This paper analyzes the relation between equity prices and conditional conservatism and introduces a new measure of conservatism at the firm-year level. We show that the asymmetric properties of conservative accounting, the existence of non-accounting sources of information, and the properties of GAAP related to special items combine to generate a nonlinear relation between unexpected equity returns and earnings news (the shock to expected current and future earnings). Based on this model, we construct a conservatism ratio (CR) defined as the ratio of the current earnings shock to earnings news. CR measures the proportion of the total shock to expected current and future earnings recognized in current year earnings. Ranking firms according to CR, we show empirically that higher CR firms have more leverage, increased volatility of returns, more incidence of losses, more negative accruals, and increased volatility of earnings and accruals, consistent with the literature on conservative accounting.

In frictionless capital markets with complete information and rational investors, stock prices adjust to new information instantaneously and completely. However, a substantial body of research studies information imperfections such as asymmetric information and incomplete information. Information imperfections potentially hinder timely price discovery and are likely associated with delayed stock price adjustment to information. Our first research question therefore is whether the quality of accounting information (or “accounting quality”) is one such information imperfection that is associated with cross‐sectional variation in stock price delay. We define accounting quality as the precision with which financial reports convey information to equity investors about the firm’s expected cash flows. Poor accounting quality is likely associated with higher expected returns through uncertainty about stock valuation parameters and incomplete information. Our second research question therefore is whether the accounting quality component of price delay is associated with higher future stock returns. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results show that poor accounting quality is associated with delayed price adjustment and higher future stock returns. Thus, accounting quality plays a role in timely stock price discovery.

We utilize the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by U.S. state courts as an exogenous shock to the proprietary costs of disclosure and study the impact of the IDD on corporate financial reporting policy. We find compelling evidence that firms headquartered in states that adopt the IDD exhibit a significant increase in financial reporting opacity relative to firms headquartered in states that fail to adopt the IDD. Our finding is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Cross-sectional evidence shows that the impact of the IDD on opacity is more pronounced for firms with weak external monitoring. Further, our path analysis shows that financial reporting opacity engendered by the adoption of the IDD had broad negative consequences for capital market investors.

We examine the importance of foreign earnings relative to domestic earnings for a sample of U.S. multinationals using variance decomposition. Our methodology represents an alternative and complementary approach over the prior literature, which is based on traditional regressions and earnings response coefficients. We document that domestic earnings are more important in explaining the variance of unexpected returns than are foreign earnings and that the relative importance of domestic earnings is a decreasing function of investor sophistication. Last, we classify institutional investors as either short- or long-term oriented following Bushee [1998]. We find that the variance contribution of foreign earnings increases with the level of investment by long-term investors. In contrast, there is no significant relation between the degree of ownership by short-term (or transient) investors and the variance contribution of domestic and foreign earnings. Overall, our results are consistent with Thomas's [1999] finding that investors on average underestimate the persistence of foreign earnings.

Varouj A. Aivazian, Jeffrey L. Callen, M. W. Luke Chan, Dean C. Mountain, Economies of Scale Versus Technological Change in the Natural Gas Transmission Industry, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 556-561

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the relationships between corporate earnings and investment. In particular, the study investigates whether knowledge of past investments improves the prediction of future earnings beyond predictions that are based on past earnings alone. Similarly, it investigates whether knowledge of past earnings improves the prediction of future investments beyond knowledge of past investments alone. This is the empirical definition of Granger causality. The empirical results show that the bivariate past series of earnings and investments is superior to the univariate series in predicting future investments but not in predicting future earnings.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the relationships between corporate earnings and investment. In particular, the study investigates whether knowledge of past investments improves the prediction of future earnings beyond predictions that are based on past earnings alone. Similarly, it investigates whether knowledge of past earnings improves the prediction of future investments beyond knowledge of past investments alone. This is the empirical definition of Granger causality. The empirical results show that the bivariate past series of earnings and investments is superior to the univariate series in predicting future investments but not in predicting future earnings.

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.