This paper investigates the positive wage-firm size relationship using a sample of workers performing the same jobs in different-sized firms. Controlling for skill differences, wages are still found to be higher in larger firms. Using an estimate of the marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure as a measure of job disutility, the difference in wages between large and small firms is found to be greater than the difference in disutility, ruling out compensating differentials as the sole cause of the wage-size relationship. Hence the argument that labor extracts some of the higher profits of larger firms is plausible.

On considere differents aspects de la conception et de l'analyse. On compare des facons alternatives d'observer des individus en temps discret via la matrice d'information de Fisher

Pension compensation is shown to rise with age and tenure until the worker becomes eligible to receive benefits. At this point, pension compensation drops sharply. If workers are paid their marginal product in each period, earnings grow at a lower rate prior to eligibility but must increase when the worker reaches the age of eligibility. This hypothesis is tested using data from the Retirement History Study, and earnings are found to rise significantly after eligibility. This finding supports the concept of spot market compensation and is in direct conflict with the predictions of Lazear-type lifetime contracts.

This paper develops a theory of the role of the underwriter in certifying that risky issue prices reflect potentially adverse inside information. The theory derives from the literature on the use of reputational capital to guarantee product quality. An underwriting cost/benefit paradigm is employed to generate testable implications related to announcement effects, issue underpricing, the choice of competitive versus negotiated underwriting, and the level of underwriter compensation as a function of firm-specific information. Existing empirical literature is reviewed in the context of the certification hypothesis and several new tests are conducted. All of the findings are supportive of the hypothesis.

This paper analyzes data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences: in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Tests of whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically reveal no evidence of such behavior.