We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms and generate superior portfolio returns. Cross‐sectional results reveal that the relation between social connections and mutual fund stockholdings is more pronounced: when the social connections are stronger, when the auditor is in a better position or has stronger incentives to acquire private information, when the fund manager exercises more power, for small audit firms, for auditors in areas with poor investor protection, and for public firms with greater business opacity or private information. Other results are consistent with fund managers electing to schedule their corporate site visits to coincide with the fieldwork of their connected auditors, as would be expected if fund managers time their visits to meet with these auditors to facilitate information transfer. Additionally, we observe associations between fund trading prior to earnings surprises and audit opinions, and the presence of social connections between fund managers and firm auditors. Finally, we show that mutual funds and firms in which they invest tend to appoint connected auditors and pay them higher fees. Collectively, we document empirical patterns that would arise if socially connected auditors and mutual fund managers share information.

We examine how state liability regimes within the United States affect auditor reporting decisions. We exploit variation across state-level common law in two aspects of auditor liability: the extent to which auditors can be held liable by third parties for negligence, and rules for apportioning liability across multiple defendants. We find that auditors are more likely to issue a modified going-concern (GC) report to financially distressed clients from high-liability states than to those from low-liability states. We sharpen inferences using a natural experiment that examines the causal effects of two exogenous shocks to auditor third-party liability standards, which dramatically restricted auditors' liability in New Jersey in 1995 and in California in 1992. Results from difference-in-differences tests imply that auditors' propensity to issue a modified opinion for client firms in New Jersey and California decreases significantly after the decline in auditors' litigation exposure, relative to control firms from other jurisdictions. These findings add to our understanding of how litigation risk affects auditor behavior and highlight an important source of variation in litigation risk within the U.S. that has seldom been studied to date.

The scarcity of suitable proxies for asymmetric information has impeded empirical research from providing reliable evidence on whether information risk shapes equity pricing. In reexamining this unresolved question, we rely on firms’ geographic distance from financial centers to gauge information asymmetry. We provide strong, robust evidence supporting the prediction that equity financing is cheaper for firms nearer central locations, implying that investors rationally require more compensation when information asymmetry is worse. The equity pricing role of geographic proximity is economically large, with our coefficient estimates translating into firms located within 100 kilometers of the city center of the nearest of six major financial centers, or in their metropolitan statistical areas, enjoying equity financing costs that are seven basis points lower. Our inferences are insensitive to measuring both the cost of equity capital and distance in several ways, controlling for corporate governance quality, and addressing endogeneity. Collectively, our analysis suggests that investors discount the price that they pay for their securities to reflect the greater information asymmetry that ensues when firms are far from major financial centers.

We analyze whether tough IRS monitoring generates a positive externality by constraining managers' bad news hoarding activities. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the threat of an IRS audit and stock price crash risk. Our evidence is consistent with recent theory that outside investors learn more about firms when tax enforcement is stricter. Additionally, path analysis suggests that the monitoring channel (direct path) plays a critical role in shaping crash risk relative to information asymmetry channels of tax planning and accruals manipulation (indirect paths). Consistent with other predictions, we find that the monitoring role of IRS audits intensifies when firms experience worse agency conflicts stemming from CEO power and incentives. Collectively, our research implies that external monitoring by tax authorities protects shareholders against managers suppressing negative firm-specific information that engenders stock price crash risk, particularly when CEOs have wider scope and stronger incentives to hoard bad news.

We extend research on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance to include the role of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring. Our evidence from large samples implies that U.S. public firms undertake less aggressive tax positions when tax enforcement is stricter. Reflecting its first-order economic impact on firms, our coefficient estimates imply that raising the probability of an IRS audit from 19 percent (the 25th percentile in our data) to 37 percent (the 75th percentile) increases their cash effective tax rates, on average, by nearly two percentage points, which amounts to a 7 percent increase in cash effective tax rates. These results are robust to controlling for firm size and time, which determine our primary proxy for IRS enforcement, in different ways; specifying several alternative dependent and test variables; and confronting potential endogeneity with instrumental variables and panel data estimations, among other techniques.

We examine whether auditors share private information about some clients in their portfolio to benefit other clients (i.e., brokerage houses). This is a salient issue in China, where there are concerns about auditors leaking information to related parties, and where we observe variation in connectedness between brokerage houses and companies through shared auditors. We document that brokerage houses that share an auditor with a company issue comparatively more accurate earnings forecasts for that company. Next, cross‐sectional variation in forecast accuracy is associated with several proxies for brokerage houses' and auditors' costs and incentives to share information (e.g., investor protection, media coverage, public listing status, and the client's economic importance). Finally, auditors are more likely to secure future audits from IPO deals sponsored by brokerage house clients with higher forecast accuracy. Collectively, our evidence is suggestive of auditors sharing private information with brokerage houses in anticipation of reciprocity in the form of lucrative future engagements.

In measuring tunneling with intercorporate loans disclosed by Chinese listed companies, we analyze the underlying channels through which aggressive tax planning facilitates the diversion of corporate resources by firm insiders. Using path analysis, we document that the path from tax aggressiveness to related loans is mediated by both the additional cash flows from tax savings and the increased financial opacity from tax planning, and that additional cash flows plays a much more important role than opacity in helping controlling shareholders to divert corporate resources under the guise of tax aggressiveness. Beyond the two mediated paths, we also detect a residual, direct path from tax aggressiveness to related loans. After an exogenous shock from the government crackdown on diversionary related loans, we find the direct path is fully mediated by the two indirect paths, suggesting that tunneling via related loans only occurs at firms where insiders can mask tunneling under the cover of opacity or can justify related loans on grounds of abnormal cash flows from tax savings. Our evidence supports the notion that greater outside scrutiny increases the hurdle for, but does not entirely eradicate, diversion facilitated by tax aggressiveness. Collectively, our research lends some support to recent theory on the importance of taxes to corporate governance by demonstrating how the agency costs of tax planning allow certain shareholders to benefit from firm activities at the expense of others.

Relying on the frequency of typos in engagement partners’ graduate theses to measure their conscientiousness, we find that more conscientious partners conduct higher-quality audits, evident in that they are more likely to require an audit adjustment. Our core results hold for both upward and downward adjustments, implying that being conscientious is not equivalent to being overly conservative. Consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981) theory, cross-sectional evidence suggests that the role that partner conscientiousness plays in audit quality comes through both the auditor competence and independence channels. Additionally, we find that the frequency of partner thesis typos is negatively associated with auditor effort. Collectively, our evidence implies that engagement partner conscientiousness plays a major role in shaping audit outcomes. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.