Abstract Reviews the book "Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior," by James S. Duesenberry.

Does attendance affect performance in college economics courses? David Romer (1993) found that attendance did contribute significantly to the academic performance of students in a large intermediate macroeconomics course that he taught in the fall of 1990. (See the Summer 1994, Journal of Economic Perspectives [vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 205-15] for numerous comments on Romer.) This conclusion held even after controlling for student motivation which, it may be argued, is the true factor determining performance and is only approximated by attendance. An earlier study by Kang Park and Peter Kerr (1990) found that attendance was a determinant of student performance in a money and banking course, but not as important as a student's GPA and the percentile rank on a college entrance exam. A study by Robert Schmidt (1983) reported that time spent attending lectures contributed positively to performance in a macroeconomic Principles course. On the other side of the ledger is evidence from Neil Browne et al. (1991) showing that students who did not attend a typically structured class with lectures did just as well on the Test of Understanding College Economics (TUCE) as those students who attended a standard microeconomic Principles course. They also reported, however, that those students who attended the lectures performed better on essay questions than those who did not. A similar study by Campbell McConnell and C. Lamphear (1969) found no significant difference in the performance of students with no classroom attendance vis-a-vis those attending class. Finally, Stephen Buckles and M. E. McMahon (1971) found attendance at lectures that simply explained material covered in reading assignments did not enhance students' understanding of economics. In this paper we present new evidence on the effects of class attendance on student performance. Our results pertain to the Principles of Economics course as it is taught in a two-semester sequence at a medium-size, comprehensive state university.

We study the interactions among geographical mobility, unemployment, and home-ownership in an economy with heterogeneous locations, endogenous construction, and search frictions in the markets for both labour and housing. The decision of home-owners to accept job offers from other cities depends on how quickly they can sell their houses ( i.e. the houses' liquidity ), which in turn depends on local labour market conditions. Consequently, home-owners accept job offers from other cities at a lower rate than do renters, generating a link between home-ownership and unemployment both at the city level and in the aggregate. When calibrated to match aggregate U.S. statistics on mobility, housing, and labour flows, the model predicts that the effect of home-ownership on aggregate unemployment is small. When unemployment is high, however, changes in the rate of home-ownership can have economically significant effects.

This paper develops static hedges for several exotic options using standard options. The method relies on a relationship between European puts and calls with different strike prices. The analysis allows for constant volatility or for volatility smiles or frowns.

This paper discusses different definitions of systemic risk and identifies the challenges, which regulators face in addressing this phenomenon. We conducted a systematic literature review of 4859 abstracts to categorize the various methodologies developed to measure systemic risk. In total, 60 systemic risk measures proposed post-2000 have been critically appraised to inform academics and regulators of their practical applications and model vulnerabilities. This review suggests that most of these methods focus on individual financial institutions rather than on system stability. Those methodologies directly reflect the current regulations, which aim to ensure individual institutions’ soundness. As macro-prudential regulation evolves, policy-makers face the issues of understanding contagion and how regulations should be implemented. This paper also discusses new systemic risk and regulatory challenges resulting from the current COVID-19 pandemic.

Caught between the end of the National Banking Era and the beginning of the Federal Reserve System, the crisis of 1914 provides an example of a banking panic avoided. We investigate how this outcome was achieved by examining data on the issues of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates to New York City institutions that identify the borrower and the quantity requested for each type of temporary liquidity measure. The extensive provision of temporary credit to a wide array of financial intermediaries was, in our opinion, essential to the successful alleviation of financial distress in 1914. Empirical results indicate an important role for clearing house loan certificates that is distinct from the influence of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency issues.