We show that production networks are important for the transmission of unconventional monetary policy. Firms with bonds eligible for purchase under the European Central Bank’s Corporate Sector Purchase Program act as financial intermediaries by extending additional trade credit to their customers. The increase in trade credit is pronounced from core countries to periphery countries and for financially constrained customers. Customers then increase investment and employment in response to the increased trade financing, whereas suppliers expand their customer base, contributing to upstream industry concentration. Our findings suggest that trade credit redistributes the effects of monetary policy across regions and firms.

We show that mutual funds worldwide provide substantial international exposure through their domestic holdings of multinationals. The international exposure of domestic funds increases, on average, by 32 percentage points when we consider international corporate diversification. We find that funds with higher indirect international exposure perform better in both the cross-section and the time series. This effect is primarily driven by the fund managers’ ability to invest in multinationals, rather than the performance of those multinationals. Our findings support the hypothesis that international diversification from multinationals reduces the transaction and information costs of investing abroad.

We test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance spillovers in the host country. Using firm-level data from 64 countries during the period 2005–2014, we find that cross-border M&A activity is associated with subsequent improvements in the governance of nontarget firms when the acquirer country has stronger investor protection than the target country. The effect is more pronounced when the target industry is more competitive. Cross-border M&As are also associated with increases in investment and valuation of nontarget firms. Alternative explanations, such as access to global financial markets and cultural similarities, do not appear to explain our findings. Received October 27, 2015; editorial decision March 25, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

This paper challenges the widely accepted stylized fact that chief executive officers (CEOs) in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Using CEO pay data across fourteen countries with mandated pay disclosures, we show that the U.S. pay premium is economically modest and primarily reflects the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent boards. Indeed, we find no significant difference in either level of CEO pay or the use of equity-based pay between U.S. and non-U.S. firms exposed to international and U.S. capital, product, and labor markets. We also show that U.S. and non-U.S. CEO pay has largely converged in the 2000s.

We measure how cuts to public procurement propagate through the banking system in a financial crisis. During the European sovereign debt crisis, the Portuguese government cut procurement spending by 4.3 percent of GDP. We find that this cut saddled banks with nonperforming loans from government contractors, which led to a persistent reduction in credit supply to other firms. We estimate a bank-level elasticity of credit supply with respect to procurement demand of 2.5. In a general equilibrium model, our findings point to large effects of fiscal policy on credit supply and output in a crisis.

We compare the performance of local versus foreign institutional investors using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings in 32 countries during the 2000–2010 period. We find that foreign institutions perform as well as local institutions on average, but only domestic institutions show a trading pattern consistent with an information advantage. Our results suggest a smart-money effect of local institutions in countries subject to higher information asymmetry, non-English speaking countries, countries with less efficient stock markets, with poor investor protection, or high levels of corruption. The local advantage is more pronounced in periods of market turmoil and in illiquid stocks.

We show that sovereign debt impairments can have a significant effect on financial markets and real economies through a credit ratings channel. Specifically, we find that firms reduce their investment and reliance on credit markets due to a rising cost of debt capital following a sovereign rating downgrade. We identify these effects by exploiting exogenous variation in corporate ratings due to rating agencies' sovereign ceiling policies, which require that firms' ratings remain at or below the sovereign rating of their country of domicile.