We develop a theory of trust in lending that distinguishes between reputation and trust. Banks emerge as more trusted lenders than non-banks. We show that trust severs the link between performance and the cost and availability of financing for lenders, but trust can be lost and is difficult to regain. Banks survive an erosion of trust better than non-banks. Banks' trust advantage arises from the lower cost of funding due to insured deposits and an endogenous belief revision channel that complements the effect of the funding cost advantage. The results have novel policy relevance for deposit insurance scope.
This paper analyzes the costs and benefits of a no-fault-default debt structure as an alternative to the typical bankruptcy process. We show that the deadweight costs of bankruptcy can be avoided or substantially reduced through no-fault-default debt, which permits a relatively seamless transfer of ownership from shareholders to bondholders in certain states of the world. We show that potential costs introduced by this scheme due to risk shifting can be attenuated via convertible debt, and we discuss the relationship of this to bail-in debt and contingent convertible (CoCo) debt for financial institutions. We then explore how, despite the advantages of no-fault-default debt, there may still be a functional role for the bankruptcy process to efficiently allow the renegotiation of labor contracts in certain cases. In sharp contrast to the human-capital-based theories of optimal capital structure in which the renegotiation of labor contract in bankruptcy is a cost associated with leverage, we show that it is a benefit. The normative implication of our analysis is that no-fault-default debt, when combined with specific features of the bankruptcy process, may reduce the deadweight costs associated with bankruptcy. We discuss how an orderly process for transfer of control and a predetermined admissibility of renegotiation of labor contracts can be a useful tool for resolving financial institution failure without harming financial stability.
Section I: Introductin to Finance and the Mathematics of Continuous-Time Models 1 Modern Finance 2 Introduction to Portfolio Selection and Capital Market Theory: Static Analysis 3 On the Mathematics and Economic Assumptions of Continuous-Time Financial Models Section II: Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Selection in Continuous-Time Models 4. Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case 5. Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model 6. Further Developments in theory of Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Selection Section III: Warrant and Option Pricing Theory 7. A Complete Model of Warrant Pricing the Maximizes Utility 8. Theory of Rational Option Pricing 9. Option Pricing when Underlying Stock Returns are Discontinuous 10. Further Developments in Option Pricing Theory Section IV: Contingent-Claims Analysis in the Theory of Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation 11. A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of the Asset Market and its Application to the Pricing of the Capital Structure of the Firm 12. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates 13. On the Pricing of Contingent Claims and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem 14. Contingent Claims Analysis in the Theory of Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation Section V: An Intertemporal-Equilibrium Theory of Finance 15. An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model 16. A General Equilibrium Theory of Finance in Continuous-Time Section VI: Applications of the Continuous-Time Model to Selected Issues in Public Finance 17. An Asymptotic Theory of Growth Under Uncertainty 18. On Consumption-Indexed Public Pension Plans 19. An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Loan Guarantees and Deposit Insurance 20. On the Cost of Deposit Insurance when there are Surveillance Costs
The combination of rising home prices, declining interest rates, and near-frictionless refinancing opportunities can create unintentional synchronization of homeowner leverage, leading to a “ratchet” effect on leverage because homes are indivisible and owner-occupants cannot raise equity to reduce leverage when home prices fall. Our simulation of the U.S. housing market yields potential losses of 1.7 trillion from June 2006 to December 2008 with cash-out refinancing vs. only 330 billion in the absence of cash-out refinancing. The refinancing ratchet effect is a new type of systemic risk in the financial system and does not rely on any dysfunctional behaviors.
Leading financial scholars present essays examining the performance of the basic financial functions underlying global financial systems: payments, lending and investing, pooling funds, allocating risk, providing information, and dealing with incentive issues - with particular emphasis on how their performance is changing and implications for the future.