We examine the structure of communications in accounting research by analyzing patterns of citations among authors who have published in five major journals between 1984 and 2008. Understanding communication structures is important because they shape academic knowledge creation, which prominent scholars have claimed has become narrowly focused and self-perpetuating in accounting due to a specific type of communication structure - 'tribalism.' We use a mathematical algorithm and other analyses to distinguish among five types of communication structures. We find that the field contains multiple clusters, with some clusters being centered on research topics alone, a finding consistent with a 'normal academic field.' Remaining clusters are more narrowly based – on combinations of topics, methods and theory bases – and all but one of them represent a “small world” structure because they are close together and exhibit frequent communication. Both normal academic fields and small worlds have been shown to contribute positively to innovation in research. The economics-based archival financial accounting cluster exhibits some properties of a tribal structure because, while researchers in other clusters communicate toward this cluster, the cluster sends most of its outbound communication to itself. A contribution of our study is that it shows that tribalism is not as rampant as previously suggested. Also, our findings suggest the field has become less tribal over time. Further, we identify 'hub' researchers who attract communications from multiple clusters and whose articles build on, and cite, work from multiple clusters. These individuals are instrumental in moving fields away from tribalism. Finally, we discuss possible determinants and consequences of the existing communication structure.

We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.

[Lifetime incomes of private equity general partners (GPs) are affected by their current funds' performance not only directly, through carried interest profit-sharing provisions, but also indirectly by the effect of the current fund's performance on GPs' abilities to raise capital for future funds. In the context of a rational learning model, which we show better matches the empirical relations between future fund-raising and current performance than behavioral alternatives, we estimate that indirect pay for performance from future fund-raising is of the same order of magnitude as direct pay for performance from carried interest. Consistent with the learning framework, indirect pay for performance is stronger when managerial abilities are more scalable and weaker when current performance is less informative about ability. Specifically, it is stronger for buyout funds than for venture capital funds, and declines in the sequence of a partnership's funds. Total pay for performance in private equity is both considerably larger and much more heterogeneous than implied by the carried interest alone. Our framework can be adapted to estimate indirect pay for performance in other asset management settings.]

We propose a new inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator for moment condition models with missing data. Our estimator is easy to implement and compares favourably with existing IPW estimators, including augmented IPW estimators, in terms of efficiency, robustness, and higher-order bias. We illustrate our method with a study of the relationship between early Black–White differences in cognitive achievement and subsequent differences in adult earnings. In our data set, the early childhood achievement measure, the main regressor of interest, is missing for many units.

We investigate the relationships between the severity of operational loss events reported in the banking sector and various regulatory, legal, geographical, and economic indicators. Based on a data sample of over 57,000 losses incurred in more than 130 countries reported by the Operational Riskdata eXchange (ORX) consortium, we identify the most relevant exposure indicators for losses in four Basel II event categories: Internal Fraud; External Fraud; Employment Practices and Workplace Safety; and Clients, Products and Business Practices. We find evidence of significant correlations between Internal Fraud and constraints on executive power and the prevalence of insider trading. Clients, Products and Business Practices losses are significantly related to securities and shareholder protection laws, restrictions on banking activity, supervisory power, and the prevalence of insider trading. Other event types are sensitive to per-capita GDP and a governance index.

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.

Using a very large sample of matched author-referee pairs, we examine how referees' and authors' genders affect the referees' recommendations. Relying on changing author-referee matches, we find no evidence of gender differences among referees in charitableness, nor is there any effect of the interaction between the referees' and authors' genders. With substantial laboratory research showing gender differences in fairness, the results suggest that outside the laboratory, an ethos of objectivity can overcome possible tendencies toward same-group favoritism or opposite-group discrimination.

The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms' total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative.

We investigate the relation between firms' weighted average cost of capital and internal financial resources, using mandatory pension contributions as a proxy for internal financial resources. Rauh (2006) documents a negative association between mandatory pension contributions and capital expenditures. We find that an increase in mandatory pension contributions increases the cost of capital, but only for firms facing greater external financing constraints. Our results suggest that firms' cost of capital is an intervening variable that can explain Rauh's finding that mandatory pension contributions (i.e., internal financing constraints) result in foregone investment. Overall, we provide evidence consistent with recent studies (Rauh 2006; Almeida and Campello 2007) that conclude that financial market frictions affect real economic activity and, in particular, corporate investment. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.