Using data on White House visitors from 2009 through 2015, we find that corporate executives’ meetings with key policymakers are associated with positive abnormal stock returns. We also find evidence suggesting that firms receive more government contracts and are more likely to receive regulatory relief (as measured by the tone of regulatory news) following meetings with federal government officials. Using the 2016 presidential election as a shock to political access, we find that firms with access to the Obama administration experience significantly lower stock returns following the release of the election result than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our results provide evidence suggesting that political access is of significant value to corporations.

This study examines whether and how entrepreneurs' facial trustworthiness is associated with the success of their crowdfunding campaigns. We adopt a novel dataset extracted from the Kickstarter crowdfunding platform and employ machine learning-based facial detection techniques to construct a comprehensive index that measures facial trustworthiness for our investigation. Our results suggest that entrepreneurs' facial trustworthiness is positively associated with crowdfunding campaign success. Specifically, trustworthy-looking entrepreneurs receive a 13.1% greater pledge amount and attract 4.8% more backers in their crowdfunding campaign as compared to those who are untrustworthy-looking. We also find that the facial trustworthiness of female entrepreneurs plays a more prominent role in determining project success than that of male entrepreneurs. Our results are robust to a series of additional analyses and sensitivity checks. Overall, the results of our study suggest that entrepreneurs' facial trustworthiness is an important factor that affects funders' decision-making process in reward-based crowdfunding.

We study the sources of racial disparities in income using anonymized longitudinal data covering nearly the entire U.S. population from 1989 to 2015. We document three results. First, black Americans and American Indians have much lower rates of upward mobility and higher rates of downward mobility than whites, leading to persistent disparities across generations. Conditional on parent income, the black-white income gap is driven by differences in wages and employment rates between black and white men; there are no such differences between black and white women. Hispanic Americans have rates of intergenerational mobility more similar to whites than blacks, leading the Hispanic-white income gap to shrink across generations. Second, differences in parental marital status, education, and wealth explain little of the black-white income gap conditional on parent income. Third, the black-white gap persists even among boys who grow up in the same neighborhood. Controlling for parental income, black boys have lower incomes in adulthood than white boys in 99% of Census tracts. The few areas with small black-white gaps tend to be low-poverty neighborhoods with low levels of racial bias among whites and high rates of father presence among blacks. Black males who move to such neighborhoods earlier in childhood have significantly better outcomes. However, less than 5% of black children grow up in such areas. Our findings suggest that reducing the black-white income gap will require efforts whose impacts cross neighborhood and class lines and increase upward mobility specifically for black men.

This paper studies how legal liability due to negligence can weaken or strengthen an auditor's reputation concerns in the client market to provide high audit effort. A negligence liability rule relies on auditing standards to provide a threshold for the level of due care. When the negligence standard is lax, legal liability can weaken the auditor's reputation incentives, with lower audit effort than without legal liability. If the damage payment is low, noncompliance is less costly, because with compliance, reputational concerns cause the auditor to provide higher costly audit effort than the standard. In this case, investors also prefer noncompliance, and earnings quality is lower than if there were no legal liability damages. When the standard is stringent, noncompliance is less costly for the auditor, and legal liability strengthens reputation incentives. Investors may also prefer noncompliance, and earnings quality is higher than if there were no legal liability damages.

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller, for example, than the strong persistence in board structure that we show. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies show a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.

The executive compensation literature presumes that shareholders offer risk‐averse managers stock options to entice them to take on more risk, resulting in riskier investment decisions and thus a greater return on investment. However, recent empirical work challenges this assumption, and theoretical research even argues that high levels of option‐based compensation for generally under‐diversified managers may actually lead to greater risk aversion . We evaluate the incentive structure of employee stock options by examining the level of R&D investment and the return on that investment conditional on the portfolio “vega,” which captures the sensitivity of option value to stock price volatility. Our results suggest that both investment in R&D and the return on R&D, as measured by future earnings and patent awards, varies concavely with vega. That is, low to moderate levels of vega correspond to increasing investment in and returns on R&D, consistent with vega inducing more profitable investments, but marginal returns decline as vega increases. Collectively, these results, bolstered by several supplemental analyses, suggest that this surprising relation between vega and risky investment is driven by greater risk aversion at higher levels of vega. Overall, our results imply that employee stock options may not always align the incentives of managers and shareholders.

What is the economic role played by arrangers of leveraged loans, and what are the risks they face? We provide evidence that arrangers solve a demand discovery problem. Investors have incentives to feign little interest in the loan to obtain better terms. To deter such behavior, arrangers underprice hot deals and ration investors on cold deals. The risk associated with demand discovery is often shared between borrowers and arrangers. One implication is that to ration investors on cold deals, arrangers retain larger loan shares. This motive for retention is different from the monitoring incentive motive previously considered in the literature.

This research investigates the relationship between government economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and trade credit and its value implication for U.S. public firms. We find that firms curtail their receivables periods and face shorter payables periods from suppliers during high EPU. The impact of trade credit policy changes on firm value is nonlinear. Tightening trade credit during periods of high EPU increases shareholder value only to a certain point, beyond which it is value-destroying since overly reducing trade credit can lead to losing customers to competitors.

We model a dynamic economy with strategic complementarity among investors and study how endogenous government interventions mitigate coordination failures. We establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness, and we show that one intervention can affect another through altering the public information structure. A stronger initial intervention helps subsequent interventions through increasing the likelihood of positive news, but also leads to negative conditional updates. Our results suggest optimal policy should emphasize initial interventions when coordination outcomes tend to correlate. Neglecting informational externalities of initial interventions results in over- or under-interventions. Moreover, saving smaller funds disproportionally more can generate greater informational benefits at smaller costs.

Although venture capitalists (VCs) can choose from thousands of potential syndicate partners, many co-syndicate with small groups of preferred partners. We term these groups “VC communities.” We apply computational methods from the physical sciences to 3 decades of syndication data to identify these communities. We find that communities comprise VCs that are similar in age, connectedness, and functional style but undifferentiated in spatial location. Machine-learning tools classify communities into 3 groups roughly ordered by their age and reach. Community VC financing is associated with faster maturation and greater innovation, especially for early-stage firms without an innovation history.