Abstract Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non‐ GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability that a company will disclose a non‐ GAAP adjusted earnings metric in its earnings press release and the likelihood that it will do so aggressively. We first investigate situations where managers already meet analysts’ expectations either based on strong operating performance or after employing real and accruals management. We find that when solid operating performance alone allows firms to meet expectations, managers do not employ earnings management or non‐ GAAP reporting. However, when managers meet expectations using real and accruals management, they are significantly less likely to report a non‐ GAAP earnings metric. Next, we explore scenarios where companies fall short of expectations. We find that when they just miss expectations after managing GAAP earnings, they are significantly more likely to employ non‐ GAAP reporting, suggesting that the timing and relatively costless nature of non‐ GAAP reporting allows managers to appear to meet expectations on a non‐ GAAP basis when managed GAAP earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that companies are more likely to report non‐ GAAP earnings (and to do so aggressively) when (i) they are unable to use real or accruals earnings management, (ii) are constrained by prior‐period accruals management, and (iii) their operating performance is poor. Taken together, our results are consistent with a substitute relation between non‐ GAAP reporting and both real and accruals management.

Monetary policy announcements have a significant impact on financial market liquidity. This study provides a novel perspective on the factors driving this relationship in the market for 10-year Treasury note futures: Target rate surprises and the complexity of the monetary policy statement language are important determinants. Differences of opinion resulting from interpretation of complex language appear to result in more trading volume despite relatively low levels of liquidity (a negative liquidity-volume relationship), while large target rate surprises reduce trading activity (a positive liquidity-volume relationship). The dynamic changes over time, as unconventional polices are adopted by monetary authorities and, high frequency traders become more pervasive. Central bankers may aid market liquidity by minimizing surprises, and issuing statements that are easier to understand (with shorter sentences and more familiar words).

In this study, we employ the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data collected in 2002, 2005, and 2009 for 21499 firms from 27 Eastern European and Central Asian countries to examine firm-level growth constraints faced by privatized firms versus those faced by the originally (de novo) private firms. We find that the de novo firms experience significantly higher financial, corruption, and legal obstacles than the privatized firms. We further document that, even though faced with more obstacles in the business environment, the de novo firms outperform the privatized firms. One explanation is that the profit motive of the de novo firms is organic, whereas the profit motive of the privatized firms is acquired. The organic profit motive may be powerful enough for the de novo firms to overcome more difficulties in the business environment and excel. Our study is the first in the privatization literature to go beyond performance comparisons and examine firm-level growth constraints.

Abstract We examine whether the presence of female directors and female audit committee members affect audit quality in terms of audit effort and auditor choice by using observations from a sample of U.S. firms, spanning the years 2001–2011. We find, after controlling for endogeneity and other board, firm, and industry characteristics, that firms with gender‐diverse boards (audit committees) pay 6 percent (8 percent) higher audit fees and are 6 percent (7 percent) more likely to choose specialist auditors compared to all‐male boards (audit committees). Our findings suggest that boards (audit committees) with female directors (members) are likely to demand higher audit quality, ceteris paribus.

Abstract What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. On the other hand, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, distortions that are especially costly when the government must finance public goods. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all of these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preference, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the desire to finance government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting optimal progressivity. In a version of the model where poverty constrains skill investment, optimal progressivity is close to the U.S. value. An empirical analysis on cross-country data offers support to the theory.

There is a widespread belief among observers that a lower premium is paid when the target CEO is retained by the acquirer in a private equity deal because conflicts of interest lead her to negotiate less aggressively on behalf of the target shareholders. Our empirical evidence is not consistent with this belief. We find that, when a private equity acquirer retains the target CEO, target shareholders receive an acquisition premium that is larger by as much as 18% of pre-acquisition firm value when accounting for the endogeneity of the retention decision. Our evidence is consistent with what we call the “valuable CEO hypothesis.” With this hypothesis, retention of the CEO can be valuable to private equity acquirers because, unlike public operating companies with managers in place, these acquirers have to find a CEO to run the post-acquisition company and the incumbent CEO may be the best choice to do so because she has valuable firm-specific human capital. When a private equity acquirer finds a target with a CEO who can manage the post-acquisition company better than other potential CEOs, we expect target shareholders to receive a larger premium because the post-acquisition value of the target is higher.

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether and to what extent repatriation tax costs constrain U.S. multinational companies' (MNCs) distributions to shareholders. During the 1987–2004 sample period, I find that repatriation tax costs decrease U.S. MNCs' dividend payments, and the economic magnitude of the effect is substantial. I do not find evidence that repatriation tax costs decrease U.S. MNCs' share repurchases, on average. I find cross-sectional variation in the effect of repatriation tax costs on share repurchases based on U.S. MNCs' opportunities to fund repurchases through external borrowing and to minimize the incremental U.S. cash tax cost of repatriations. I do not observe an association between repatriation tax costs and U.S. MNCs' dividend payments or share repurchases during a more recent time period (2009–2014). This study contributes to our understanding of the impact of the current U.S. worldwide tax system on U.S. MNCs' real decisions and of the determinants of firms' payout policies.