the data and distinctive aspects of the market structure. Order flow is concentrated near the quote, while the depth of the book is somewhat larger at nearby valuations. We analyze the supply and demand of liquidity. For example, thin books elicit orders and thick books result in trades. To gain price and time priority, investors quickly place orders within the quotes when the depth at the quotes or the spread is large. Consistent with information effects, downward (upward) shifts in both bid and ask quotes occur after large sales (purchases).

This article characterizes optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio decisions in the presence of capital gains taxes and short-sale restrictions. The optimal decisions are a function of the investor's age, initial portfolio holdings, and tax basis. Our results capture the trade-off between the diversification benefits and tax costs of trading over an investor's lifetime. The incentive to rediversify the portfolio is inversely related to the size of the embedded gain and investor's age. Contrary to standard financial advice, the optimal equity holding increases well into an investor's lifetime in our model due to the forgiveness of capital gains taxes at death.

[This article reexamines the value of tax trading when the tax rate on long-term realizations is less than that on short-term realizations. In particular, the value of the option to realize long-term capital gains and repurchase stock in order to increase one's tax basis and restart the option to realize future losses short term is examined empirically. Our estimate of the incremental value of restarting, which is based on the results of simulations of several alternative tax trading policies over a large number of independent return sequences, is generally much smaller than that reported by Constantinides (1984). The incremental value of restarting is shown to depend critically on the particular pattern of realized returns and the assumed tax treatment of unrealized capital gains at the end of the simulation period. The effects of stock price volatility, transaction costs, portfolio offset rules, and realization cutoff levels on the value of tax trading are also investigated.]