This paper deals with the evaluation of some public employment policies set up in France during the 1980's to improve the labour market prospects of unskilled young workers. The evaluation implemented in this paper is restricted to the impact of such public measures on durations and outcomes of subsequent spells of unemployment and employment. The econometric study is conducted with non-experimental longitudinal microdata recording individual labour market histories. A particular attention is paid to the differential effects of various types of measures, according to the educational level of recipients. Programmes involving a higher level of on-the-job training, such as alternating work/training programmes in private firms, are principally beneficial to the less educated young workers. In contrast, for more educated young workers, “work fare” programmes in the public sector decrease the intensity of transition from the subsequent unemployment spell to regular jobs; for that subgroup, “work fare” programmes may act as a signal of low employment performance.

We present an information-based explanation for spinoffs. When the various divisions of a firm are spun off into several firms that have separate stock market listings, the number of traded securities increases. This makes the price system more informative. It improves the quality of the investment decisions made by managers and reduces uninformed investors' uncertainty about the value of the divisions. Both effects serve to increase the sum total of the market values of the spun-off divisions above the market value of the original firm.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G14, G34.

The authors conduct a unique test of adverse selection in the equity issuance process. While common stock is the dominant means of payment in bank mergers, stock acquisition agreements provide target shareholders with varying degrees of protection against adverse price movements in the bidder's stock between the time of the merger agreement and the time of merger completion. The authors show that it is the degree of protection against adverse price changes and not the percent of stock offered in a bank merger that explains bidder merger announcement abnormal returns. This result is difficult to explain outside of an adverse selection framework.

Fama and French (1992) document a significant relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns for nonfinancial firms. Because of their initial interest in leverage as an explanatory variable for security returns, Fama and French exclude from their analysis financial firms, thus creating a natural holdout sample on which to test the robustness of their results. The authors document that the relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns is similar for financial and nonfinancial firms. In addition, they present evidence that survivorship bias does not significantly affect the estimated size or book-to-market premiums in returns. The authors' results indicate data-snooping and selection biases do not explain the size and book-to-market patterns in returns.

Fama and French (1992) document a significant relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns for nonfinancial firms. Because of their initial interest in leverage as an explanatory variable for security returns, Fama and French exclude from their analysis financial firms, thus creating a natural holdout sample on which to test the robustness of their results. We document that the relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns is similar for financial and nonfinancial firms. In addition, we present evidence that survivorship bias does not significantly affect the estimated size or book-to-market premiums in returns. Our results indicate data-snooping and selection biases do not explain the size and book-to-market patterns in returns.

Fama and French (1992) document a significant relation between firm size, book‐to‐market ratios, and security returns for nonfinancial firms. Because of their initial interest in leverage as an explanatory variable for security returns, Fama and French exclude from their analysis financial firms, thus creating a natural holdout sample on which to test the robustness of their results. We document that the relation between firm size, book‐to‐market ratios, and security returns is similar for financial and nonfinancial firms. In addition, we present evidence that survivorship bias does not significantly affect the estimated size or book‐to‐market premiums in returns. Our results indicate data‐snooping and selection biases do not explain the size and book‐to‐market patterns in returns.

While it is widely believed by academics, politicians, and the popular press that incumbent members of Congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district, the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak. One explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays. Since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort, the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias. We address this estimation problem using instrumental variables. For each House district, we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district. Federal spending is affected by a large number of actors (e.g., governors, senators, mayors, and other House members in the state delegation), leading to positive correlations in federal spending across the House districts within states. However, federal spending outside of a district is unlikely to be strongly correlated with the strength of that district's electoral challenge. In contrast to previous studies, we find strong evidence that federal spending benefits congressional incumbents: an additional $100 per capita in spending is worth as much as 2 percent of the popular vote. The only category of federal spending that does not appear to yield electoral rewards is direct transfers to individuals.

While it is widely believed by academics, politicians, and the popular press that incumbent members of Congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district, the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak. One explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays. Since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort, the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias. We address this estimation problem using instrumental variables. For each House district, we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district. Federal spending is affected by a large number of actors (e.g., governors, senators, mayors, and other House members in the state delegation), leading to positive correlations in federal spending across the House districts within states. However, federal spending outside of a district is unlikely to be strongly correlated with the strength of that district's electoral challenge. In contrast to previous studies, we find strong evidence that federal spending benefits congressional incumbents: an additional $100 per capita in spending is worth as much as 2 percent of the popular vote. The only category of federal spending that does not appear to yield electoral rewards is direct transfers to individuals.

Using Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics data for 1979 and 1988, the authors analyze how a falling gender wage gap occurred despite changes in wage structure unfavorable to low-wage workers. The decrease is traced to 'gender-specific' factors which more than counterbalanced changes in measured and unmeasured prices working against women. Supply shifts net of demand were unfavorable for women generally and hurt high-skilled more than middle- and low-skilled women. By analyzing wages, the authors find support for the notion of a gender twist in supply and demand having its largest negative effect on high-skilled women.