This paper provides the first systematic analysis of performance patterns for emerging funds and managers in the hedge fund industry. Emerging funds and managers have particularly strong financial incentives to create investment performance and, because of their size, may be more nimble than established ones. Performance measurement, however, needs to control for the usual biases afflicting hedge fund databases. After adjusting for such biases and using a novel event time approach, we find strong evidence of outperformance during the first two to three years of existence. Each additional year of age decreases performance by 42 basis points, on average. Cross-sectionally, early performance by individual funds is quite persistent, with early strong performance lasting for up to five years.

Standard credit risk models cannot explain the observed clustering of default, sometimes described as “credit contagion.” This paper provides the first empirical analysis of credit contagion via direct counterparty effects. We find that bankruptcy announcements cause negative abnormal equity returns and increases in CDS spreads for creditors. In addition, creditors with large exposures are more likely to suffer from financial distress later. This suggests that counterparty risk is a potential additional channel of credit contagion. Indeed, the fear of counterparty defaults among financial institutions explains the sudden worsening of the credit crisis after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008.

This paper studies the hedging activities of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001 and evaluates their effect on firm value. Theories of hedging based on market imperfections imply that hedging should increase the firm's market value (MV). To test this hypothesis, we collect detailed information on the extent of hedging and on the valuation of oil and gas reserves. We verify that hedging reduces the firm's stock price sensitivity to oil and gas prices. Contrary to previous studies, however, we find that hedging does not seem to affect MVs for this industry.

This paper re-examines the evidence on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in the long run. Previous studies have generally been unable to reject the hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random walk. If true, this implies that PPP does not hold. In contrast, this paper casts serious doubt on this random walk hypothesis. The results follow from more powerful estimation techniques, applied in a multilateral framework. Deviations from PPP, while substantial in the short run, appear to take about three years to be reduced in half.

This paper re‐examines the evidence on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in the long run. Previous studies have generally been unable to reject the hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random walk. If true, this implies that PPP does not hold. In contrast, this paper casts serious doubt on this random walk hypothesis. The results follow from more powerful estimation techniques, applied in a multilateral framework. Deviations from PPP, while substantial in the short run, appear to take about three years to be reduced in half.

This paper examines the issue of integration versus segmentation of the Canadian equity market relative to a global North American market. We compare the international and domestic versions of the CAPM, and find that integration, or the mean‐variance efficiency of the global market index, is rejected by the data. Segmentation is the preferred model, based on a maximum likelihood procedure correcting for thin trading. We further divide the sample into securities that are interlisted in Canada and the U.S., and those that are not. Integration is rejected for both groups, which indicates that the source of segmentation can be traced to legal barriers based on the nationality of issuing firms.

This paper examines the issue of integration versus segmentation of the Canadian equity market relative to a global North American market. We compare the international and domestic versions of the CAPM, and find that integration, or the mean-variance efficiency of the global market index, is rejected by the data. Segmentation is the preferred model, based on a maximum likelihood procedure correcting for thin trading. We further divide the sample into securities that are interlisted in Canada and the U.S., and those that are not. Integration is rejected for both groups, which indicates that the source of segmentation can be traced to legal barriers based on the nationality of issuing firms.

We examine the incidence of operational losses among U.S. financial institutions using publicly reported loss data from 1980 to 2005. We show that most operational losses can be traced to a breakdown of internal control, and that firms suffering from these losses tend to be younger and more complex, and have higher credit risk, more antitakeover provisions, and chief executive officers (CEOs) with higher stock option holdings and bonuses relative to salary. These findings highlight the correlation between operational risk and credit risk, as well as the role of corporate governance and proper managerial incentives in mitigating operational risk.

We compare execution quality of six brokerage accounts across five brokers by generating a sample of 85,000 simultaneous market orders. Commission levels and payment for order flow (PFOF) differ across our accounts. We find that execution prices vary significantly across brokers: the mean account‐level round‐trip cost ranges from 0.07% to 0.46%, excluding any commissions. The dispersion is due to off‐exchange wholesalers systematically giving different execution prices for the same trades to different brokers. Across brokers, variation in PFOF does not explain the large variation in price execution. We provide several suggestions for more informative disclosures on execution quality.

We placed 85,000 retail trades in six retail brokerage accounts from December 2021 to June 2022 to validate the Boehmer et al. algorithm, which uses subpenny trade prices to identify and sign retail trades. The algorithm identifies 35% of our trades as retail, incorrectly signs 28% of identified trades, and yields uninformative order imbalance measures for 30% of stocks. We modify the algorithm by signing trades using the quoted spread midpoints. The quote midpoint method does not affect identification rates but reduces the signing error rates to 5% and provides informative order imbalance measures for all stocks.