Economic theory points to five parties disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in takeovers, nonexecutive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This paper reports the first comparative evaluation of the role of these different parties in disciplining management. We find that, in the United Kingdom, most parties, including holders of substantial share blocks, exert little disciplining and that some, for example, inside holders of share blocks and boards dominated by nonexecutive directors, actually impede it. Bidders replace a high proportion of management of companies acquired in takeovers but do not target poorly performing management. In contrast, during periods of financial constraints prompting distressed rights issues and capital restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the United States, where there is little evidence of a role for new equity issues but nonexecutive directors and acquirers of share blocks perform a disciplinary function. The different governance outcomes are attributed to differences in minority investor protection in two countries with supposedly similar common law systems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G3.

Dividends of German firms are often perceived to be more flexible than those of Anglo-American firms. We analyse the decision to change the dividend for 221 German firms over 1984–1993. Consistent with Lintner [Am. Econ. Rev. 46 (1956) 97], net earnings are key determinants of dividend changes. However, our findings also refine those of Lintner [Am. Econ. Rev. 46 (1956) 97] and Miller and Modigliani [J. Bus. 34 (1961) 411]. First, the occurrence of a loss is a key determinant of dividends in addition to the traditional key determinant, the level of net earnings. Second, the majority of dividend cuts or omissions are temporary. This stands in marked contrast with DeAngelo et al. [J. Finance 47 (1992) 1837] who report that US firms are more likely to reduce their dividend when earnings deteriorate on a permanent basis. Finally, we find that firms with a bank as their major shareholder are more willing to omit their dividend than firms controlled by other shareholders.

An artist’s death constitutes a negative shock to his future production; death permanently decreases the artist’s float. We use this shock to test predictions of speculative trading models with short-selling constraints. As predicted in our model, we find that an artist’s premature death leads to a permanent increase in prices and turnover; this effect being larger for more famous artists. We document that premature death increases prices (by 54.7%) and secondary market volume (by 63.2%).

An interdependent network coupling financial institutions’ multiplex (i.e. multi-layer) and financial market infrastructures’ single-layer networks gives a more accurate picture of a financial system's true connective architecture. We examine and compare the main properties of Colombian multiplex and interdependent financial networks. Coupling financial institutions’ multiplex networks with financial market infrastructures’ networks removes modularity, which augments financial instability because the network then fails to isolate feedbacks and limit cascades while it retains its robust-yet-fragile features. Moreover, our analysis highlights the relevance of infrastructure-related systemic risk, corresponding to the effects caused by the improper functioning of financial market infrastructures or by financial market infrastructures acting as conduits for contagion.

This paper provides a critical review of the literature on socially responsible investments (SRI). Particular to SRI is that both financial goals and social objectives are pursued. Over the past decade, SRI has experienced an explosive growth around the world reflecting the increasing awareness of investors to social, environmental, ethical and corporate governance issues. We argue that there are significant opportunities for future research on the increasingly important area of SRI. A number of questions are reviewed in this paper on the causes and the shareholder-value impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the risk exposure and performance of SRI funds and firms, as well as fund subscription and redemption behavior of SRI investors. We conclude that the existing studies hint but do not unequivocally demonstrate that SRI investors are willing to accept suboptimal financial performance to pursue social or ethical objectives. Furthermore, the emergence of SRI raises interesting questions for research on corporate finance, asset pricing, and financial intermediation.

We study plaintiff law firms in corporate litigation, focusing on “star” firms that dominate settlement outcomes. Stars are associated with larger settlements; however, much of this effect is predicted by the defendant's litigation insurance coverage, suggesting assortative matching of stars with lawsuits that have ex ante larger expected payoffs. Moreover, stars charge higher fees for a given settlement size. Additional tests suggest that visibility and information asymmetry vis‐à‐vis less sophisticated plaintiffs help sustain the stars’ market share. These findings advance our understanding of corporate litigation and the agency relationship between plaintiff law firms and their clients.

This paper investigates the impact of equity markets and top incomes on art prices. Using a newly constructed art market index, we demonstrate that equity market returns have had a significant impact on the price level in the art market over the last two centuries. We also find evidence that an increase in income inequality may lead to higher prices for art. Finally, the results of Johansen's cointegration tests strongly suggest the existence of a long-run relation between top incomes and art prices.

Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders' propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders' performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold bonus schemes on traders' behavior. Traders buy and sell shares in an experimental stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (past share price evolution, realized earnings, analysts' earnings forecasts, and evolution of the market index). We find that linear and threshold bonus schemes have different effects on trading behavior: traders make more transactions but of a smaller size under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. Furthermore, transaction frequency significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders' performance is lower (even when there are no transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (i.e., under low profitability conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, put more effort into understanding those relationships, and thus eventually learn to perform better.

This paper investigates the market's reaction to U.K. insider transactions and analyzes whether the reaction depends on the firm's ownership. We present three major findings. First, differences in regulation between the U.K. and United States, in particular the speedier reporting of trades in the U.K., may explain the observed larger abnormal returns in the U.K. Second, ownership by directors and outside shareholders has an impact on the abnormal returns. Third, it is important to adjust for news released before directors' trades. In particular, trades preceded by news on mergers and acquisitions and CEO replacements contain significantly less information.