We investigate the trade-off between the benefits from bank monitoring when a banker is represented on a firm's board and the costs from two sources: conflicts of interests between lenders and shareholders, and U.S. legal doctrines that generate lender liability for bankers on boards of firms in financial distress. Consistent with high costs of active involvement, bankers are on boards of large, stable firms with high proportions of collateralizable assets and low reliance on short-term financing. While permitting banks to own equity could mitigate conflicts, the protection of shareholder versus creditor rights could continue to reduce the role of U.S. banks in corporate governance.

This article presents a simple yet powerful new approach for approximating the value of American options by simulation. The key to this approach is the use of least squares to estimate the conditional expected payoff to the optionholder from continuation. This makes this approach readily applicable in path-dependent and multifactor situations where traditional finite difference techniques cannot be used. We illustrate this technique with several realistic examples including valuing an option when the underlying asset follows a jump-diffusion process and valuing an American swaption in a 20-factor string model of the term structure.

The contracting view of CEO pay assumes that pay is used by shareholders to solve an agency problem. Simple models of the contracting view predict that pay should not be tied to luck, where luck is defined as observable shocks to performance beyond the CEO's control. Using several measures of luck, we find that CEO pay in fact responds as much to a lucky dollar as to a general dollar. A skimming model, where the CEO has captured the pay-setting process, is consistent with this fact. Because some complications to the contracting view could also generate pay for luck, we test for skimming directly by examining the effect of governance. Consistent with skimming, we find that better governed firms pay their CEO less for luck.

This paper explores daily international portfolio flows into and out of 44 countries from 1994 through 1998. We find several facts concerning the behavior of flows and their relationship with equity returns. First, we detect regional flow factors that have increased in importance through time. Second, the flows appear to be stationary, but far more persistent than returns. Third, flows are strongly influenced by past returns, a finding consistent with positive feedback trading by international investors. Fourth, inflows have positive forecasting power for future equity returns, and this power is statistically significant in emerging markets. Fifth, the sensitivity of local stock prices to foreign inflows is positive and large. Sixth, prices seem consistent with flow persistence, in that transitory inflows impact future returns negatively.

Mergers can reduce costs and alter incentives about how to position products, so that theory alone cannot predict whether mergers will increase product variety. We document the effect of mergers on variety by exploiting the natural experiment provided by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. We find that consolidation reduced station entry and increased the number of formats available relative to the number of stations. We find some evidence that increased concentration increases variety absolutely. Based on the programming overlap of jointly owned stations, we can infer that the effects operate through product crowding that is consistent with spatial preemption.

It is widely thought that incomes risks can be shared by trading in financial assets. But financial assets typically carry some risk idiosyncratic to them, hence, disposing incomes risk using financial assets will involve buying into the inherent idiosyncratic risk. However, standard theory argues that diversification would reduce the inconvenience of idiosyncratic risk to arbitrarily low levels. This paper shows that this argument is not robust: ambiguity aversion can exacerbate the tension between the two kinds of risks to the point that classes of agents may not want to trade some financial assets. Thus, theoretically, the effect of ambiguity aversion on financial markets is to make the risk sharing opportunities offered by financial markets less complete than it would be otherwise.

In recent decades, asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries. In light of this experience, how, if at all, should central bankers respond to asset price volatility? We have addressed this issue in previous work (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). The context of our earlier study was the relatively new, but increasingly popular, monetary-policy framework known as inflation-targeting (see e.g., Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin, 1997). In an inflation-targeting framework, publicly announced medium-term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy, while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run. The inflation-targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices: Changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank’s forecast of inflation. To a first approximation, once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for, there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations. In use now for about a decade, inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice. However, so far this approach has not often been stress-tested by large swings in asset prices. Our earlier research employed simulations of a small, calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation-targeting policy (defined as one in which the central bank’s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation) might fare in the face of a boom-and-bust cycle in asset prices. We found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule (in our simulations, one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2.0) substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses, as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices. Intuitively, inflation-targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices, while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand. Conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation, we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central-bank policy to the level of asset prices. In our view, there are good reasons, outside of our formal model, to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices, including the fact that (as history has shown) the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable. Hence, we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices, except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast. In the spirit of recent work on robust control, the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst-case † Discussants: Robert Shiller, Yale University; Glenn Rudebusch, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University.

The two key questions which motivate our work are: do bubbles exist (in the sense that stock market prices do not always correspond to the present value of expected future profitability) and, if bubbles exist, do they have an effect on business fixed investment? The case of Japan is particularly interesting because of the dramatic movements in the Japanese stock market and the wide perception that these were associated with a bubble. We use a variety of techniques to analyze these questions. Fist, we examine financing and investment patterns to gauge firms' reactions to the 1980s stock market run-up. Second, we test subsets of the orthogonality conditions associated with the empirical first-order conditions for fixed investment. Third, we use a linear projection to decompose stock market prices into fundamental and bubble components, allowing us to carry out parametric estimates of the effect of the bubble component on fixed investment. The data strongly suggest that there was a bubble that had an economically important statistically significant effect on business fixed investment in Japan.;

Balanced growth models are commonly used in macroeconomics because they are consistent with the well-known Kaldor facts regarding economic growth. These models, however, are inconsistent with one of the most striking regularities of the growth process—the massive reallocation of labour from agriculture into manufacturing and services. This paper presents a simple model consistent with both the Kaldor facts and the dynamics of sectoral labour reallocation.

Who should enforce laws or contracts: judges or regulators? Many Coasians, though not Coase himself, advocate judicial enforcement. We show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice. We then compare the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market. In the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market.