Income smoothing, Chemical industry, Real smoothing, Artificial smoothing

In addition to being a function of traditional fundamentals such as cash-flow persistence and the discount rate, the equilibrium association between a security price and a value-relevant statistic can simply be a function of what rational investors believe the association will be. We refer to this phenomenon as beliefs-driven price association (BPA). By explicitly considering the phenomenon of BPA, we show that the price response to information releases can vary over time even if the risk-free interest rate and investor preferences are static and the earnings/cash flow generating process is stable. This observation suggests, for example, that price-to-earnings associations and price volatility can vary over time even if a stable pattern of economic fundamentals suggests otherwise. The possibility of BPA suggests that measures of the cost of capital, information content, and growth prospects inferred from observed market prices will be confounded. While we do not predict when periods of BPA will arise, we provide empirically testable predictions about how prices should behave during periods of BPA. In particular, we predict that, during sufficiently long periods of high (positive or negative) BPA, price volatility, price levels, and expected returns will be higher than would be implied by a fundamental valuation framework. Finally, while BPA in the pricing of one security does not cause BPA in the pricing of other securities, the price levels of those other securities will be affected if the securities with BPA are sufficiently large relative to the market as a whole.

Journal Article Note on Inter-Commodity Relationships in Demand Get access E. E. Lewis E. E. Lewis Washington, DC Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 5, Issue 1, October 1937, Pages 53–59, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967579 Published: 01 October 1937

"This article investigates the effects of welfare payments, wages, and unemployment on women's probability of interstate migration [in the United States]. It also investigates if the income attraction of locations varies with recency of labor market experience. Welfare gains increase the probability of interstate migration. Welfare effects are largest for single mothers with small children and stronger among women with no recent labor market experience. The welfare effects, albeit small, are larger than the wage effects. The wage effects are weaker among women with no recent work experience. Ethnic-specific analyses suggest differences in migration behavior among Anglos, African-Americans, and Puerto Ricans."

This paper examines the role of seniority in two interrelated phenomena-rising age-earnings profiles and the use of layoffs rather than wage adjustments during economic decline. The results suggest that rehiring based on a seniority-first criterion is not inconsistent with an approach that maximizes worker productivity within a heterogeneous labor force. Moreover, assessment of worker reliability based on the upward portion of the wage-productivity cum seniority locus is appropriate since it reduces subsequent turnover. Thus, an approach that combines human capital accumulation with Lazear-type deferred payments schemes explains much of long-term worker-firm attachment.

This paper addresses the First Theorem of Welfare Economics in a moral hazard environment. An entrepreneur sells equity in a firm which he supplies with an unobservable, costly input. How much equity he retains determines his incentives and is observed by investors. The investors have rational expectaions which cause the equity price to increase in the amount of equity the entrepreneur retains. This gives the entrepreneur an incentive to retain equity and hence supply input. The entrepreneur may also be bound by an explicit incentive contract. In this framework, not all competitive equilibria are efficient, as defined relative to the moral hazard constraint. However, equilibria can be inefficient only if the entrepreneur's optimal input is nonunique or exhibits positive income effects.

We formalize the effects of an earnings disclosure on security prices under an assumption of limited liability. We derive various nonlinear relations between equity prices and earnings under a variety of capital structure assumptions and. if possible, we tie the relations attained to results from the existing empirical literature. We also characterize how debt prices respond to earnings when holders of debt have limited liability. Finally, we analyze how changes in the degree of leverage and conversion features of debt affect the relation between price and earnings.

Family income is a positive predictor of children's health, human capital, and later-life earnings, but determining the extent to which these associations reflect causal effects is challenging. A recent wave of natural and randomized experiments, together with increased accessibility of large-scale administrative data, are allowing us to gain new perspectives about the importance of families' monetary resources in the U.S. and other high-income countries. This review pulls the emerging literature together to provide deeper insights into what we know, and what we don't know, about the extent to which policies that provide more generous income transfers could make a difference to children's life chances. My reading of the evidence suggests that policies providing financial resources to economically vulnerable families have the potential to improve children's outcomes. The magnitude of predicted impacts varies considerably across studies, however, and may be related to specific features of the income-generating event that researchers' leverage.

This essay reviews new histories of the role of game theory and rational decision making in shaping the social sciences, economics among them, in the postwar period. The recent books The World the Game Theorists Made by Paul Erickson and How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality by Paul Erickson, Judy Klein, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, Thomas Sturm, and Michael Gordin raise a number of complex historical questions about the interconnections among game theory, utility theory, decision theory, optimization theory, information theory, and theories of rational choice. Moreover, the contingencies of time, place, and person call into question the usefulness of economists' linear narratives about the autonomous and progressive development of modern economics. The essay finally reflects on the challenges that these issues present for historians of recent economics. (JEL B23, C70, D74, N42)