The paper examines within a unified methodology expectational coordination in a series of economic models. The methodology views the predictions associated with the Rational Expectations Hypothesis as reasonable whenever they can be derived from the more basic Common Knowledge Hypothesis. The paper successively considers a simple non-noisy N-dimensional model, standard models with “intrinsic” uncertainty, and reference intertemporal models with infinite horizon. It reviews existing results and suggests new ones. It translates the formal results into looser but economically intuitive statements, whose robustness, in the present state of knowledge, is tentatively ascertained.

This paper examines changes in the information content of earnings over the past three decades using the two metrics from Beaver [1968]: abnormal trading volume and abnormal return volatility. We find no evidence of a decline in the information content of earnings announcements over the past three decades, as measured by both abnormal trading volume and return volatility around quarterly earnings announcements. If anything, our results suggest an increase over time in the informativeness of quarterly earnings announcements. Variables reflecting changes in firm‐specific factors account for a portion of the observed increase.

The recent repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in the US has cleared the way for commercial banks to enter the securities underwriting business. Many of the concerns that resulted in the original passage of the Glass–Steagall Act, however, still exist. One of these is the possible conflict of interest a universal bank faces. This paper provides evidence on this issue from the experience of Canada following its removal of restrictions on chartered bank ownership of investment dealers. Both ex ante bond yield comparisons between commercial and investment bank underwritten issues and equity price reactions to bond issue announcements provide no evidence of a conflict of interest.

One of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings (IPOs) is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table, defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first-day closing market price and the offer price. The average IPO leaves $9.1 million on the table. This number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm. We present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes. Our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern: much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls. This results in an explanation of hot issue markets. We also offer a new explanation for why IPOs are underpriced.

The standard class of affine models produces poor forecasts of future Treasury yields. Better forecasts are generated by assuming that yields follow random walks. The failure of these models is driven by one of their key features: Compensation for risk is a multiple of the variance of the risk. Thus risk compensation cannot vary independently of interest rate volatility. I also describe a broader class of models. These aessentially affine‐ models retain the tractability of standard models, but allow compensation for interest rate risk to vary independently of interest rate volatility. This additional flexibility proves useful in forecasting future yields.

The use of incentive regulation and other alternative regulatory programs in U.S. electricity markets has grown during the past two decades. Within a stochastic frontier framework, I investigate the effect of individual programs on the technical efficiency of a large set of coal and natural gas generation units. I find that those programs tied directly to generator performance and those that modify traditional fuel cost pass-through programs, to provide a greater incentive to reduce fuel costs, are associated with greater efficiency levels. Other programs have no statistical association with efficiency levels.

Ongoing questions on the historical mean and standard deviation of the return on equities and bonds and on the equilibrium demand for these securities are addressed in the context of a stationary, overlapping-generations economy in which consumers are subject to a borrowing constraint. The key feature captured by the OLG economy is that the bulk of the future income of the young consumers is derived from their wages forthcoming in their middle age, while the bulk of the future income of the middle-aged consumers is derived from their savings in equity and bonds. The young would like to borrow and invest in equity but the borrowing constraint prevents them from doing so. The middle-aged choose to hold a diversified portfolio that includes positive holdings of bonds and this explains the demand for bonds. Without the borrowing constraint, the young borrow and invest in equity, thereby decreasing the mean equity premium and increasing the rate of interest.

The last three decades have witnessed the rise of a pohtical gender gap in the United States wherein more women than men favor the Democratic party. We trace this development to the decline in marriage, which we posit has made men richer and women poorer. Data for the United States support this argument. First, there is a strong positive correlation between state divorce prevalence and the political gender gap—higher divorce prevalence reduces support for the Democrats among men but not women. Second, longitudinal data show that following marriage (divorce), women are less (more) likely to support the Democratic party.