Abstract Examines negotiated transfer-pricing outcomes between a buying and selling division by using a bilateral bargaining methodology. Motivation and hypotheses; Manipulation checks and subject cavariates; Implications for research.

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether futures market data can be used to understand the behavior of real interest rates. Several ways of examining the data indicate that futures market data are not particularly informative about real interest rates. Not only does this evidence cast some doubt on results in previous research that make use of futures market data to draw inferences about real interest rates, but it also indicates that future research on real interest rates may need to turn to a different line of attack.

This paper examines whether futures market data can be used to understand the behavior of real interest rates. Several ways of examining the data indicate that futures market data are not particularly informative about real interest rates. No only does this evidence cast some doubt on results in previous research that make use of futures market data to draw inferences about real interest rates, but it also indicates that future research on real interest rates may need to turn to a different line of attack.

By committing to terminate funding if a firm's performance is poor, investors can mitigate managerial incentive problems. These optimal financial constraints, however, encourage rivals to ensure that a firm's performance is poor; this raises the chance that the financial constraints become binding and induce exit. We analyze the optimal financial contract in light of this predatory threat. The optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring predation by relaxing financial constraints against the cost of exacerbating incentive problems.

Nagesh S. Revankar, Naoyuki Yoshino, An `Expanded Equation' Approach to Weak-Exogeneity Tests in Structural Systems and a Monetary Application, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 173-177

A variance components model explains wage dispersion with a specific version of generalized least squares. The estimation preserves individual data while examining the influence of union penetration on dispersion in both the union and nonunion sectors. Controlling for both individual and industry characteristics and for the endogeneity of wages, union penetration correlates strongly with reduced dispersion in the union sector but not in the nonunion sector. A decomposition reveals the relative importance of the influences of union penetration and of union membership. Copyright 1990 by MIT Press.