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Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises

Journal of Finance 2005 60(2), 615-647 open access
We show in this article that bank failures can be contagious. Unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks, we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity, creating, or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages. This could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system. Given the costs of a meltdown, there is a possible role for government intervention. Unfortunately, liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other, making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis. We propose a robust sequence of intervention.

Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending

Journal of Finance 2002 57(6), 2533-2570
The distance between small firms and their lenders is increasing, and they are communicating in more impersonal ways. After documenting these systematic changes, we demonstrate they do not arise from small firms locating differently, consolidation in the banking industry, or biases in the sample. Instead, improvements in lender productivity appear to explain our findings. We also find distant firms no longer have to be the highest quality credits, indicating they have greater access to credit. The evidence indicates there has been substantial development of the financial sector, even in areas such as small business lending.

A Theory of Bank Capital

Journal of Finance 2000 55(6), 2431-2465 open access
Banks can create liquidity precisely because deposits are fragile and prone to runs. Increased uncertainty makes deposits excessively fragile, creating a role for outside bank capital. Greater bank capital reduces the probability of financial distress but also reduces liquidity creation. The quantity of capital influences the amount that banks can induce borrowers to pay. Optimal bank capital structure trades off effects on liquidity creation, costs of bank distress, and the ability to force borrower repayment. The model explains the decline in bank capital over the last two centuries. It identifies overlooked consequences of having regulatory capital requirements and deposit insurance.

The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data

Journal of Finance 1994
This paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm. We analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the Small Business Administration. The primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases. We find smaller effects on the price of credit. Attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit. In sum, relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices.

The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data

Journal of Finance 1994 49(1), 3-37
This paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm. We analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the Small Business Administration. The primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases. We find smaller effects on the price of credit. Attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit. In sum, relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices.

Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy

Journal of Political Economy 2012 120(3), 552-591 open access
Banks finance illiquid assets with demandable deposits, which discipline bankers but expose them to damaging runs. Authorities may not want to stand by and watch banks collapse. However, unconstrained direct bailouts undermine the disciplinary role of deposits. Moreover, competition forces banks to promise depositors more, increasing intervention and making the system worse off. By contrast, constrained central bank intervention to lower rates maintains private discipline, while offsetting contractual rigidity. It may still lead banks to make excessive liquidity promises. Anticipating this, central banks should raise rates in normal times to offset distortions from reducing rates in adverse times.

Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking

Journal of Political Economy 2001 109(2), 287-327 open access
Loans are illiquid when a lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect them. Consequently, if the relationship lender needs funds before the loan matures, she may demand to liquidate early, or require a return premium, when she lends directly. Borrowers also risk losing funding. The costs of illiquidity are avoided if the relationship lender is a bank with a fragile capital structure, subject to runs. Fragility commits banks to creating liquidity, enabling depositors to withdraw when needed, while buffering borrowers from depositors' liquidity needs. Stabilization policies, such as capital requirements, narrow banking, and suspension of convertibility, may reduce liquidity creation.

Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles

Journal of Finance 2022 77(2), 1259-1324 open access
A simple proxy for a bank’s credit risk – the average physical distance of small corporate borrowers from their bank’s branches – suggests risky lending before the global financial crisis was pro-cyclical and especially so in banks operating in counties where banking was competitive. Surprisingly, such lending took off as the Fed raised interest rates between 2004 and 2007. We argue that bank responses to the rate hikes led to a shift of bank deposits into counties where banking was competitive. Short-horizon bank management recycled these new deposits into loans to more distant counties where banking was not competitive. Unfortunately, given the difficulty of making distant small business loans, loan quality deteriorated. We discuss the conditions under which a normalization of interest rates can lead to a deterioration in loan quality.

Liquidity, pledgeability, and the nature of lending

Journal of Financial Economics 2022 143(3), 1275-1294
We develop a theory of how corporate lending and financial intermediation change based on the fundamentals of the firm and its environment. We focus on the interaction between the prospective net worth or liquidity of an industry and the firm’s internal governance or pledgeability. Variations in prospective liquidity can induce changes in the nature, covenants, and quantity of loans that are made, the identity of the lender, and the extent to which the lender is leveraged. We offer predictions on how these might vary over the financial cycle.

The Internal Governance of Firms

Journal of Finance 2011 66(3), 689-720
We develop a model of internal governance where the self‐serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, in which dividends are paid by self‐interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control.