Analysts, Earnings Warnings, Negative earnings surprise, Management forecasts

Auditing, Audit expertise, Tacit knowledge, Technical knowledge

Standard setting, FASB, Qualitive characteristics

Investments that are classified as Level 2 within the fair value hierarchy account for approximately 92 percent of US banks' fair value assets. We report an experiment that examines how experienced auditors apply current PCAOB guidance when auditing portfolios of these assets. We hypothesize and find that, depending on how overstatement is distributed within a portfolio, current PCAOB guidance leads auditors to make adjustments that are predictably larger or smaller than the aggregate overstatement in the portfolio. Auditors are more likely to follow PCAOB guidance when doing so leads to lower audit adjustments and higher client income. We also predict and find that auditors identify some patterns of overstatement as indicative of management bias, but not others. However, management-bias assessments do not affect auditors' adjustment decisions as standards imply they should, even when auditors are prompted to consider management bias. Together, these results highlight a potential deficiency in current auditing guidance that managers could exploit by strategically locating overstatements within securities with larger book values or by spreading those overstatements across many securities within a portfolio. We suggest changes to current PCAOB guidance which may reduce these effects.

Les études précédentes indiquent que les analystes n’ajustent pas totalement leurs évaluations en fonction du biais général à la baisse des annonces de résultats prévisionnels faites par les directions d’entreprises. Les auteurs rapportent les résultats de deux expériences visant à déterminer comment la feuille de route des entreprises en ce qui a trait à la publication de résultats prévisionnels et les enjeux motivant les analystes expliquent de concert la mesure dans laquelle ces derniers ajustent leurs évaluations en fonction du biais des annonces de résultats prévisionnels. Ces résultats d’expérience semblent indiquer que les analystes pour qui l’enjeu est celui de l’exactitude ajustent leurs évaluations selon la feuille de route de la direction en ce qui a trait à la publication de résultats prévisionnels biaisés à la baisse lorsque le biais est relativement modeste (un cent), mais que les analystes pour qui l’enjeu est celui de leur relation avec la direction s’en abstiennent. Au surplus, la différence dans l’ajustement est plus importante lorsque la feuille de route de l’entreprise en matière de biais est irrégulière que lorsqu’elle est régulière. Aussi, lorsque le biais des annonces de résultats prévisionnels est plus important que moins (deux cents par rapport à un cent), les analystes pour qui l’enjeu est celui de la relation avec la direction procèdent à un ajustement partiel, paraissant ainsi rechercher un équilibre entre exactitude et volonté de plaire à la direction. Ces constatations ont des répercussions pour les investisseurs, les autorités de réglementation et l’interprétation des études précédentes.

Prior research indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for the general downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management. We report the results of two experiments designed to investigate how guidance track record and analysts incentives jointly explain the extent to which analysts adjust for guidance bias. Our results suggest that analysts with accuracy incentives adjust for managements track record of downwardly biased guidance when the bias is relatively small (one cent), but those with relationship incentives do not. Furthermore, the difference in adjustment is larger when the bias track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. Also, when guidance bias is larger (two cents) relative to smaller (one cent), analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust, as they appear to strike a balance between accuracy and their desire to please management. These findings hold implications for investors, regulators, and the interpretation of prior research.

Prior research indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for the general downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management. We report the results of two experiments designed to investigate how guidance track record and analysts’ incentives jointly explain the extent to which analysts adjust for guidance bias. Our results suggest that analysts with accuracy incentives adjust for management’s track record of downwardly biased guidance when the bias is relatively small (one cent), but those with relationship incentives do not. Furthermore, the difference in adjustment is larger when the bias track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. Also, when guidance bias is larger (two cents) relative to smaller (one cent), analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust, as they appear to strike a balance between accuracy and their desire to please management. These findings hold implications for investors, regulators, and the interpretation of prior research.

We examine whether information in footnotes might lack reliability because auditors permit more misstatement in disclosed, as opposed to recognized, amounts. In both the stock-compensation and lease settings, audit partners require greater correction of misstatements in recognized amounts than in the equivalent disclosed amounts. Debriefing questions indicate that the partners make these decisions knowingly, even though they expect greater client resistance to correcting recognized amounts, because they view recognized amounts as more material. Partners also spend more time on correction decisions for recognized information. While prior literature suggests that amounts are often relegated to footnotes because they are less reliable, our results suggest that the actual choice to disclose versus recognize can also reduce information reliability. These results have implications for the interpretation of prior research on the reliability of recognized and disclosed numbers, for financial-accounting standard setters who may want to consider the reliability effects of their recognition versus disclosure decisions, and for auditing standard setters who may wish to clarify auditors' responsibilities for preventing misstatements in disclosed amounts.

Preannouncements of earnings tend to overstate negative or understate positive news, which decreases the chance of a negative surprise when actual earnings is announced. We conduct an experiment to investigate how experienced sell‐side analysts’ earnings forecasts are affected by preannouncements that either understate, accurately state, or overstate the magnitude of positive or negative total earnings news, holding total earnings news constant. We find that firms with negative (positive) total news receive the highest post‐earnings announcement forecasts of future earnings when the earlier preannouncement overstates (understates) the magnitude of the news. These forecasts are consistent with the analysts’ perceptions about the firms’ future prospects, but not their perceptions of management. While analysts expect preannouncements to be lower than actual earnings, they do not adjust their forecasts for these beliefs. These insights into analysts’ responses have implications both for managers and analysts.

Current IFRS requires significant disaggregation of income statement numbers while such disaggregation is voluntary and much less common under U.S. GAAP. We examine whether voluntary disaggregation of income statement numbers increases the reliability of income statement subtotals because auditors permit less misstatement in the disaggregated numbers. In our experiment, experienced auditors require correction of smaller errors in disaggregated numbers. Auditors also believe that greater disaggregation will increase SEC scrutiny of uncorrected financial statement errors in the disaggregated numbers. However, the effects are substantially reduced if the disaggregated numbers are presented in the notes. Furthermore, there is significant disagreement among participants on whether disaggregated numbers are relevant materiality benchmarks, and on what current auditing guidance requires. These results suggest a potential deficiency in current audit guidance, which traditionally has been aimed at promoting consensus in practice among auditors. The results also suggest an unintended positive consequence of voluntary disaggregation for the reliability of income statement subtotals. Possible effects of management behavior and required disaggregation resulting from U.S. adoption of IFRS or the recommendations of the joint FASB/IASB financial statement presentation project are also discussed. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.