We hypothesize that a mandated accounting change (MAC) that disallows the deferral of revenues or capitalization of expenditures causes the aggregate deferred revenue and capitalized expenditure flows to fall below their levels prior to the change. In addition, the deferred revenue or capitalized expenditure flows after a MAC will exceed the pre‐MAC levels that would have resulted from formerly capitalizing or deferring these items. We discuss using deferred tax flows as a proxy for a firm's level of capitalization and deferral. Finally, we test our hypothesis by examining changes in deferred tax flows for a sample of firms that capitalized research and development costs prior to the promulgation of FAS2. The test results indicate that managers actively restored revenue flows and capitalized expenditures for the period immediately following FAS2. Second, smaller firms appear to be more active in this restoration process than larger firms. Finally, the decline in the rate of growth of depreciation for capitalizing firms suggests that managers may have influenced the capitalization of costs to restore earnings to pre‐FAS2 levels. Résumé. Les auteurs posent l'hypothèse selon laquelle une modification comptable non discrétionnaire (MCND) par suite de l'interdiction du report de produits ou de la capitalisation de dépenses fait en sorte que les flux globaux des produits reportés et des dépenses capitalisées diminuent au‐dessous des niveaux qu'ils affichaient avant la modification. En outre, les flux de produits reportés ou de dépenses capitalisées après une MCND excéderont les niveaux qui auraient résulté de la capitalisation ou du report de ces éléments avant la MCND. Les auteurs traitent de l'utilisation des flux d'impôt reporté d'une entreprise à litre de substitut du niveau de capitalisation et de report. Enfin, ils vérifient leur hypothèse en examinant les changements des flux d'impôt reporté pour un échantillon d'entreprises qui ont capitalisé leurs frais de recherche et de développement avant la promulgation par le FASB de la Norme n o 2. Les résultats du test indiquent que les gestionnaires ont activement rétabli les flux de produits reportés et de dépenses capitalisées pendant la période suivant immédiatement la Norme n o 2. Deuxièmement, les entreprises plus petites semblent plus enclines à opérer ce processus de rétablissement que les entreprises plus grandes. Enfin, le déclin du taux de croissance de l'amortissement pour les entreprises qui recourent à la capitalisation donne à penser que les gestionnaires peuvent avoir joué sur la capitalisation des coûts pour ramener les bénéfices à leurs niveaux antérieurs à la Norme n o 2.

Analyst forecasts, Analyst forecast errors, Correlated forecast errors, Private information

Robert W. Holthausen, Robert E. Verrecchia, The Effect of Sequential Information Releases on the Variance of Price Changes in an Intertemporal Multi-Asset Market, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 82-106

William N. Lanen, Robert E. Verrecchia, Operating Decisions and the Disclosure of Management Accounting Information, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 25, Studies on Stewardship Uses of Accounting Information (1987), pp. 165-189

This paper introduces a model in which the firm's returns depend on trading volume when the firm defers disclosure, because market makers use volume to draw inferences about better-informed investors' private information on firm value. In addition, we show that a firm's commitment to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes dampens the slope coefficient on volume in a Taylor expansion of the log of the absolute value of returns on volume. The reason for this is that when a firm commits to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes, the deferral of a report indicates that the outcome is extreme. This heightens adverse selection. In turn, this makes informed trade more costly and hence less likely, thereby rendering returns less dependent on trading volume as a source of information about firm value. This result predicts that firms committing to more disclosure should experience a smaller slope coefficient on trading volume. Thus, the slope coefficient offers a potential tool for measuring the economic consequences of shifts in disclosure regimes.

In addition to being a function of traditional fundamentals such as cash-flow persistence and the discount rate, the equilibrium association between a security price and a value-relevant statistic can simply be a function of what rational investors believe the association will be. We refer to this phenomenon as beliefs-driven price association (BPA). By explicitly considering the phenomenon of BPA, we show that the price response to information releases can vary over time even if the risk-free interest rate and investor preferences are static and the earnings/cash flow generating process is stable. This observation suggests, for example, that price-to-earnings associations and price volatility can vary over time even if a stable pattern of economic fundamentals suggests otherwise. The possibility of BPA suggests that measures of the cost of capital, information content, and growth prospects inferred from observed market prices will be confounded. While we do not predict when periods of BPA will arise, we provide empirically testable predictions about how prices should behave during periods of BPA. In particular, we predict that, during sufficiently long periods of high (positive or negative) BPA, price volatility, price levels, and expected returns will be higher than would be implied by a fundamental valuation framework. Finally, while BPA in the pricing of one security does not cause BPA in the pricing of other securities, the price levels of those other securities will be affected if the securities with BPA are sufficiently large relative to the market as a whole.

We analyze how analysts' forecasts relate to investor beliefs and describe the implications of these relations for price and volume reactions to earnings surprises. We show that dispersion among forecasts does not fully capture investor uncertainty. We also show how the relations between market reactions and forecast properties differ under the alternative assumptions of exogenous and endogenous private information acquisition. Finally, the analysis suggests refined tests for volume reactions at the time of an announcement. Our results indicate that the model is useful for understanding and interpreting empirical work and developing empirical tests of market reactions to announcements.

We present a simple model of managerial reporting bias for a setting in which the capital market is uncertain about the manager's reporting objective. In this setting, the manager's reporting bias reduces the value relevance of the manager's report; that is, it adds noise to the report. Through comparative static results, our model yields insights into factors that affect the slope and intercept terms in a regression of price on earnings. Specifically, we find that the information content of the manager's report, as captured by the earnings slope coefficient, falls as the private cost to the manager of biasing reports falls, and as the uncertainty about the manager's objective increases. We also find that the magnitude of the adjustment for the expected amount of bias, as captured by the absolute value of the intercept, falls as the uncertainty about the manager's objective increases. Finally, to highlight conditions under which managers would lobby to retain an option to bias reports (i.e., retain reporting flexibility), we analyze the effect of the option to bias on the manager's welfare. For example, we show that the ex ante benefit from biasing the report is positive if there is sufficient uncertainty about the manager's reporting objective.

[We reexamine the "uniformity vs. flexibility" debate by considering the consequences of varying the amount of discretion managers have in reporting current period expenses. We study the effects of altering GAAP on both the "internal agency problem" between current shareholders and their manager and the "external agency problem" between current and prospective shareholders. We show that the internal agency problem is ameliorated by expanding discretion, and we exhibit examples where expanding discretion is undesirable when the internal and external agency problems are present concurrently and the nonexpense-related components of earnings are measured with error. We establish that expanding discretion is welfare-enhancing if either the manager's contract is publicly observable or else the nonexpense-related components of earnings are measured without error. These results demonstrate the limitations of evaluating GAAP on a piecemeal, or issue-by-issue, basis.]

This paper presents a partially revealing rational expectations model of competitive trading to identify two effects of information releases; an informedness effect and a consensus effect. The informedness effect measures the extent to which agents become more knowledgeable, and the consensus effect measures the extent of agreement among agents at the time of an information release. We demonstrate that informedness and consensus generally occur jointly when information is disseminated, and that unexpected price changes and trading volume are each influenced by both informedness and consensus. Thus, interpretations of unexpected price changes and volume associated with information releases are conceptually similar. Since informedness and consensus each affect both the variance of price changes and volume, our paper provides an economic rationale for examining both price and volume effects at the time of information releases.