This paper examines strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with publicly observable contracts. We analyse both the cases of unilateral and bilateral intervention. We find that the requirement of incentive compatibility undermines the strategic precommitment effect when public funds are costly, even with no restrictions on the form of the policies. Second, when firms sell substitute goods, the introduction of a rival interventionist government may reduce the cost of informational rents to each government. Third, it turns out that under bilateral intervention there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria with levels of output and corresponding levels of welfare in the exporting countries which can be ranked. The requirement of ex post participation constraints for the firm limits the set of subsidies which can be offered to the firm. In particular, under bilateral intervention, the equilibrium levels of output which are implemented under adverse selection are below their values under ex ante uncertainty, i.e., below the equilibrium levels of output which are achieved when firms sign their contracts before the realization of their costs.

This paper develops and estimates a cost model for U.S. hospitals, analyzing the cost of excess bed capacity. A new estimate is worth making for at least two reasons. Recent changes in the economic environment of hospitals have caused their utilization rates to fall sharply, making previous estimates inaccurate. Second, we employ econometric techniques not previously applied to this problem, with estimation based on all short-term community hospitals from 1979-89. Our results, based on conservative estimates of the average optimal occupancy rate, indicate an annual cost of excess bed capacity of $17.2 billion in 1989, $24.1 billion in 1991, and over $25 billion in 1993. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.

In this paper, we test the synergy and internalization hypotheses for international acquisitions using a sample of foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms during the period 1979–1990. The major findings include: First, shareholders of our paired sample of U.S. targets and foreign acquirers experienced significantly positive combined wealth gains, $68 million on average, indicating that cross-border takeovers are generally synergy-creating activities. Second, shareholders of the U.S. targets realized significant wealth gains, regardless of the nationality of acquirers. Third, the Japanese acquisitions in our sample generated the largest net wealth gains, $398 million on average, which was shared by both target shareholders (43%) and acquirer shareholders (57%). Fourth, foreign acquirers benefitted from the targets' R&D capabilities, supporting the ‘reverse-internalization’ hypothesis.

Recent evidence from aggregate models of automobile demand indicates that, when not corrected for quality differences, market price elasticity of demand is substantially biased downwards. This note presents new information on market price and income elasticities derived from a disaggregate demand model that controls for cost, household income, vehicle attributes and perceived quality, consumer search, and manufacturer. Based on an extensive household survey of new vehicle purchasers in 1989, market price and income elasticities are estimated to be -0.87 and 1.70, respectively. Moreover, excluding vehicle quality from a well-specified model is found to have little effect upon the estimated market elasticities. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.

The estimation of censored probit models can result in an estimated correlation between the disturbances approaching [plus]1.0 or -1.0 when most of the observations are selected into the sample and the outcomes are unequally distributed. Outcomes of 0 can induce an estimated correlation of -1.0, and outcomes of 1 can induce an estimated correlation of [plus]1.0. This paper analyzes the population problem, derives corresponding sample conditions, proposes a solution to the problem, and offers a computer program. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.

Most sports teams play as either the favorite or the underdog and either at home or away. The failure to recognize the symmetric and interdependent relations between these characteristics has led previous researchers to use potentially biased methods to test for rationality and efficiency in football betting markets and thus to reach inappropriate conclusions. We develop a more general specification, which also incorporates ‘pick-em’ games and games played on neutral sites, and find little or no evidence against market efficiency in the NFL and college betting markets for regular season games. We do, however, uncover evidence of biased betting lines for Superbowls.