Robert A. Korajczyk, Deborah J. Lucas, Robert L. McDonald, Equity Issues with Time-Varying Asymmetric Information, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 397-417

Brent W. Ambrose, William L. Megginson, The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 575-589

Abstract Reviews the book "Accounting Research Methods: Do the facts Speak for Themselves?," by Wanda A. Wallace.

Sharon G. Levin, Stanford L. Levin, John B. Meisel, Market Structure, Uncertainty, and Intrafirm Diffusion: The Case of Optical Scanners in Grocery Stores, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 74, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 345-350

The microeconomic forces that influence real wages are not fully understood. This paper studies pay determination using data on approximately 600 labor contracts. It finds that the real wage is an increasing function of past profitability in the employer's industry, and a decreasing function of the level of unemployment in the employer's region. These results are consistent with rent-sharing theories.

A simple supply and demand framework is used to analyze changes in the U. S. wage structure from 1963 to 1987. Rapid secular growth in the demand for more-educated workers, “more-skilled” workers, and females appears to be the driving force behind observed changes in the wage structure. Measured changes in the allocation of labor between industries and occupations strongly favored college graduates and females throughout the period. Movements in the college wage premium over this period appear to be strongly related to fluctuations in the rate of growth of the supply of college graduates.

Part 1 The markets: spot, forward interbank swap and futures deals interrelations of markets time spans and volatilities in the currency markets forecasting exchange rates. Part 2 Management principles and classification of risks: a general approach to business risks the place of currency risk management in general and financial management defining and classifying currency risks corporate objectives and policies in currency risk management. Part 3 The risks and their management: competitiveness risk trading risk - the problem managing trading risk - the mechanisms position risk in the group of companies managing position riak - the mechanisms policy decisions in position risk management.

Enforcement by monitoring cannot be conditioned on the severity of an offense while enforcement by investigation can be. If some degrees of the offense are not adequately reported or if investigation is too costly, the regulator must monitor and treat offenses of different severity quite differently. Smaller offenses should not be investigated; they should be deterred by monitoring alone, coupled with graduated fines. To deter larger offenses, the regulator should vary the investigation rate while setting maximal fines.