China’s economic model involves regular and intensive government interventions in financial markets, while Western policymakers often refrain from substantial interventions outside crisis periods. We develop a theoretical framework to rationalize the approaches of both China and the West to managing the financial system as being optimal given the differences in their respective economies. In this framework, a government leans against trading of noise traders but at the expense of introducing policy noise to the market. Our welfare analysis shows that under certain underlying economic conditions, the optimal government policy induces a government-centric equilibrium, in which government intervention is so intensive that all investors choose to acquire private information about policy noise rather than fundamentals. This policy regime characterizes China’s approach with financial stability prioritized over other policy objectives.

This article proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts that an allocation is belief-neutral efficient (inefficient) if it is efficient (inefficient) under any convex combination of agents’ beliefs. Although this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations, it can identify positive- and negative-sum speculation driven by conflicting beliefs in a broad range of economic environments.

China's gradualistic approach allowed the government to learn how the economy reacts to small policy changes, and to adjust its reforms before implementing them in full. With fully developed financial markets, however, private actors may front-run future policy changes, making it impossible to implement policies gradually. With financial markets, the government faces a time-inconsistency problem. The government would like to commit to a gradualistic approach, but after it observes the economy's quick reaction, it has no incentive to implement its policies in small steps.

This paper studies how a large increase in the price level is transmitted to the real economy through firm balance sheets. Using newly digitized macro- and micro-level data from the German inflation of 1919–1923, we show inflation led to a large reduction in real debt burdens and bankruptcies. Firms with higher nominal liabilities at the onset of inflation experienced a larger decline in interest expenses, a relative increase in their equity values, and higher employment during the inflation. The results are consistent with real effects of a debt-inflation channel that operates even when prices and wages are flexible. (JEL D22, E23, E31, G32, N14, N24)

The field of asset pricing is a rich and diverse discipline that has contributed to many areas of discourse, including those of fundamental importance to policy makers, investors, and households.1 As we look ahead during a time of substantial economic and political change, it is apparent that society faces many pressing questions, both new and old, that the field is uniquely suited to informing.To contribute to this conversation, the NBER Asset Pricing program convened a panel discussion on “Perspectives on the Future of Asset Pricing” at its November 8, 2019, meeting that took place at Stanford University. The objective of the panel was to identify some of the important questions the field could productively address in the next five to 10 years. The panelists, consisting of experts in several subfields of asset pricing, were invited to share their views on these questions with an eye toward innovative research topics that are ripe for exploring, and the metrics the field could be using to gauge progress.

We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks' domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio--known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free.