In this paper, we analyse the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a particular class of monopolistic rational expectations models. We show the equivalence between the Kyle (1985) model of insider trading where the insider observes the amount of noise trading and the Kyle (1989) model of informed speculation when there is one risk-neutral insider and many risk-neutral market makers. We show that in these two equivalent models: (i) There exists a unique equilibrium independently of the distribution of uncertainty; (ii) This equilibrium minimizes the expected gains of the informed agent under incentive compatibility constraints. We extend our results to a class of signalling games.

J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers; Equipment Investment and Economic Growth: Reply, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 109, Issue 3, 1 August 199

It is now customary to view the corporation as nexus of explicit and implicit contracts. Governance determines how the firm's top decision makers (executives) actually administer such contracts. We survey recent theory and evidence on executive behaviour and incentives and reject the standard assumption of shareholder-wealth-maximisation, either in its strict sense or in the sense implied by standard principal-agent models. Explanations for this state of affairs as an inefficient, rent-seeking outcome are contrasted with efficiency explanations, particularly those that explicitly consider the diverse claims of employees, customers, and suppliers as well as those of investors.

Numerous empirical studies document patterns in the means and variances of security returns measured over periods that are punctuated by market closures. This article develops a multiperiod model in which closures delay the resolution of uncertainty, thereby redistributing risk across time and agents. Since agents are risk averse in the model, this redistribution affects the equilibrium price, altering risk premia, liquidity costs, and the degree of informational asymmetry. As a consequence, closures alter both the means and variances of returns. The article demonstrates that closures can generate a variety of mean and variance effects, including those that mirror the empirical phenomena.

Using a database that is free of survivorship bias, this article finds that book-to-market equity, earnings yield, and cash flow yield have significant explanatory power with respect to the cross-section of realized stock returns during the period from July 1940 through June 1963. There is a strong January seasonal in the explanatory power of these variables, even though small stocks are, by construction, excluded from the sample.

Numerous empirical studies document patterns in the means and variances of security returns measured over periods that are punctuated by market closures. This article develops a multiperiod model in which closures delay the resolution of uncertainty, thereby redistributing risk across time and agents. Since agents are risk averse in the model, this redistribution affects the equilibrium price, altering risk premia, liquidity costs, and the degree of informational asymmetry. As a consequence, closures alter both the means and variances of returns. The article demonstrates that closures can generate a variety of mean and variance effects, including those that mirror the empirical phenomena.

Numerous empirical studies document patterns in the means and variances of security returns measured over periods that are punctuated by market closures. This article develops a multiperiod model in which closures delay the resolution of uncertainty, thereby redistributing risk across time and agents. Since agents are risk averse in the model, this redistribution affects the equilibrium price, altering risk premia, liquidity costs, and the degree of informational asymmetry. As a consequence, closures alter both the means and variances of returns. The article demonstrates that closures can generate a variety of mean and variance effects, including those that mirror the empirical phenomena.

We model entry incentives in auctions with risk-neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic. The presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare. We show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness (i.e., the relative abundance of buyers). Our analysis extends well-known revenue-equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies (e.g., reservation prices) in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry.

[This study investigates the impact of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106, "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions" (FASB 1990, hereinafter, SFAS 106) for a sample of rate-regulated public utility firms. The results of a recent study by Espahbodi et al. (1991) of the market reaction to the issuance of the exposure draft for SFAS 106 suggest that, for a sample including both regulated and non-regulated firms, investors perceived the required disclosures as value-decreasing due to higher contracting costs. However, the unique institutional setting for rate-regulated firms implies that while a similar negative market reaction may result for some regulated firms, there is also a theoretical basis for predicting either no market reaction or a positive reaction to the proposed accounting standard. The no reaction hypothesis is motivated by the nature of the relationship between regulatory rate-setting process and special external financial reporting procedures; as a result, some regulated firms may be sheltered from the indirect costs attributed to SFAS 106. A prediction of a positive market reaction arises from the notion that accounting rules can have an effect on the way regulators set rates, resulting in a direct (positive) cash flow effect for some of the sample firms. Our results suggest that investors in public utilities did not, on average, view the proposed standard as a value-decreasing event. This result is in sharp contrast to the Espahbodi et al. (1991) finding of a large negative average reaction for firms affected by SFAS 106. We also find evidence that the market reaction at the exposure draft announcement varies cross-sectionally based on the market's exante expectation of regulators' actions and the resulting changes in revenues from the adoption (or non-adoption) of the accounting rule for ratemaking purposes. The results thus add to a growing body of literature which demonstrates differences in the market's assessment of accounting information across regulated and non-regulated industries. More importantly, the results point to the role of regulatory response in the market's assessment of impending accounting changes in regulated industries.]