Many authors relate a firm's performance to legal and political features and the regulatory environment in which it operates. This article compares firms' capital structure adjustments across countries and investigates whether institutional differences help explain the variance in estimated adjustment speeds. We find that legal and financial traditions significantly correlate with firm adjustment speeds. More narrowly, institutional features also relate to adjustment speeds, consistent with the hypothesis that better institutions lower the transaction costs associated with adjusting a firm's leverage. Such associations between institutional arrangements and leverage adjustment speeds are consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure choice.

During the recent financial crisis, many large banks’ losses were absorbed by their sponsoring governments, despite the fact that these banks complied with Basel standards for “adequate” capital. We illustrate a serious supervisory problem by demonstrating that large European banks’ reported regulatory capital measures often far exceeded their loss-absorbing capacity during 1997–2011. The cumulative value of government guarantees thereby extended to the largest 25 European banks over that period amounts to nearly €1.4 trillion, corresponding to an average of 28.5% of the banks’ equity market values. We show that early regulatory attention to declining equity value can substantially reduce the social cost of dealing with bank losses. This research is particularly relevant for European institutions at the present time, as the European Union deals with joint solvency concerns about its banks and its governments.

The rapid increase in U.S. house prices during the 2001–2006 period was accompanied by a historically rapid expansion of bank assets. We exploit cross-regional variation in local housing booms to study how housing demand shocks affected the growth of the banking sector. We estimate the effect of housing demand shocks that are orthogonal to observed non-housing demand shocks and credit supply shocks in each bank’s market area. We employ several instrumental variables that plausibly identify variation in local housing demand that is exogenous to local banks. We find that the housing boom had a large effect on bank asset growth—the cross-regional elasticity of bank growth with respect to housing demand shocks is around 0.6. The regional elasticity estimate suggests that housing demand shocks can potentially account for a large fraction of the growth of the banking sector during this period.

We evaluate US firms’ leverage determinants by studying how firms paid for 2,073 very large investments between 1989 and 2006. This approach complements existing empirical work on capital structure, which typically estimates regression models of leverage for a broad set of firms. Because large investments are mostly externally financed, security issuances should provide information about managers’ attitudes toward leverage. We find that issued securities move firms toward target debt ratios. Firms also tend to issue more equity following a share price run-up, consistent with both the tradeoff hypothesis and managerial efforts to time market sentiment. We find little support for the standard pecking order hypothesis.

We assess the market microstructure properties of U.S. banking firms’ equity, to determine whether they exhibit more or less evidence of asset opaqueness than similar-sized nonbanking firms. The evidence indicates that large bank holding companies (BHC), traded on the NYSE, have very similar trading properties to their matched nonfinancial firms. In contrast, smaller BHCs, traded on NASDAQ, trade much less frequently despite having very similar spreads. Analysis of IBES earnings forecasts indicates that banking assets are not unusually opaque; they are simply boring. The implications for regulatory policy and future market microstructure research are discussed.

We examine debenture yields over the period 1983–1991 to evaluate the market's sensitivity to bank‐specific risks, and conclude that investors have rationally reflected changes in the government's policy toward absorbing private losses in the event of a bank failure. Although this evidence does not establish that market discipline can effectively control banking firms, it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally differentiate among the risks undertaken by the major U.S. banking firms.

Previous studies of bank subordinated debenture yields have detected scant evidence that market investors rationally price bank-specific default risks. However, investors' incentives to monitor their banks' true default risks have increased over the past decade, as federal regulators have removed the conjectural guarantees on subordinated debentures that were so prominent in the period following Continental Illinois' failure. By examining debenture yields over the period 1983-91, we demonstrate that subordinated debenture prices reflect accounting risk measures, and that the market's sensitivity to bank-specific risks has rationally reflected changes in the government's policy toward absorbing private losses in the event of a bank failure. Although this evidence does not establish that market discipline can effectively control banking firms, it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally differentiate among the risks undertaken by the major U.S. banking firms.

This paper examines the relation between the interest rate sensitivity of common stock returns and the maturity composition of the firm's nominal contracts. Using a sample of actively traded commerical banks and stock savings and loan associations, common stock returns are found to be correlated with interest rate changes. The co-movement of stock returns and interest rate changes is positively related to the size of the maturity difference between the firm's nominal assets and liabilities.