The article discusses the investigation of accounting records. During an investigation of business records preserved in the manuscript section of the Baker Library at Harvard University Graduate School of Business, an early 19th century accounting primer was discovered. Various bookkeeping records and accounting procedures of mercantile companies operating during that period are outlined in the text. The book proved intrinsically interesting and also afforded the writer a useful guide to record keeping methods of early merchants. The purposes of this article are to describe the contents of the primer, to comment upon certain recording procedures of the early 1800's and to gain some insight into accounting methodology in the United States during this period. The value of the primer described in this paper is two-fold. First, the book is a valuable example of accounting instruction in the United States during the early 1800's. As such, it deserves recognition and preservation as an example of the evolution of accounting education and practice in the U.S. Second; students of business history would find the primer a useful preliminary study prior to examination of records of 19th century American businesses.

In contrast to theoretical and empirical evidence linking disclosure to information environment benefits, recent research concludes that guidance increases volatility, but leaves open the question of whether volatility plays a role in prompting the issuance of guidance. Consistent with the notion that managers react to rising volatility by providing guidance, we document a link between abnormal run-ups in volatility and the decision to issue a forecast after controlling for the market’s ability to anticipate the guidance. Upon disentangling pre-guidance volatility changes from post-guidance volatility changes, we find no evidence that guidance increases volatility. Indeed, our evidence consistently supports the view that managers seek to and do mitigate share price volatility with guidance.

The National Association of Security Dealers alleges that professional-trader use of the Small Order Execution System (SOES) causes greater security price volatility. We docu? ment bidirectional Granger causality between a proxy for professional SOES trading (the frequency of maximum-sized SOES trades) and a measure of stock price volatility. We find that high levels of volatility precede high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades, suggesting that volatility causes more frequent large SOES trades. Likewise, over a one-minute time interval, high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades cause high volatility. Over longer periods, however, intense maximum-sized SOES trading causes lower volatility. Inter? preted in conjunction with Harris and Schultz (1997), these results suggest that high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades lead to more efficient price discovery. In light of these results, we believe that efforts to eliminate SOES based on volatility considerations are unwarranted.

We identify retail brokers that seemingly route orders to maximize order flow payments, by selling market orders and sending limit orders to venues paying large liquidity rebates. Angel, Harris, and Spatt argue that such routing may not always be in customers’ best interests. For both proprietary limit order data and a broad sample of trades from TAQ, we document a negative relation between several measures of limit order execution quality and rebate/fee level. This finding suggests that order routing designed to maximize liquidity rebates does not maximize limit order execution quality and thus brokers cannot have it all.

This article focuses on completed contract methods used for solving accounting problems. The present status of construction in progress seem relatively stable. Most textbooks in accounting treat this topic at the intermediate level using two acceptable methods "completed-contract" or "percentage-of-completion.'' The costs incurred to date on any project are stored in a debit balance account labeled "Construction in Progress." An analogous situation can be found in the areas of depreciation accounting, overhead accounting, and depletion accounting in which, when an earlier discrepancy is found, people are offered the options of correcting and using a new rate (or amount) or letting the error stand and absorbing it by an error in the opposite direction over the remaining time.

We examine the impact deciding to route limit orders away from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has on three dimensions of execution quality with methodologies controlling for market conditions and order submission strategies. Overall differences in limit order execution quality between regional stock exchanges and the NYSE are small, suggesting that the order routing decision may not affect retail limit order traders substantively. Conditioning on the distance between the limit order’s price and prevailing quotes, however, reveals systematic differences in execution quality. This implies that brokers can strategically route limit orders to improve retail limit order execution quality.

In an effort to better understand the dynamic market price adjustment process, this paper develops a model which describes the impact of new information on a financial market. The primary emphasis is on the price change‐volume relationship in the presence of a margin requirement. We find that the margin requirement significantly affects the relation of price change to volume. Furthermore, this relationship is shown to be affected by the number of investors in the market, the degree of information dissemination, differences in interpretation of information and the implicit cost of the margin requirement.

Theory suggests that reputations allow nonanonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in trading. We identify instances in which New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks experience trading floor relocations. Although specialists follow the stocks to their new locations, most brokers do not. We find a discernable increase in liquidity costs around a stock's relocation that is larger for stocks with higher adverse selection and greater broker turnover. We also find that floor brokers relocating with the stock obtain lower trading costs than brokers not moving and brokers beginning trading post‐move. Our results suggest that reputation plays an important role in the NYSE's liquidity provision process.