Work by Kaplan and Zingales provides both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that investment-cash �ow sensitivities are not good indicators of �nancing constraints. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen {this Journal} criticize those �ndings. In this note we explain how the Fazzari et al. criticisms are either very supportive of the claims in earlier work by Kaplan and Zingales or incorrect. We conclude with a discussion of unanswered questions. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen {1988} (hereinafter, FHP {1988}) introduce a methodology to identify the presence of �nancing constraints based on the differential sensitivity of corporate investment to cash �ow. Kaplan and Zingales {1997} (hereinafter, KZ) provide both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that this differential sensitivity is not a valid measure of �nancing constraints. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen {2000} (hereinafter, FHP {2000}) criticize those �ndings. In this note we explain that the main arguments in FHP {2000} are, in fact, quite supportive of KZ’s main conclusion, while the speci�c criticisms in FHP {2000} are unjusti�ed. I. POINTS OF AGREEMENT FHP {2000} admit that �nancially distressed �rms are likely to have lower investment-cash �ow sensitivities than less �nancially constrained �rms. This is exactly the point that the KZ model makes: investment-cash �ow sensitivities are not necessarily monotonic in the degree of �nancing constraints. The only disagreement FHP {2000} have with KZ is how pervasive the nonmonotonicity result is. But this is ultimately an empirical question. FHP {2000} also recognize that the literature on investmentcash �ow sensitivities has not been based on a solid theoretical foundation. As KZ point out, the practice of (1) splitting the sample according to a measure of �nancing constraints and then

We study shareholder proposals across a period of substantial activity and find systematic differences both across sponsor identity and across time. To measure the success of shareholder activism, we examine voting outcomes and short-term market reactions conditioned on proposal type and sponsor identity. The voting analysis documents that sponsor identity, issue type, prior performance and time period are important influences on the voting outcome. Proposals sponsored by institutions or coordinated groups appear to act as substitutes gaining substantially more support than proposals sponsored by individuals. The nature of the stock market reaction, while typically small, varies according to the issue and the sponsor identity.

The number of producers in the U.S. tire industry grew for 25 years and then declined sharply, and the industry evolved to be an oligopoly. The role of technological change in shaping the industry’s market structure is explored. A model of industry evolution featuring technological change is used to derive predictions that are tested using a novel data set on firm entry, exit, size, location, distribution networks, and technological choices prior to the shakeout of producers. Consistent with the model, earlier‐entering and larger firms survived longer, principally because of the influence of age and size on technological change.

Michael L. Ettredge, Daniel T. Simon, David B. Smith, Mary S. Stone, The Effect of the External Accountant's Review on the Timing of Adjustments to Quarterly Earnings, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 195-207

College educated couples are increasingly located in large metropolitan areas. These areas were home to 32 percent of all college educated couples in 1940, 39 percent in 1970, and 50 percent in 1990. We investigate whether this trend can be explained by increasing urbanization of the college educated or the growth of dual career households and the resulting severity of the colocation problem. We argue that the latter explanation is the primary one. Smaller cities may therefore experience reduced inflows of human capital relative to the past and thus become poorer.

High and rising executive pay levels over the past two decades have attracted considerable popular and political hostility. As Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990 p. 227) argue, these forces may constrain compensation practices in informal and indirect ways. Our earlier work documents the impact of such indirect political constraints on executive compensation in regulated sectors (Paul Joskow et al., 1993, 1996). This study investigates the political use of the corporate tax code to influence executive-pay decisions more broadly. In particular, we analyze the provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA) that eliminated corporate tax deductibility for compensation in excess of $1 million for the CEO and each of the next four highestpaid executives within a firm. Congressional proponents of this legislation argued that this provision would reduce excessive CEO pay by raising its cost to the corporation. Exemptions for qualified performance-based compensation could have further indirect effects by inducing changes in the structure of executive compensation plans. Given the broad scope for exemptions and the minimal impact that tax deductibility of executive pay typically has on overall corporate profitability, however, the real impact of the tax cap on executive-pay patterns remains an open question. This paper, with Rose and Wolfram (2000), extends analyses by Tod Perry and Marc Zenner (1999) and Brian Hall and Jeffrey Liebman (2000), to provide further evidence on the impact of this legislation on CEO pay.

Why Are Women Such Reluctant Economists? Evidence from Liberal Arts Colleges by Elizabeth J. Jensen and Ann L. Owen. Published in volume 90, issue 2, pages 466-470 of American Economic Review, May 2000

The Kuhn-Tucker model of Wales and Woodland (1983) provides a utility theoretic framework for estimating preferences over commodities for which individuals choose not to consume one or more of the goods. Due to the complexity of the model, however, there have been few applications in the literature and little attention has been paid to the problems of welfare analysis within the Kuhn-Tucker framework. This paper provides an application of the model to the problem of recreation demand. In addition, we develop and apply a methodology for estimating compensating variation, relying on Monte Carlo integration to derive expected welfare changes.

We study order flow and liquidity around NYSE trading halts. We find that market and limit order submissions and cancellations increase significantly during trading halts, that a large proportion of the limit order book at the reopen is composed of orders submitted during the halt, and that the market‐clearing price at the reopen is a good predictor of future prices. Depth near the quotes is unusually low around trading halts, though specialists and/or floor traders appear to provide additional liquidity at these times. Finally, specialists appear to “spread the quote” prior to imbalance halts to convey information to market participants.