This paper examines the effects of unexpected inflation on the returns to the common stock of companies with different short-term monetary positions, and different long-term monetary positions, and different amounts of nominal tax shields. Unlike most previous studies of the effects of nominal contracting, we distinguish between expected and unexpected inflation in our tests. Surprisingly, over the 1947-79 period there is little evidence that stockholders of net debtor firms benefit from unexpected inflation relative to the stockholders of net creditor firms. We conclude that wealth effects caused by unexpected inflation are not an important factor in explaining the behavior of stock prices.

This paper examines the effects of unexpected inflation on the returns to the common stock of companies with different short-term monetary positions, and different long-term monetary positions, and different amounts of nominal tax shields. Unlike most previous studies of the effects of nominal contracting, we distinguish between expected and unexpected inflation in our tests. Surprisingly, over the 1947-79 period there is little evidence that stockholders of net debtor firms benefit from unexpected inflation relative to the stockholders of net creditor firms. We conclude that wealth effects caused by unexpected inflation are not an important factor in explaining the behavior of stock prices.

In an innovative and provocative paper in this Review, Eugene Fama presents evidence which appears to be consistent with the joint hypothesis that the real rate of interest, ignoring taxes, is a constant and that the market for U.S. Treasury Bills is efficient in the sense of embodying rational expectations.' Those findings are strikingly at variance with a long list of previous studies which seemed to support the view that the real rate of interest varies over time and can be related to economic variables such as real output, monetary policy, and so forth.2 The methodologies which lead to these contradictory conclusions are quite different. Previous studies had followed the lead of Irving Fisher by relating nominal interest rates to distributed lags on past rates of inflation.3 These distributed lags are generally interpreted as approximations to the market's expected rate of inflation and thus any remaining variation is attributed to variation in the real rate.4 Fama's methodology, on the other hand, draws on the fact that the difference between the market interest rate and the subsequently observed rate of inflation, the ex post real interest rate, consists by definition of the ex ante real interest rate plus a pure forecasting error.5 The hypothesis of market efficiency implies that these forecasting errors must be serially random. Thus, observing ex post real rates is equivalent to observing ex ante real rates with random measurement error. These errors of course confound the problem of identifying variation in the ex ante real rate. In this paper, we will argue that the relative magnitude of these measurement errors is such that the tests carried out by Fama were not powerful enough to reject the joint hypothesis that the ex ante real rate is a constant and expectations are rational. More powerful tests which are presented in this paper using the same data do lead to rejection of that hypothesis. Of course, rejection

In 2002, the editors of the RFS, JF, and JFE simultaneously published an editorial that urged authors to make good use of the advice and input provided by referees.1 Recent informal communications have suggested to us that it is time to renew that advice. Many papers are submitted to our journals, and the scarcest resource we have as a profession is the supply of time donated by referees to read, consider, and comment on their colleagues' work. In general, the author does not know the identity of the referee, so referees can express honest opinions about the quality of the work without alienating the author. However, this system has the counterproductive consequence that authors can undervalue the services they receive.We are particularly troubled by two practices that we see too frequently. First, some authors submit papers to journals at a relatively early stage of production in the hope that “the referee will help me figure out how to revise it to make it publishable.” This strategy imposes substantial costs on both sides. It burdens the referees with responsibilities that are not theirs. For the submitter, it raises the probability that the referee and editor will reject the paper as being too distant from acceptability. By submitting a paper that is unpolished, an author can cut off a potentially valuable publication outlet.

The monthly volatility of IPO initial returns is substantial, fluctuates dramatically over time, and is considerably larger during “hot” IPO markets. Consistent with IPO theory, the volatility of initial returns is higher for firms that are more difficult to value because of higher information asymmetry. Our findings highlight underwriters’ difficulty in valuing companies characterized by high uncertainty, and raise serious questions about the efficacy of the traditional firm‐commitment IPO process. One implication of our results is that alternate mechanisms, such as auctions, could be beneficial for firms that value price discovery over the auxiliary services provided by underwriters.