This study presents a general approach for selecting comparable firms in market‐based research and equity valuation. Guided by valuation theory, we develop a “warranted multiple” for each firm, and identify peer firms as those having the closest warranted multiple. We test this approach by examining the efficacy of the selected comparable firms in predicting future (one‐ to three‐year‐ahead) enterprise‐value‐to‐sales and price‐to‐book ratios. Our tests encompass the general universe of stocks as well as a sub‐population of so‐called “new economy” stocks. We conclude that comparable firms selected in this manner offer sharp improvements over comparable firms selected on the basis of other techniques.

The recent repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in the US has cleared the way for commercial banks to enter the securities underwriting business. Many of the concerns that resulted in the original passage of the Glass–Steagall Act, however, still exist. One of these is the possible conflict of interest a universal bank faces. This paper provides evidence on this issue from the experience of Canada following its removal of restrictions on chartered bank ownership of investment dealers. Both ex ante bond yield comparisons between commercial and investment bank underwritten issues and equity price reactions to bond issue announcements provide no evidence of a conflict of interest.

We analyze 1,607 investors who switched from phone-based to online trading during the 1990s. Those who switch to online trading perform well prior to going online, beating the market by more than 2% annually. After going online, they trade more actively, more speculatively, and less profitably than before—lagging the market by more than 3% annually. Reductions in market frictions (lower trading costs, improved execution speed, and greater ease of access) do not explain these findings. Overconfidence—augmented by self-attribution bias and the illusions of knowledge and control—can explain the increase in trading and reduction in performance of online investors.

We examine the effect of bargaining power and informational asymmetry on the design of international cooperative ventures in the presence of restrictions on equity participation and investment. When the bargaining advantage rests with the multinational, equity participation restrictions can increase the profits to domestic firms and encourage sub-optimal investment policies. Overinvestment occurs when the multinational's bargaining advantage is reinforced by an informational advantage, while underinvestment occurs when the domestic firm possesses the informational advantage. In contrast, when the bargaining advantage rests with the domestic firm, equity participation restrictions do not affect investment levels.

This paper develops an extension of the classical multinomial logit model which approximates a class of models obtained when there is uncontrolled taste variation across agents and choices in addition to the stochastic noise inherent in the logit model. Unlike semiparametric and parametric alternatives, the extended logit model is easy to estimate even when there are many potential choices. Unlike parametric alternatives, it does not require the specification of a distribution of varying tastes. The extended logit model can give a quick indication of the impact of taste variation on estimates and it generates estimates of the covariances of the taste shifters. It can be used as an exploratory device en route to the construction of a model incorporating a particular form of random taste variation and it can be used to determine whether such effort is required at all. When the amount of taste variation is not excessive the approximate model can be adequate itself. The model nests the conventional logit model which leads to a misspecification diagnostic. A method for estimating the model using conventional logit model software is proposed, asymptotic properties of estimators are derived and an application is presented.

We investigate the relation between earnings predictability, information asymmetry and the behavior of the adverse selection cost component of the bid‐ask spread around quarterly earnings announcements for NASDAQ firms. While we find an increase in the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread on the day of and the day prior to quarterly earnings announcements for firms with less predictable earnings, we find no evidence of such changes for firms with more predictable earnings. During a non‐announcement period, we find that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have consistently higher total bid‐ask spreads than firms with more predictable earnings. This finding suggests that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have a higher cost of equity capital than comparable firms with more predictable earning streams, ceteris paribus. Hence, earnings predictability may be a legitimate concern of managers who wish to minimize their cost of equity capital at least as it pertains to bid‐ask spreads.

Stocks can be overpriced when short-sale constraints bind. We study the costs of short-selling equities from 1926 to 1933, using the publicly observable market for borrowing stock. Some stocks are sometimes expensive to short, and it appears that stocks enter the borrowing market when shorting demand is high. We find that stocks that are expensive to short or which enter the borrowing market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis. Size-adjusted returns are 1–2% lower per month for new entrants, and despite high costs it is profitable to short them.

This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings‐per‐share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities.

This essay discusses the benefits to a firm from morality – specifically trustworthiness – by exploring the analogy between firms and individuals. It identifies five factors that help to align trustworthiness and the interest of an individual: (1) reputation, (2) the social limits on how much trustworthiness demands, (3) uncertainty, (4) the ambiguities of self-interest, and (5) the role of trustworthiness in constituting an individual's interest. Each of these factors has analogues in the case of a firm, and the essay suggests the slightly paradoxical conclusion that in certain environments firms may serve the interests of their stakeholders by placing moral constraints on their actions.