SEC, AAER, Auditing enforcement releases, Market reaction

This study investigates the structure/conduct/performance relationship in retail deposit markets. The study explicitly incorporates conduct as the link between structure and performance in local deposit markets. It attempts to determine whether banks typically behave competitively or strategically, and whether their conduct is influenced by market concentration. The empirical investigation is guided by an equilibrium model of a retail deposit market. The model is applied to regression equations for local (MSA) MMDA and three- and six-month CD rates. The empirical results indicate that strategic conduct is the norm in MMDA and in three- and six-month CD markets. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

As demonstrated by Boyce and Kalotay (1979) and Brick and Ravid (1985), the use of long-term debt may be preferred because of tax-related advantages. Brick and Ravid show that if there exists a tax advantage to debt and nonstochastic interest rates, long-term debt will increase the present value of the tax benefits of debt if the term structure of interest rates, adjusted for risk of default, is increasing. A decreasing term structure, on the other hand, calls for short-term debt. The present paper extends the tax-induced argument of Brick and Ravid to allow for the presence of stochastic interest rates. Once interest rates are uncertain, pricing even under risk neutrality becomes a complex issue. We analyze the debt maturity decision under two competing pricing equations: the return to maturity expectations hypothesis and the local expectations hypothesis. (This terminology is used in Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981) and Campbell (1986).) Under uncertainty, a debt capacity factor will create an additional incentive to issue long-term debt. Our other results may be interpreted to indicate that if the term premium, the difference between the implied forward interest rate and the future expected spot rate, is positive (sufficiently negative) then long-term (short-term) debt maturity strategy is optimal.

We analyze a model in which firms signal their quality by using financial policies to commit to cash outflows. Two financial policies may be used: dividend and debt-service obligations. We find sufficient conditions for the informational equilibrium to entail concommitant use of both dividends and leverage in the cost-minimizing combination of the commitment signal. In this equilibrium, better firms pay higher dividends and are more highly levered than lower quality firms.

ABSTRACT Transactions prices of S&P 500 futures options over 1985‐1987 are examined for evidence of expectations prior to October 1987 of an impending stock market crash. First, it is shown that out‐of‐the‐money puts became unusually expensive during the year preceding the crash. Second, a model is derived for pricing American options on jump‐diffusion processes with systematic jump risk. The jump‐diffusion parameters implicit in options prices indicate that a crash was expected and that implicit distributions were negatively skewed during October 1986 to August 1987. Both approaches indicate no strong crash fears during the 2 months immediately preceding the crash.

Compensation planning within firms creates important corporate financial problems. Theoretical models and empirical tests of hypotheses in this area should play a much larger role than currently in the modern theory of corporate finance. Employees fund a large proportion of their firm's activities through deferred compensation arrangements tied to the performance of their company. These arrangements are generally put in place for incentive reasons, to align the interests of employees more closely with those of shareholders. Moreover, tax rules encourage or discourage these arrangements at various times. Currently, both tax rules and incentive considerations encourage stock buyback programs to fund deferred compensation arrangements. Prior to the 1980s, however, tax rules favored funding in other than company stock, implying that employees likely held company stock for incentive and not for tax reasons during this time period.

This comment describes the U.S. federal income tax treatment of corporate bonds that are indexed for inflation and argues that these bonds do not have a tax-induced clientele in the United States.